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On the Legibility 
of Culture.
What we call “the real” is also the result 
of a protocol of reading. Such a reading 
is unavoidably historical and contingent, 
as a product of a specific temporary 
sense. It also stands within a complex 
correlation of marked and unmarked 
spaces, therefore in a spatial sense too. 
But this latter framework also carries the 
evidence of time. Such “marks”, taken 
as individual projections or choices, are 
not only constantly changing, according 
for instance to the daylight (or nocturnal 
illumination, or twilight palettes), to the 
instant temper or mood, to the physical 
conditions and the cultural antecedents of 
the perceiving and exposing subject – to 
sum up, according to a whole package 
of conditions and circumstances. If we 
put together the myriads of individuals 
on the global surface, we constantly have 
to redraw the lines of intersection and 
re-read the mappings of an interactive 
geography made of partly individual 
options, partly mimetic movements. 
Like ruins, views are constantly being 
destroyed and rebuilt; like lines, they are 
constantly being erased and rewritten. 
But this never happens completely 
anew. Culture work may also be seen as 
a patient attempt to read palimpsests 
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Introduction:  
Rewriting Culture between the Lines
Making the world more legible by explaining it – has this not always 
been the dream of science? Works of art occasionally achieve the same aim, 
opening up new spaces of legibility between the observer’s position and the 
observed objects. However, art mostly seeks to attain precisely the contrary, 
suggesting further questions after having contributed to following its own 
particular quests, its own lines of searching.
Art may blur horizons – and this often happens just when it seems to 
make them clearer – just as it may also displace them: by focusing on its 
object in a close-up, art stirs and rebuilds whole systems and, therefore, re-
defines contexts and perspectives. Moreover, some works of art that touch 
us are particularly able to open all our senses as well as recall the memories 
of our body.
We might see culture theories as being positioned in a middle-field be-
tween science and art, reaching out towards both and choosing their re-
search objects within significant spaces in the so-called living realm, where 
human deeds may be testified to and human configurations may be inter-
preted. Such spaces are generously wide but not always easy to precisely 
grasp. Furthermore, setting limits to the task of contextualizing an object 
proves rather impossible and accordingly impossible to stick to any single 
theory unless one actively decides to do so out of some act of willingness. 
Theorizing and analyzing belong together in a kind of dialectic teamwork 
which also decides about the choice of the moment needed for research clo-
sure out of the mere pragmatic reason of getting work done.
As well as always finding ourselves among marked and unmarked spaces, 
we are bound to combine those theoretical approaches we may find more 
suitable as regards specific objects of analysis. Marked spaces are relevant 
not only for a culture, for a group, for a nation, but also for ourselves in a 
strictly personal way. In spite of not always being consciously assumed, they 
are vital to helping configure collective and personal identities.
A space of mind, of memory unavoidably also becomes a space of af-
fection, irrespective of whether positive, negative or ambiguous. In such a 
disposal, and by framing timely traces, spaces become places in processes 
creating a complex mosaic of significations, which is the proper working 
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field of a culture analyst. In other words, a culture analyst perceives in 
each object and situation a complex field, full of attractors and meaning 
knots. It remains his/her task to establish the suitable frames and reading 
protocols.
A theoretical view may also be perceived as a kind of marked space. 
Therefore, the openness of culture theory, alongside its changing position 
in the palette of possibilities, may find its own closure – together with its 
own disclosure – within the relationship with the object of analysis. The 
attempt to make the world (or at least our research objects) more legible 
represents a dynamic issue, an attempt to find a way to overcome a huge 
number of barriers we are otherwise unable to surmount, to cross or to 
decipher even should we try to overfly them and to integrate them from a 
panoramic perspective.
Between the (at least apparent) regularity of scientific laws and the laby-
rinthine character of artistic configurations, the lines of a theoretical cul-
tural work cannot but move slowly forward as far as they remain hostage 
to the tensions and contradictions generated by all kinds of relationships. 
Such tensions and contradictions might also be a warning to prevent cul-
tural mappings from becoming dogmatically rigid out of a (vain) search for 
timeless validity for instance.
The quest for legibility might therefore actually be, as we are constantly 
experiencing, a task of Sisyphus, most of all when insisting on the pursuit 
of a functional scheme instead of playing the game provided by perspec-
tive views and hypothetic challenges. This requires hermeneutic flexibility. 
Goethe could still aphoristically say that one person should quietly venerate 
the issues that cannot be immediately understood (Goethe, 1982: 12, 467). 
Alternatively, as his contemporary fellow-writer Schiller had already seen 
some years before in his third medicine dissertation: we put aside a book 
that may seem illegible to us at one precise moment, in order to rediscover 
it some decades later when able to understand it better (cf. SW V, 324). 
However, a further question arises here: is a wider horizon, given by life ex-
perience, a sure guide for a better reading, or does it just provide a possibility 
of getting more proper insights, cautioned by timely distance?
Schiller mentioned a book, but we might also say image, assertion, as 
well as text or sentence in any book – or even in any e-book. The relation-
ship between the observer (together with the conditions of his or her mis/
understanding) and the object of analysis remains as a condition of possibil-
ity for the building of a non-dogmatic culture theory.
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And here we stand alone, at least for a first moment while facing such a 
task anew, but not on totally unknown ground. Such a ground may be called 
“the real”.
Nevertheless, what we call “the real” also proves the result of a protocol 
of reading. Such a reading is unavoidably historical and contingent as a 
product of a specific temporary sense. This also incorporates a complex cor-
relation of marked and unmarked spaces and therefore additionally in a spa-
tial sense. But this last facet also carries the evidence of time. Such “marks”, 
taken as individual projections or choices, are not only constantly changing, 
for instance, according to the daylight (or nocturnal illumination or twilight 
palettes), to the instant temper or mood, to the physical conditions and the 
cultural antecedents of the perceiving and exposing subject – to sum up, ac-
cording to a whole package of conditions and circumstances. Should we put 
together the myriads of individuals on the global surface, we constantly have 
to redraw the lines of intersection and re-read the mappings of an interactive 
geography made up of partly individual options, partly mimetic movements. 
Like ruins, views are constantly destroyed and rebuilt; like lines, they are 
constantly erased and rewritten. However, this never happens completely 
anew. Culture work may also be seen as a patient attempt to read palimpsests 
– which are, as we well known, marked spaces par excellence.
“Objectivity” is therefore obtained by closeness to the object(s) that 
corresponds rather to a sculpted reconfiguration than to any plain “thick 
description” (Clifford Geerz). Such “objectivity” is the product of multiple 
intersections, which are also interwoven with forms of materialized subjec-
tivity. We do not need to ascribe worldly reality to a “fetish character” – in 
analogy with the Marxist analysis of commodities – in order to realize how 
such corresponds to a permanent configuration of materialized intentions, 
plans, perspectives, as well as emotions, passions, in a perpetual crossroad of 
insights, obsessions, Irrungen, Wirrungen (Theodor Fontane) – wandering 
perambulations not only in the open labyrinths of modernity but also in the 
representations produced by our own historical readings. We easily come to 
such insights by demanding and practicing finer, more differentiated forms 
of reading the endless fields, the multiple fabrics of the world. Enriched with 
information from all sources and channels, the reading-of-a-book metaphor 
still works as a package packed with plural significances.
Relying upon the insights of neurophysiologic research into the indis-
solubility of reason and feelings, coming together as emotional intelligence, 
we may regard both instances as a further step beyond the discussions often 
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 taking place precisely around the postulate of some opposition existing be-
tween them. In fact, the testimonies of such discussions throughout the cen-
turies – beginning with the platonic school and culminating in Horkheimer’s 
and Adorno’s Dialectics of Enlightenment – provide us with a considerable 
amount of marked spaces, examples of what we call here material ideas. Since 
emotions (and passions) are always as present and alive as flesh and blood 
in our complex psychosomatic system, they are not only interwoven with 
the representation of the alleged “tyrannical reason” that is supposed to re-
press them but they also contribute to configuring and intensifying reason 
based discourses. In this view, I would like to stress the hypothesis according 
to which the highest forms of the so-called “repression by reason” might 
by the same token be called the highest forms of “passion of reason”. In 
other words, we should finally ask whether reason has not hitherto been a 
rather more fragile part, grasped, manipulated and configured by emotions 
and passions. This assertion may of course seem disputable. However what 
does seem undeniable is the following: as a construct, reason is a culture 
product, natura naturata, while passions are endowed with energy sources, 
natura naturans.
This brings us to the title of this volume. As an expression in itself, “ma-
terial idea” has been here borrowed from a text written by Friedrich Schiller 
when a 19-year old medicine student. The description of the constituting 
processes of such ideas, although remaining within the philosophical-med-
ical discourses of the late Enlightenment that proposed the first psycho-
somatic, anthropological perspectives (Riedel, 1985: 61ff), may shed light 
upon the building processes of ideologies. According to the young Schiller, 
such ideas “stir the soul” by forcing themselves “on the understanding more 
potently in all associations” (SW V, 266). In a kind of zero degree, accord-
ing to Schiller, the “soul” or conscientiousness develops an attentiveness 
that points to balanced conditions in the possibility of developing free judg-
ments, free forms of willing and acting. The gap between such situations and 
the grasping of the “soul” or conscientiousness by materialized ideas such as 
obsessions was left unexplained by Schiller. Nevertheless, his hypothesis still 
opens a number of thrilling questions.
This text was presented to a jury at the Stuttgart Military Academy 
(Karlsschule) as a medical dissertation submitted to qualify as a physician. It 
was rejected on the grounds of being considered too speculative. In order to 
gain his medical degree, and following a more academic discourse, Schiller 
wrote two more dissertations, one in Latin about the differences between 
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two kinds of fever, the other in German about the correlations between the 
animal and spiritual aspects of human nature. This third essay develops fur-
ther pioneering insights about the psychosomatic correlations between body 
and soul and the display of such correlations. Ironically, Schiller quotes from 
his utmost secret dramatic project Die Räuber [The Robbers] – which some 
months later became a great success on the Mannheim stage – portrayed as 
coming from the feather of an English author, “Krake”, somehow inspired 
by Shakespeare (cf. SW V, 309). As far as we know, such boldness remained 
unnoticed by the Karlsschule jury members.
The expression “material idea” is here supposed to take on a broader 
meaning than Schiller intended. It reaches out to multiple senses in the 
context of the dialectics of being-in-the-world and the paradoxes of a cul-
ture conception that always keeps an eye on contrasts whilst trying to dis-
cern the varieties among them. Therefore, this draws attention to culture 
configurations as spaces marked by form creations, following action memo-
ries, as well as their in-between traces and configurations.
As far as we know, modernity has dislocated the charge of meanings from 
older symbols to newer signs. Without being erased, the former often be-
come easily overruled through their own inability or unavailability to move 
according to the proper speed of the communications. The dynamics of mo-
dernity seem to obliterate former significances, which had been settled by 
a patient work of meaning projections or, at the least, not caring primarily 
for their preservation or rescue. In the last four centuries, the Cartesian res 
extensa appears to have become full of mobile spaces, changing the scope for 
naming and identifying their marked and unmarked counterparts.
But is this really so – or should we not instead speak about forms of re-
configuration, re-absorption, re-creation? Should we not mistrust a “current 
rhetoric of impossibility and unrepresentability” as a “counter-productive 
over-dramatization” (Rorty, 2001: 36)? In other words, as Siegfried Kracauer 
already suspected in his “Film Theory”, we probably live not only among 
ruins of old believed contents with only a shadowy conscientiousness of 
things in their plenitude (cf. Kracauer, 1964: 379). The closeness to Wal-
ter Benjamin (our not really mysterious “WB”) can neither be denied nor 
concealed. However, this closeness might also mean a simple recognition 
of the power of literature and art as an indispensable complement to scien-
tific perspectives. Artistic codes and features provide synthetic insights that 
might fill the spaces within the grids of significance provided by scientific 
conceptions.
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The indispensable distinction between moments of thinking, willing and 
judging, not only on a timely basis but also as spatial instances, is also con-
nected with the relationship between them and the realms of the invisible 
and the visible. As a matter of fact, no cultural analysis can give up – or 
deny the existence of – the hidden enormity of the iceberg, implying the 
contextualizing task within the same analysis. Such a process of thinking si-
multaneously works as a kind of store for potential operations of willing and 
judging. The latter draw the premises for political action (in the sense of the 
Arendtian praxis and Habermasian communicative action) and take place, 
on the one hand, in the realm of appearances. On the other hand, prior to 
any decision that probably leads to action, on the basis of the perception 
of such appearances, we may set limits to our study of objects (cf. Arendt, 
1982: 3). Thus, we detach them so to say from their respective space-time 
contexts and yet without clipping them off entirely.
Such a procedure brings us back to those realms where abstract and con-
crete elements, invisible and proto-visible aspects, continuously tend to 
merge. These work as flexible and open structures, constantly bringing about 
sense proposals. These are inseparable from the indispensable (self-) critical 
observation. Without this perspective, any cognitive mapping of an object 
of analysis would risk simultaneously becoming a work of both Sisyphus and 
Penelope. The caducity of the work itself, also due to the tendency towards 
the crystallization of any mappings, even the most complex and thickest, 
such caducity becomes evident in the confrontation with the permanent 
mutation that the actual context imposes on an object. The visibility of 
contingency hereby shows a fluid polycontextuality in a process of mutation 
of unpredictable speed (or slowness). At this point, the frequent lamenta-
tion (not only among older people) about the changes brought about by new 
technologies, about the threat these may pose to the life of books, appears 
as an expression, eventually pathetic, of a withdrawal from the indispensible 
task of starting building steps, bridges, drawing the attention to unmarked, 
intermediary spaces. Such a start might prove a simple result from a slight 
movement, of the eye, of the head, of the body, of the spirit-and-soul: “In 
order to understand other realities, it is enough to have the possibility of 
observing things in another way” (Innerarity, 2010: 148).
Some of the most powerful barriers to cultural analysis regarding the 
complementary tendencies in the materialization of ideas and the idealiza-
tion of matter involve assertions with an absolute, conclusive character. For 
Schiller, these represented the most radical forms of “material ideas”. Our 
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deployment of that expression proves less radical and more concerned with 
the connections of invisible, protovisible and visible elements and aspects in 
a cultural context as these belong together within a whole system (as our 
analytical objects) and its environment. They provide a reliable ground for 
object contextualization.
Marked spaces also display, as already asserted, evident historical dimen-
sions. By reading how symbolic constitution may provide grids for reading 
History, we cannot be as sure as Marc Augé, in quoting Saussure, that the 
dominant aspects are forms of persistence of the ancient. While processual 
sedimentations take on an undeniable degree of stability, nevertheless, by 
setting and configuring marked spaces that have more chances to be uni-
versally recognized, it may happen that sheer violence, either as accelerated 
dynamics, or as an expression of power will, or as a response to injustice, 
repression or unfortunate living conditions, or even simply out of the blue 
of welfare boredom, leaves deep traces which need reading as modalities of 
memory, as well as what has been silenced, forgotten or distorted (cf. Augé, 
1994: 18ss).
The determinative choices of marked spaces, as well as the forms of indif-
ference towards unmarked spaces or spaces in-between, all of this is cultur-
ally conditioned and yet to different degrees and forms. We could enquire, 
almost in a tone of provocation, in just how many regions of our planet 
a person would easily agree with George Allan’s assertion, according to 
which “persons are condemned to be free, but they are also condemned to 
be organic bodies and denizens of a culture” (Allan, 2001: 115). Surely, one 
might begin by asking to which degree one is allowed to be free since the 
two other aspects possess a more evident status. Even if we further agree that 
“these neighboring systems are [...] so tightly intertwined that it is nearly im-
possible to distinguish among nature, nurture, and free choice in the consti-
tution of any actual person” (ib., 115f), the appearances of free choice seem 
clearer in our individual-based, Western guilt-cultures. However, perhaps 
this constitutes a false question when deciding to speak instead of “meaning-
ful systems” (ib., 263) that enable us to integrate all kinds of differences and 
contradictions as well as “alternatives that might have been and alternatives 
that yet might be” (ib.). Traditionalism may lurk in situations where indi-
viduals, feeling insecure, reach out a help searching hand to old paradigms 
and not only in shame-cultures.
Between an “assertoric gaze”, in its dogmatic narrowness, and an 
“aletheic gaze”, which “tends to see from a multiplicity of standpoints and 
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 perspectives, and is multiple, pluralistic, democratic” (Pallasmaa, 2005: 36), 
there can be no question about the choice. However, this represents only 
the beginning of a path that encounters a succession of crossroads with no 
formula prescribing any decision about which turn to take.
This volume’s texts are divided into two groups. The six articles in the 
first group (“On Marked Spaces and Spaces In-between”) contain specific 
themes interrelating with the main concern of thinking and presenting 
problems within their time and space contexts. They were originally confer-
ence papers and thus far unpublished and now completely rewritten in order 
to make the interconnections between marked, unmarked and intermediary 
spaces clearer.
However, we may also say that a culture analyst is entitled to follow fur-
ther purposes beyond the simple will to understand complexity. He or she 
may quest, for instance, for a spirit of peace that has to begin by analyzing 
practices of conflict in order to keep its presence alive, both as a historical 
experience and as a threat and opportunity to switch from or into violence. 
War and conflict must not only be regarded as necessary heterotopias of peace 
(cf. Foucault, 2001: 1571ff) but as its nourishing soil. We could call them, 
analogically, heterochronias of peace. Without the pulsing, close memory of 
violence (that may surely be recalled by consequent culture work), there 
is no possibility of setting and keeping solid ground for a lasting peace as 
experienced in the recent post-war decades in most European countries. We 
rapidly realize how important this issue becomes when recalling all the con-
ditions of possibility to produce and practice culture in its widest sense.
This is the main thematic thread extending through the short essays in 
the second part of this volume (“Searching for the Birth of Peace out of the 
Spirit of Conflict”). They are all dated, in order to mark the circumstances 
of their genesis, and contributions to discussions within the frame of the 
writers’ meetings organized yearly by the Writers for Peace Committee of 
PEN International and taking place at Bled, Slovenia. They have only been 
published as internal conference papers for meeting participants. They have 
also been completely rewritten for this volume.
Such discussions have never concealed the perplexity of the double na-
ture of PEN members around the world – as citizens and as creators – and 
the awareness of the fragile balance between deeds and works, between 
praxis and poiesis. The polemical character of most of these texts intercon-
nects with great concern over the frequent forms of misreading the nature 
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of violence. As I wrote elsewhere, we should never forget the assertion that 
the “wounds provoked by violence always leave scars which should be read 
within the great book of life and hence enable us in this way to think his-
torically about the effects of violence and to act in order to avoid injustice, 
cruelty and arbitrariness” (Salema, 2007: 75). Such might be suitable read-
ing protocols, as lessons taught by marked spaces – as time scars.
Nevertheless, the scope for such violently marked spaces to release new 
opportunities and create forms of peaceful interchange may be opened by 
cultural conscientiousness of what is at stake. The reading protocol of his-
torical memories, as well as the building of consensual practices anew, is a 
process that shall always remain a challenge not only for cultural analysts 
but most of all also for denizens in general. As George Allan puts it, “the 
rules of a game do not dictate the movements of the players” (Allan, 2001: 
265) – they set many unmarked spaces free, which wait to be marked for the 
best and for the worst.
Out of all cases and situations, however problematic they might appear, 
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I – Marked and Unmarked Spaces. 
Reading Culture Figurations
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The Oblique Web in the Narrative World
Let us imagine a story where the main character is someone about to 
light the fire in the hearth of the family’s country home. The person does 
not necessarily have to be a man or a woman but earns a living in one of the 
liberal professions. This would mean having completed higher education 
and being proficient in some specific sort of skill. The person in question 
needs not be a practicing writer but, instead, owns a narrative spirit capable 
of dismantling the world into meaningful segments. While fanning the fire 
and sorting out bits of damp wood, putting them to one side, A. – let us 
fall back on the alphabet here and call our protagonist by the first letter – 
mourns the fact that firewood is not what it used to be. As s/he does so, s/
he mulls over the reasons which led her/him to invite a few friends over for 
a get-together that also includes dinner and a long chat sitting before the 
leaping flames.
With these few pointers, it is now possible to spin a web stretching out-
wards from the here-and-now of local time and move off in virtually any 
far-off direction, going back into the past or ahead into the future, into uni-
versal time. Thus, by starting out as several bright dots, the network of A.’s 
friends gains in form and shape, becoming computerized images in living or 
lived-through memories. Put another way, they become computerized im-
ages in A.’s experience or story-making unraveling indirect information.
Both the acts of weaving a web and casting a net imply the need to sur-
vive – if their original meaning is taken into account. And should survival 
persist in being an emergency in vast areas of the world, in others it has 
become no less imperious. In the latter case, however, this imperiousness 
has been plucked from the biological world and transferred to an intellec-
tual, psychic plane where it becomes vital to discover oneself and find self-
affirmation, to intermesh one’s identity with one’s alter ego.
Let us say that A. has come face to face with a crucial moment in her/
his existence; s/he has reached a turning point where messages and other 
people’s opinions are necessary in order to see beyond her/his own forecasts 
and doubts. For example: whether or not to drop an interesting but exhaust-
ing profession; whether to leave behind the urban crisscross of timetables 
and roadways; whether to renounce the social whirl and the challenges of 
modernization. True to the end-of-century stereotype, A. is both single and 
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younger looking than what s/he really is; s/he is divorced with adult children 
and leads her/his own life – in other words, any decision-making need only 
affect her/himself.
Afterwards, the narrative may resort to flashbacks to recall other char-
acters. Some of them would shortly be keeping A. company before the 
dying embers while others will not be making their appearance because 
they have since passed away or merely exist in A.’s imagination or because 
they do not really get on with A.. The oblique web of the narrative plot 
may be stretched indefinitely to free whoever from their history or dreams, 
from their geography or intermediary reality. However, the fixture point 
to which the web attaches itself continues to remain the place, the body 
giving the narrative its shape, in this case, A. And it is A. who will be put-
ting off future challenges. Because these flights into the future may cause 
anguish, discomfort or suffocation; they are leaps into the unknown void 
or regressive descents into tightly-knit but all-too-familiar circles. For in-
stance, leaping into space may take the form of supporting humanitarian 
causes on other continents, travelling to uncertain parts where a new sense 
of local awareness emerges along with a new sense impatience and new 
intransigence; it may well lie in subjecting oneself to the inevitable mis-
understandings that fail to protect even those wishing to strip themselves 
of previously held privileges. For its part, plunging into the restricted cir-
cle may very well mean going back to the traditional humus of the family 
home, kept alive mostly by way of a photographic memory and, at that 
precise moment, focused upon the fireplace, on the womb-like fire. But 
then again, A. has no illusions about the narrowness of such walls or about 
the not-so-eternal cycle of life turning within them; a kind of life that risks 
gilding over the dark fluid of the city with its sharp-drawn breaths and 
the disenchanted trembling of its numbers and engines. A. has a critical, 
social awareness; s/he feels a certain amount of regret about her/his freely-
admitted selfishness, belonging as s/he does to a generation which, one fine 
day, held the dream of building a better world.
As from this point onwards, the web opens itself up to a horizon full of 
expectations but it will only discover its shape in the narrative’s plot when 
the gaps left by hurtling over several chasms, between eras, between cultures 
have been filled. From this stance – and, for the time being, only from this 
stance – dare I admit that in a Flaubertian manner of speaking, A. c’est moi 
owing to the attraction and rejection exercised upon me by the place I am in 
at present: the reign of mothers calling us only to reject us again, the child’s 
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rhyme of myth and kitsch to which we compulsively return. And our moth-
ers’ reign is writing. As much as this blesses us, this also tears us apart just as 
soon as we show we are ready to defend its existence, its persistence, with 
the tenacity of any of the great, obstinate heroes of Greek tragedy.
But is writing enough? In other words, what is lost should the alphabeti-
cal combinations eventually be defeated by imagistic and digital combina-
tions? Looking back over the tracks left by the history of writing, I do not 
merely see ideograms and pictograms crushed underfoot by an alphabetic 
logos throughout the centuries. I see this very logos binding human beings 
to the work bench; I see them bending double under artificial light, silenc-
ing their declamatory mouths, paralyzing both their performative pleasure 
and the controlled freedom of their limbs, cutting their breathing in legato 
wherein circulates their vital energy, and instead, replacing it with a state 
of tension in staccato fed on compulsive vices. Faced with the panorama of 
iconoclastic passions which writing has both encouraged and fallen victim 
to – and here, we recall the trials and purges of different climes – I cannot 
help but express serious doubts about writing being indispensable, doubts 
which are much more than a mere rhetorical artifice and much more than a 
chance artifact leading me to finally conclude that, in the end, writing and 
books are indispensable.
Let us look at what lies behind such doubts.
This love which (I believe) everyone here today has for reading and 
writing does not, in itself, mean any kind of proselytizing fundamental-
ism or any wish to live in a non-existent community composed of fever-
ishly busy readers and writers. Besides, I think that, in the end, there is 
not much difference in the circles of contaminated air lying between Don 
Quixote’s obsession for the alphabet and Sancho Panza’s common horse 
sense; their narrow horizons eventually meet. On the one hand, what I call 
the plus-value of reading and writing does not only belong to book-lovers, 
who should by rights be able to appreciate the whole process involved 
in book-making, including the sacrificing of trees. This plus-value makes 
part and parcel of the narrative spirit of which I spoke at the beginning 
and which, I believe, provides one of the best weapons to respond to the 
challenges of the 21st century. It is this spirit which, even if the body that 
houses it never writes a single line, still knows how to discern the mecha-
nisms of the narrative world, casting a range of virtualities before its eyes 
that extend from the nerve-wracking urban choreography to the aggres-
sive or affable palette of nature. Ranging from the familiar city quarter 
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where socializing renews contact to the fascinating human mosaic-work of 
languages and cultures we have not yet learnt about but should have the 
humility to decipher in adulthood. Because everything forms part of the 
great book of the world even though not always written down nor even 
read. Furthermore, at this stage, we note that the narrative spirit is also 
the perceptive body; it ceases to give pride of place to sight and, instead, 
becomes the touch of skin and metallic surfaces, the taste of acidic fruit 
and dry sweets, the smell of strong mingling emotions like heavy scent 
or stale ashes, the sound of breathing rising and falling and a pulse beat-
ing. In brief, it seeks to go beyond the microscopic dimensions that open 
themselves up to us like a series of screens, helped along to a great extent 
by new technology and globalization.
We therefore realize that we have to deal with the advances made by 
computer science within a rigorous dialectic of means and ends. Should this 
noble Western principle be linked to a no less noble principle, which is 
famous in my host-country’s culture, then it might be said that technology 
would seem a stranger bearing a warlike semblance. What is implied here, 
not so much any fierce combat nor even unconditional surrendering but, 
instead, a rather serious negotiation in which there is a meeting of bodies 
and minds.
On the other hand, it does not really help if we are to be surrounded 
by technological artificiality when having already discovered that, contrary 
to images and similar to books, they curtail our performative movements, 
which are really the only moments we have of animistic interaction and 
impossible to capture on film. All around us we note the rhythmic beating 
of expansion and counteraction expressed in the wish to sever the bonds 
of form and in the desperate flight for shelter in yet another kind of form 
that happens to be even more authoritarian and imperative. Because we 
pay dearly every time we cut ourselves off; human beings are not able to 
survive for very long in an anarchic fluid, unless anaesthetized by a state 
of continuous, frenetic, almost always violent activity. The Western world 
may yet pay dearly for the devastation caused by the cultural blindness that 
leads it to favor the youth-oriented dictates that hold increasing sway over 
the labor market, leisure time and models for attaining an idealized self and 
aesthetic life style. As to be expected, the problematic nature of such pat-
terns emerges precisely in those people wishing to conform to them with-
out, however, having the necessary physical and mental requirements. They 
therefore race off towards mirages, galloping ahead on their technological 
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prostheses. What provided the stuff for farce, superbly depicted in the liter-
ary drama and epics of other eras, has now tended to become an epidemic 
causing blindness because there is just too much to see.
Let us look at the present situation. It is not my intention to curse or 
praise a cultural pattern that may or may not be our own. Neither should 
we limit our recourse to technology to our particular era or to certain kinds 
of apparatus and materials. As ancestors of this self-same technology, do 
examples not lie in the manipulation of consciences by the mediaeval Jesuit 
Church and in the pleasurable, rational choreography enjoyed by Court so-
ciety and prevalent to a lesser degree among today’s monarchies? A pre-
dominantly animist technology in the former case and a predominantly 
 corporal technology in the latter. In every time, just as something has been 
programmed, organized into hierarchies and made functional, anarchy has 
also counteracted such programs, hierarchies and functions. Thus has the 
world progressed in a systolic and diasystolic fashion, irrespective of the 
quarrel going on about the calendar and exactly when the turn of the mil-
lennium occurs.
Freedom to create, therefore, holds an oblique relationship with hier-
archies and anarchies. It spins its web, setting off a chain of known and 
unknown sequences, feeding itself on the plasticity of a language open to 
other languages, where writing is only one of them. A fearful perspective? It 
need not be for those who have not made writing their livelihood but merely 
something to live for. In other words, it need not be feared by those who 
do not depend on publishers’ fees but live for the density and the harmony 
of the measured word that has been weighed, smelled, tasted and felt. This 
word is our tool and also our epidermis; it submerses us in contradictions and 
adversities, divorcing understanding from emotion only to find that after-
wards a way has been found to articulate one with the other.
Understanding involves being able to articulate even when such articu-
lations turn out torturous and complicated. I would recall two examples 
of such articulation at this point. The first relates to the Doge Palace in 
Venice, and I would advise anyone about to visit it to choose the following 
route. Sandwiched between floors open to the general public and hidden 
among halls showing the splendor of the time is a relatively modest floor 
housing what used to be the archives of the Venetian Republic. A guid-
ed tour of these «secret sojourns» results in a better understanding of the 
workings of the bureaucratic machine where data compiling avant la lettre 
took place behind the scenes. Most of the information stored here came 
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from anonymous denunciations made by fringe elements and respectable 
citizens who slipped their writings into the open mouth of a stone lion 
embossed upon a wall at the patio entrance. The lion is shaped like a sun, 
shining brightly and rationally. However, its mouth makes us wary for it 
outlines a dark jagged oval hole that is, at one and the same time, tiny and 
yet infinite. It is like the ring of Moebius, its tendrils creeping outwards 
to spy and wreak revenge, perhaps the undesirable but also the inevitable 
travelling companions of such information gathering. After having me-
andered through this maze and visited the Inquisition chamber, where a 
painting by Hieronymus Bosch casts a sinister light, as well as the torture 
chamber, we find ourselves once again in the open air of St. Mark’s square. 
It is then we notice the tiny round windows, situated halfway up, dotted 
along the corridors of these floors. We see them better because we now 
know more and we realize that our knowledge is merely a drop in a very 
deep ocean.
My second example focuses on both the advantages to be had from glo-
balization and the perplexity caused about everything brought to us by satel-
lite in the way of information and that consistently challenges our narrative 
spirit. We now witness the emergence of nationalities which, all said and 
done, have always been there in very concrete ways. We see demonstrations 
marching for civilizations that we failed at first to understand until starting 
to spin the oblique web that tragically cuts down on distances and makes 
us become increasingly more responsible for the rather hazy connections 
we afterwards discern. Placed within this dynamic of approach and with-
drawal (always in order to see better but also to use our other senses more 
judiciously), we are forced to question the correlation between Western per-
missiveness and the fundamentalist inhibition that straitjackets feminine 
activity and movement. Such an inhibition, as we know, goes to the extreme 
of turning women into mere reproductive shadows of themselves, obliging 
them to hide their bodies under heavy drapes. Be that as it may – the narra-
tive spirit asks a moment later – is this the only form of repression? Should 
we not take a step further beyond limiting anthropocentrism? Should we not 
only busy ourselves demanding rights but, more importantly, give shape to 
animal, vegetable and mineral places, endow them with weight and sound, 
smell and touch? In a final analysis, do we not have everything to learn 
from these cosmovisions teaching us precisely this and reaching beyond the 
poorly contrived audio-visual illusions created by television channels and 
Internet webs?
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What is at stake – so my character A. finally decides – is living and sacri-
ficing more tree trunks so as to heat up the room and looking at the cobwebs 
patiently spun over the weeks s/he was away from the house that keeps alive 
the memory of a microcosm inhabited by parents and grandparents. About 
those threads stretching into the future? A. knows nothing about them yet.
The story may well begin here.
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Dr. Schiller and Mr. Mankind –  
Anthropological Analysis, Diagnosis and Therapy  
in the Late Enlightenment
“We should reject every answer to a question that has not yet been for-
mulated” (P III, 40), Friedrich Schiller asserted in an informal conversation 
with his family in 1801 when the subject was raised about giving a religious 
education to a very young child. Preceding what Franklin D. Roosevelt was 
to say much later, Schiller continued by stating that nothing makes human 
kind more miserable than fear and in this respect, people had a lot to learn 
from animals and their absolute present. Just take the ox, for example: it 
only becomes afraid when the butcher’s axe swings down upon it. He ended 
by praising the role of “enlightened understanding” striving to overcome 
misfortune without fearing it.
His words, uttered in a carefully chosen chatty voice because he was 
speaking to one of his wife’s relations, once again reveals what has become 
a dominant note in research in the last few years: the “idealist”, Schiller, 
who not only knew about the physical reality of the human being but, more 
importantly, about what I would call the reality of human ideality. It remains 
true that in other personal testimonies, mainly in the portrait he paints of 
himself in a letter to Goethe, written on 23.8.1794 (BW 1, 33 onwards), it 
was the author himself who helped construct the idealist cliché surrounding 
his image, which has lasted through to our own times (cf. Berghahn 1986).
However, before we run the risk of getting ensnared in the various argu-
ments raised in studies about the author, we would do well not to forget 
Schiller’s essay on ingenuous and sentimental poetry, where he deconstruct-
ed the caricatured extremes of realism and idealism in a most remarkable 
way. When writing about idealism in 1795, he differentiated between the 
true from the false, saying: “The true idealist only discards nature and expe-
rience because he has failed to find in it what is unchanging and uncondi-
tionally necessary and which nature wants him to seek; the fantasist discards 
nature merely by chance, so that he is able to pursue the desires and whims 
of his imagination that more freely” (SW V, 780).
This sort of objectively removed criticism is typical of writers living dur-
ing the later Enlightenment, confronted as they were by the experience of 
the French Revolution and bearing the scars left on human kind by the 
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 dizzying spiral of ideological experiments and physical deprivation. All 
Schiller’s work reflects this complicated interweaving and mirrors “the con-
cerns of a pedagogue, the apprehensions of an anthropologist, the impres-
sions of a psychologist, the commentaries of a playwright, the marks of a 
stage-director, the skepticism of a historian, the despondency of a demiurge, 
the enthusiasm of a spectator – of the theatre, of the world” (Cadete apud 
Schiller, 1997: 7).
Last but not least, I should add that all Schiller’s work, whether his plays 
or his historical writing as well as in his attempt to work out an aesthetic 
theory, reveals a clinical eye sharpened by the knowledge gained while sitting 
for his medical degree at the Stuttgart Military Academy between 1776 and 
1780. This perspective, which tended to act as a place of meeting for all the 
others mentioned above, focused on the Enlightenment’s main central at-
traction – in other words, the human being enquiring into his structure, his 
potentialities and his boundaries.
Let us look at the way in which the steps involving: 1. Analysis, 2. Diag-
nosis, and 3. Therapy, fit into this clinical perspective.
1. Schiller’s analytical method, revealed throughout his entire work 
when , in the Fourth Letter on aesthetic education, calling for “a complete 
anthropological assessment” (SW V, 577), was consolidated on the basis of a 
peculiar combination made up of Cartesian theories about influx, Leibnitz’s 
psychology of the faculties, French materialism and various other lines of 
thought typical of his age, although more particularly the “doctor-philoso-
pher” current (cf. Dewhurst, Reeves, 1978 and Riedel, 1985), that came un-
der the heading of popular philosophy. In his first dissertation presented to 
a jury from his medical school, Schiller raised these three perspectives from 
a critical angle. He tried to step beyond them by taking up the line which 
was much in discussion during his day and considered to lie at the crux of 
the matter: the influence the body and the spirit mutually exert upon each 
other. Schiller’s speculations led him to defend the existence of a “transmu-
tative force” allegedly demonstrated by experience and, owing to this, made 
irrefutable as theory1
Although he had left unchanged and even reaffirmed the conceptual 
premises of the age, namely the marked distinction between matter and spir-
it, the immortality of the soul, divine perfection and the moral perfectibility 
of the human being, Schiller’s first dissertation on medicine was rejected by 
1 Cf. Philosophie der Physiologie [Philosophy of Physiology](1779), SW V, 254.
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the examining jury and he was thus obliged to write another two disserta-
tions in the months that followed. One of them dealt with a medical issue 
(describing two different kinds of fever), while the other opened up a broad-
er range of study about the correlation between the human being’s physical 
nature and his spiritual nature and Universal History. In this second text, 
the author openly recognizes the influence exerted on him by Adam Fergu-
son’s An Essay on the History of Civil Society (1767). This had been translated 
into German by the popular philosopher, Christian Garve, and published 
in Leipzig the year following its first edition while bearing no mention of 
the translator’s name. Apart from relying on this publication to give the 
object of his study wider scope in space and time, projecting it backwards in 
time to other civilizations, Schiller also imbued it with personal concerns 
of an experiential, dramaturgical nature. Such preoccupations were to take 
on particular interest when consolidating his methodology as I shall briefly 
refer to next.
His concern with the experiential was aroused when following up on a 
case study on hypochondria. It involved a fellow doctor, whom Schiller was 
attending while writing his second and third medical dissertations. On a par 
with noting in his definition of Febris Putridarum, that the etiological factors 
consisted not only of physical symptoms such as miasmas and wounds but 
also psychic symptoms such as indignation, anger, weariness, yearning and 
melancholy, the writer excitedly noted in the same text, that the fever also 
had a healthy aspect to it (excretory, purifying, cathartic). He pointed out 
the etymology of the word, februare, and recalled how this meant a chance 
to ritually expel ancestral ghosts2. At the same time, Schiller observed his 
colleague’s behavior, believing his disease to indicate “a real case of hypo-
chondria, this unhappy state typical of a human being, in which he is the 
deplorable victim of the exact sympathy between the abdomen and the soul, 
a disease of the spirit of all those who think and feel deeply as well as of al-
most all the greatest wisemen”3. Schiller leaves the question of cause open 
and states that “the exact connection between the body and the soul makes 
it infinitely difficult to detect the primary source of evil”. This in turn, ren-
ders difficult deciding on the place to begin looking for its origin, whether 
in the body or in the soul4.
2 Cf. De descrimine febrium inflammatorium et putridarum (1780), NA 22, p. 48, and also 
Foucault 1983, p. 182.
3 Cf. SW V, p.286 onwards.
4 Ib. p. 269.
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The dramaturgical dimension emerged just as Schiller was rewriting his 
study about the correlation of man’s physical and spiritual natures and which 
later became his third dissertation. This also came simultaneous to the writ-
ing of his first play, Die Räuber (The Robbers). He was unable to resist writing 
into his academic thesis, a self-quotation under the pseudonym, Krake, sup-
posedly a Shakespearean scholar and whose work exemplified this correla-
tion. Accordingly, the evil Franz Moor, brother of the brigand, Karl Moor, 
intends to kill their father by causing him grief because the old man had 
transferred his favours to the prodigal son. We see how this gets exemplified 
in the harmony among strings when their vibrations are mutually transmit-
ted between the physical and the psychic domains in agreement with what 
Schiller calls the law of mixed natures according to which “the free activity 
of organs should also be linked to the free flow of sensations and ideas, (…) 
while the deterioration in their state should likewise have the same way of 
thinking and feeling”5.
Both examples show how difficult it was for Schiller, the analyst, to ab-
stain from interfering with either the intention to treat or the aim to manip-
ulate. When seen against the backdrop of the world in the 1700s, and given 
the Enlightenment’s agreement as to mankind’s active role, current research 
was founded on the way in which all knowledge was constituted and pro-
cessed as a moment triggering action in the world. In Schiller’s case, this 
view of things was magnified not only because of his medical-philosophical 
(anthropological) and historical knowledge acquired at the Academy, but 
also because of his gift for rhetoric and drama. They afforded him a highly 
complex view of things due to his heightened awareness of spatial and tem-
poral limitations. Schiller tapped into precisely these gifts when striving to 
articulate his analysis, diagnosis and therapy.
2. We know that in medical practice, treatment cannot take place with-
out the benefit of prior diagnosis and a diagnosis is only made when some 
sort of crisis (or disease) calls for it. Schiller’s medical expertise helped him 
consolidate a line of thought tending to favor the psychodynamic approach 
put forward by Georg Ernst Stahl without, however, dismissing La Mettrie’s 
materialism6. At this point, Schiller, the playwright, made use of his clinical 
look in order to bestow added relevance to the state of conflict, both latent 
and open, between the components of human nature.
5 Cf. Note 8 and also, Versuch über den Zusammenhang der tierischen natur des Menschen mit 
seiner geistigen [Essay on the correlation of the animal nature of the human being with his spiritual nature], 
SW V, 312.
6 Cf. Riedel 1985, p. 24s.
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It is here that we are able to catch a glimpse of the nucleus of human 
complexity, revealed through analysis, sharpened through diagnosis, and 
partially re-established in its precarious state of balance through therapy. 
However much the relationship between the body, spirit and soul may be 
in harmony, the diversity of their separate natures and aims helps to set 
up an osmotic tension and mainly in situations where there is opposition 
and conflict. Knowing about this tension enabled Schiller not only to chart 
diagnostic maps for private and universal human crises, but also to draw up 
treatment strategies that would very often take advantage of the ensuing 
driving-force energies for writing drama.
As a matter of fact, all the diagnoses he made about crises, whether on 
the individual plane, as in the case involving Grammont, or on a civili-
zational plane as written about in his Fifth Letter on aesthetic education, 
are built around the shattering of sensitive and intellectual possibilities as 
well as the analytical and dynamic capabilities that may well lead to their 
destruction.
In a letter to his friend Ferdinand Huber written on 5.10.1785, Schiller 
describes the enthusiasm which helps free the spirit from the body whereby 
the surrounding physical shell obeys the laws of gravity and falls away in an 
arch-like movement7. In the same year, Schiller pondered about the effects 
of this between-extremes laceration: “This free spirit, eager to rise, is woven 
into a rigid, immovable mechanism, a mortal body; it is mingled with its 
trivial needs and tied to its small destinies – this god has been exiled to a 
world of worms”8. Moreover, his colleague, Grammont, possessed of a “Pi-
etist delirium” and a metaphysical bitterness which lead him to believe that 
“all truths are suspicious”, is plunged into a state of “terrible melancholy”, 
on the same level as his “despair about his own strength” and going as far as 
a proto-nihilistic denial of existential finality9.
Such personal experience was to become the subject of discussion within 
the Sturm und Drang literary movement. It gave scope to many different 
kinds of energy, to undisguised erotic rule-breaking, genial dreams, patho-
logical symptoms of repression and civilizational ill-being10. Even Schiller 
himself failed to escape from the so-called Werther syndrome (and here we 
7 Jonas I, 270.
8 Fr. Schiller, Philosophische Briefe, SW V, 341.
9 Fr. Schiller, Berichte über die Krankheitsumstände des Eleven Grammont [Accounts of student 
Grammont’s disease conditions], SW V, 269.
10 Concerning this subject, cf. Mattenklott 1985.
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recall the widespread effects Goethe’s youthful novel had). He confesses 
as much in his letter of 20.1.1788 to Ferdinand Huber: “What is my state 
now or what has it been ever since you’ve known me? A fatal, never-ending 
chain of tension and weariness, opium-like lethargy and champagne-like 
light-headedness”11.
In this way, Schiller tries to understand the make-up of physical-spir-
itual pathogenicity – in this case hypochondriacal melancholy – within a 
framework of dynamic tension between health and sickness. He attempts to 
transform spatial discontinuity into a kind of process which allows one to 
glimpse at a possible course of treatment leading to cure: “Skepticism and 
free thought are the feverish paroxysms of the human spirit and, therefore, 
in the end they play a role in helping to regain health precisely because of 
the artificial shock they cause in well-organized souls”12.
Ten years after writing these lines, Schiller was already dubious about the 
capacity human civilization had to regenerate itself in less than one century, 
as he admitted in his Seventh Letter on aesthetic education13. The reasons 
are well-known, as is the picture Schiller so vividly painted in his Fifth Let-
ter showing the uncouthness of the uneducated and the degeneration of the 
privileged classes. This letter reflects upon the traumatic experience suffered 
by many intellectuals in the aftermath of the French Revolution. Never-
theless, many readers of these selfsame letters are unaware that the focal 
point of his analysis had already been mentioned by the author as a young 
man writing his first medical dissertation. Schiller had described the morbid 
symptoms of what he then called the “material idea” as the over-powering 
of the physical state by intellectual or emotional obsessions: “[the material 
idea] will impose itself on all associations, although to a greater degree on 
one’s understanding, acting decisively over it in an even more powerful way 
(…). There might be people, therefore, who end up by automatically doing 
something good or something bad”14.
In Schiller’s opinion, the same sort of contamination is present in uto-
pian thought and it came in for some severe criticism in his Twenty-fourth 
Letter on aesthetic education. In this letter, he pointed out the features 
common to all “systems of happiness” whether relating with political or reli-
gious matters. Furthermore, he showed how in all of them and while in the 
11 Jonas II, p. 9s.
12 Cf. note 15, SW 5, p. 337. 
13 Cf. SW V, 590. 
14 Cf. note 8, SW V, 266.
Miolo_material idea.indd   31 5/20/14   10:55 AM
32   |   Teresa R. Cadete
midst of their animality, an individual or a group may be caught unawares 
by a push forward towards the absolute, helped along by imagination: “… 
and once thrust into this dull state, all man’s efforts will only be directed at 
what is material and temporal (…), he sees himself merely motivated by the 
wish to extend his own individual scope towards infinity instead of becom-
ing abstracted from it; he aspires to reaching a state of inexhaustible matter 
instead of aspiring to acquire shape (…).The first fruits he harvests in the 
spiritual kingdom are (…) worry and fear; both bear the weight of reasoning 
and not of the senses although it is the kind of reasoning that is obscure in 
its aim and acts out its will directly on matter”15.
However, it is not only ideological voracity that concerns Schiller in his 
role as an analyst of civilization. He diagnoses its evils through disclosing 
the way human faculties have been dissociated, the way hostility wedges 
itself between intuition and speculation. In his Sixth Letter on aesthetic 
education, we face the dismaying effects of modern specialization. Needless 
to say, this ripping apart of the faculties bears witness to a failure to medi-
ate, similar to what happened in the case described above. Moreover, when 
hostility is transformed into aggressiveness, distance, which becomes void 
whenever there is any contamination, also tends to disappear. In this sense, 
the deployment of metaphorical wordplay about war-like nature never 
proves innocent. Thus, we see the imagination threatening “understanding’s 
laborious plantations” and the spirit of abstraction sucking up the energy 
emanating from the heart and from fantasy16.
3. Here, we note that the individual or civilizational treatment put for-
ward by Schiller has to go through setting up or re-establishing the circum-
stantial mediators between the two sets of faculties, respectively grouped ac-
cording to what the author, in his Twelfth Letter, calls the sensuous drive 
and the form-drive. We know that he elaborated upon his aesthetic theory 
within this context. He considered the mediating action of the play-drive, 
as well as the action exerted by the play-drive itself, to be of utmost impor-
tance, whether stemming from the effort of bringing the faculties together 
once again after having become disconnected from each other, or whether 
meaning an effort to slow down and realign the distance in cases where these 
drives had become contaminated17. What Schiller was trying to do here was 
reach beyond the rigid Platonic-Kantian duality by referring to the Fichtian 
15 Cf. note 20, SW V, 648.
16 Ib., p.528
17 Cf. Ib., p. 604 ff and 612.
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concept of correlation18thus allowing him to either set up a hiatus between 
the moments in conflict or fill this hiatus with mechanisms capable of ab-
sorbing the excess energy generated by the faculties in a state of tension.
Let us go back to the example and look at the treatment Grammont 
received. It not only revealed Schiller’s psychological sensitiveness but also 
knowledge on the most advanced scientific methods of his time. They were 
based on psychosomatic therapy that was intentionally void of the custom-
ary physical violence then accompanying the treatment of mental illnesses. 
His description of a course of therapy based on physical and spiritual move-
ment proves particularly interesting. The aim was to transfer or dissipate 
hypochondriacal obsessions by going horseback riding, bathing and reading. 
However, these positive aspects should not attempt to divert attention from 
Schiller’s own ambiguous position. He openly admitted to having used the 
patient’s language in order to gain his confidence and even of having played 
a double game with both the patient and his supervising tutors. Without dis-
guising a certain amount of pride in his own rhetorical talents and creative-
ness, Schiller owned up to the fact that his methods were not quite orthodox 
but he excused them by explaining to the Duke of Württemberg, to whom 
the reports were addressed, that his results had been successful: “...while we 
were speaking, we were unable to make him realize that we were follow-
ing orders; we were only allowed to act within the boundaries of friendship 
because one preferred backing down in the face of violence while another, 
a madman who imagined he had two heads, refused to be controlled by non-
dictatorial methods; eventually, a second artificial head had to be placed on 
him and then cut off”19. What we have here lies at the heart of his future 
theory about aesthetic appearance and about the measure of truth surviving 
in an illusion. At this stage, the difference between sanity and illness lies in 
the ability to discern their respective boundaries.
As a “practicing anthropologist”20, Schiller organized his way of behavior 
so as to become understandable within the light of theories put forward by 
Adam Ferguson and Christian Garve, both of whom were copiously referred 
to in his third medical dissertation. Such theories consisted of extending 
the path separating the perception of a need or lack and its subsequent fol-
low up with satisfactory measures. Lengthening the chain of action would 
normally invert means and aims, thus leaving enough space in which to 
18 Cf. Ib. p. 607.
19 Cf. note 16, SW V, p. 278 ff.
20 Cf. Schings, 1977, p.16.
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exercise reason and imagination and, more importantly, leading to dialogue 
between them.
When writing those lines describing how the fictitious head was cut off, 
Schiller could not have possibly guessed the tragic prophesy contained in 
them. Effectively speaking and as his personal correspondence testifies, his 
condemnation of events happening in the French Revolution made part 
and parcel of the trauma he suffered when Louis XVI was beheaded. In the 
Twenty-sixth Letter on aesthetic education, he underlined the need to sepa-
rate reality from appearance21.
We may thus come to the conclusion that by relying on the medical 
knowledge he had acquired as a young man, Schiller’s theoretical and dra-
matic work hinges on productively exploring the tension existing between 
idea and reality. By paraphrasing the central idea in Robert Louis Steven-
son’s well-known novel, Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, we could say that Dr. 
Schiller may be considered the inseparable double of Mr. Mankind where 
he is not always able to respect the Kantian premise that views mankind as 
an end in itself and not as a means. In other words, as the Fourth Letter on 
aesthetic education indicates, Schiller experiences difficulty in dealing with 
human matter in a practical way, or rather in a political and pedagogical 
way, and not in a poietic or creative way, manipulating it in the same fashion 
as a creative artist or craftsman. Why this is so gets explained in terms that 
have much to do with the hard-driving all-powerful and with the risks of 
laceration and contamination that we have already mentioned. Therefore, 
for Schiller, aesthetics is not so much an ideal to strive for as an intrinsic 
part of human nature. Taken in this light, human nature prescribes com-
pensatory therapy as well as prophylactic treatment. This is then rendered 
in a sublime and tragic register as an energetic stimulus to fragile wills or an 
inoculation of antibodies against weak character22, or in a beautiful register 
able to soothe tense, dogmatic human nature23.
Schiller also knows that the insolvable quality of human nature is not al-
ways receptive to treatment, whether or not displaying an aesthetic-drama-
turgical nature or whether applying to an individual or a civilizational plane. 
Grammont ended up committing suicide despite both the treatment doctors 
and colleagues prescribed for him and being placed under the watchful eye 
of the Duke of Württemberg. Criticism based on utopian contamination, 
21 Cf. note 20, SW V, p. 658.
22 Fr. Schiller, Über das Erhabene [About the Sublime], SW V, 805.
23 CF. Note 20, SW V, p. 620 ff.
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which is so relevant in our day and age, was unable to remove the immeas-
urable quality of the driving force present in the human species and repre-
sented in the twofold Mr. Hyde. Nevertheless, Schiller’s entire work shows 
us that even where compensatory and prophylactic measures fail, there are 
always withdrawal strategies we may follow in order to assess what has hap-
pened. There is always a platform for reflection on which the shipwrecked 
spectator simply cannot disguise the aesthetic sensitiveness that comes nat-
urally to us. No amount of guilt-culture can wipe out it out; rather only serv-
ing to strengthen its tragic tone.
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The Principle of Escher: 
Is There any Alternative to Candle Lights  
and Raw Vegetables?
The hands that draw themselves, believing themselves placed outside 
the drawing while actually intrinsically a part of the same drawing – which 
image could better signify the principle of reciprocity, the attitude of the ob-
server observing himself or herself while he or she observes the object. This 
person draws a representation of the object as something external, perhaps 
without suspecting how the object has become a part of him or her, as far as 
it means a self projection.
Drawing Hands by Mautitus Cornelius Escher (1898-1970) could there-
fore materialize, in a peculiar way, our involvement as living systems, feeling 
and thinking the environmental world around us. The drawing hands are 
the drawing or, in other words, a represented reality suggesting a number of 
questions to us in looking for a frame and for a narrative for that intimate 
relationship. The following questions might appear, at a first sight, as mere 
disconnected lines. They try to draw co-ordinates for an understanding both 
of our condition, projected in the world, and of the world condition, pro-
jected in us.
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Rethinking Adam’s way and the myth of Prometheus in the Western tradition: 
are these narratives an attempt to justify hubris and the predatory attitude of the 
human being towards nature?
•  Rethinking all forms of knowledge and science between adaptability and 
norm: can we see all sciences as human sciences in a final instance?
•  Questioning the forms of managing excesses and needs of matter, energy, 
information: which responses may art give us, as reflected nature, as an 
experimental and symbolic field?
•  Questioning the alternatives: tearing up, in selfish blindness, the network 
of connections in which we live a predator’s attitude, or restoring the same 
network (sustainability as a regulative principle). This issue points to the 
necessity of rethinking individual freedom and responsibility and promo-
ting critical thinking against arbitrariness and dogmatism.
•  Questioning the role of historical memories in the projection of the future, 
in the path that leads from a latent towards a displayed sense. Which pers-
pective follows those historical memories, the predator’s or the victim’s 
one? How far are we able to detect mutual implications?
A fable by the German writer Heinrich Böll (1917-1985), Anekdote 
zur Senkung der Arbeitsmoral [Anecdote to the Lowering of Productiv-
ity], written in 1963, suggests some links between the questions formulated 
above. This recounts a dialogue in a fishing port on the western European 
coast between a tourist with his omnipresent camera and a fisherman who 
takes a nap after returning from the sea. The first wakes up the second with 
questions in machine-gun rhythm, autistic and economicistic:
“Yes [if you went to the sea more often], in not later than a year, you would be able 
to buy a motor, in two years another boat, in three or four years you might get a 
little trawler, with two boats and the trawler you would be able to catch much more 
– someday you would have two trawlers, wouldn’t you...” – the enthusiasm over-
casts his voice for some moments, “you would build a little cold storage chamber, 
maybe a smokehouse, later on a factory for canned goods, fly your own helicopter, 
detect the shoals and give instructions to your trawlers by radio. You could buy sal-
mon fishing quotas, open a fish restaurant, export lobster directly to Paris, without 
intermediaries – and then...”, once more the enthusiasm overcasts the foreigner’s 
speech. Shaking his head, troubled to the very deepest of his heart, almost losing the 
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holiday pleasure, he looks at the quietly rising tide, where  uncaught fishes spring 
freely. “And then”, he says, with his speech again overcast by excitement anew.
The fisherman slaps his back, as if he were a child with something stuck in his 
throat. “And then what?” he asks lowly.
“Then”, says the foreigner with a moderate enthusiasm, “you could sit here quietly 
on the harbor, slumber in the sun and look out at the wonderful sea.”
“But that’s what I’m already doing”, says the fisherman, “I’m quietly sitting on the 
harbor slumbering and only disturbed by the click of your camera.”
The aforementioned western coast might be Portuguese even though the 
text information tells us that it could be anywhere in Normandy or Brittany; 
otherwise the reference to Paris would seem displaced. Read fifty years later, 
this fable may be faced not only as a chronicle of an announced globaliza-
tion but also as a sign of cores of resistance and persistence. Here, tradition 
speaks out at modernization, which not only threatens to make it disappear 
but also promises to keep it, even to recontextualize it under better condi-
tions, more efficiently and hygienically, with more rapidity and clear and 
systematic order.
We should not let ourselves get deceived by the irony. This fictive tes-
timony, yet still entirely plausible, of the tension brought about through 
moments of non-simultaneity within a simultaneous situation, draws our 
attention towards the global context. It now becomes our task to fill up the 
spaces in-between the gaps, to articulate aspects of different natures and 
levels, mainly economic-cultural, socio-historical, and psychological-ideo-
logical. They are different for the mental universes of the tourist – probably 
American, but equally probably Japanese – and of the fisherman.
When we understand ourselves as cultural ecosystems, individually or 
collectively, we cannot but develop a scientific attitude towards everything 
around us, as our environment within which we keep moving. This makes 
manifestations of alterity, contradictions, and paradoxes easy to accept. 
They are no longer expressions of any metaphysical entity, as perceived in 
former times, but systemic configurations with a proper functionality (even 
if we do not seize it). They may display themselves to our eyes as indifferent, 
cold, opaque or even violent.
We live in a specular epoch that endows new signification to such terms 
as reflection. Reflection is visible and invisible, which means that it is per-
manently unfolding itself across multiple senses, imagistic (visible) and 
conceptual (invisible). This may also be experienced across  multiple levels. 
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In our latitudes, we may observe a broad spectrum of cultural claims. They 
commonly swing between an inclination towards quantity, commonly sub-
sumed under the cliché of compulsive consumption, on the one hand, and 
the selective claim of quality, which may also be labeled as elitism, on the 
other hand. We never know how far the network effects of our worldly 
action reach: we may either experience the illusion of being autonomous 
while fulfilling a function, or it may happen that we take an autonomous 
– and most of the times gutty – decision under the tightest amount of 
conditions.
In the context of ecological balance, the problem may lie in not really 
knowing which one of both claims (quantity or quality) comes out to be 
statistically a more consequent predator of resources, more parasitic on the 
natural elements provided by the environment. The core of the problem lies 
in knowledge about the subjective perspective in which both claims take 
root as an expression of what H. Arendt called world alienation (Arendt, 
1958: 248ff). We are, in a somehow umbilical way, connected with our own 
world alienation, as self-predators, so that it becomes ever more difficult to 
notice just which resources we squander and spoil. Both options may there-
fore appear as two different phases in a symbolic ontogenesis in which the 
individual begins by devouring its object thoughtlessly, in a hypothetical 
childhood, and later on grows towards a symbolic adult age when he or she 
becomes able to select, to differentiate and to integrate.
However, even on this level, as we may easily discern, we have not yet left 
behind a fixation on a subjective self-reference. Such a self-reference may 
have become actually evident in our days, as an individual attitude even 
while continuing to decline any form of responsibility for the consequences 
of his or her actions, possibly as a previous, half-unconscious rejection of a 
verdict between catastrophic and ravaging. Nevertheless, as we may read in 
the fragmentary denouncement of the “dialectics of the Enlightenment” by 
Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno in 1947, the Manichaeism of the 
extremes, plenty and scarcity, corresponds to the reduction and simplifica-
tion of any reasoning intending to proceed with a line of division between 
subject and object:
If thought is to do more than merely confirm dominant regulations, it must appear 
more universal and authoritative than when it simply justifies something which al-
ready holds. You consider existing power to be unjust – Do you want power repla-
ced by chaos? You criticize the monotonous uniformity of life and progress – Shall 
we then light wax candles in the evening and allow our cities to be full of stinking 
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refuse as they were in the Middle Ages? You do not like the slaughter houses – Is 
society to live on raw vegetables from now on? However absurd it may seem, the 
affirmative answer to questions such like this fall on friendly ears.
Without presenting friendly ears to esoteric discourses, since they are 
also ideological and therefore closed, let us begin by asking what is supposed 
to be a pragmatically scientific attitude. This is expected to articulate action 
and reflection and enable us to observe ourselves while observing our study 
objects. By consequently practicing this second degree observation, we get 
growingly entitled to handle contradiction and paradox. For John Dewey 
(1859-1952), such an attitude means a quality displayed in any aspect of life 
and susceptible to characterization both in the negative and in the positive 
senses. The negative sense corresponds to a refusal of submission under the 
control of routine, of prejudice, of dogma, of unexamined tradition, of pure 
personal interest. The positive sense consists of a will to inquire, to exam-
ine, to discriminate, and to come to conclusions after an effort to gather the 
available evidences. Its experimental dimension comes out of a principle ac-
cording to which the ideas would be necessary as working hypotheses, which 
ought yet to be verified according to the consequences that they produce 
(cf. Dewey, 1988: 273).
Such an attitude is always trying to articulate structures with processes in 
order to render our eyes clear to the evolution of living elements and to our 
own evolution within them. On the one hand, we no more ask what we are 
observing and start questioning how we do it. On the other hand, we become 
more sensible towards all sorts of gaps, fractures, ruptures, which always ap-
pear in such simplifying paradigms as “modern society, individualist in one 
single token, liberal and expansionistic”. When contemplating the informa-
tion from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), they 
may cause the most disparate reactions. We might quit driving a car, eating 
meat or using traditional lamps as well as getting distressed about the virtual 
character of all its graphics and abstractions.
We know now how to distinguish between scientific spirit and scientific 
assertions. The first displays a process character; the second holds implica-
tions and ways of reading the observed facts. At the last, it proves practically 
impossible to distillate the observing agent from the observed object, which 
attributes all sciences, even the “hardest”, with at least some humanistic 
dimension. At the limit, every description represents a configuration to hu-
man eyes even when not directly interfering in the processes.
Miolo_material idea.indd   40 5/20/14   10:55 AM
Material Idea. On the Legibility of Culture   |   41
In 1795, Friedrich Schiller sustained that the poet is nature or otherwise 
he will be compelled to search for it, either as its witness or as its avenger 
(cf. Schiller, 2003: 59). In Schiller’s personal case, we might add to the poet, 
the playwright, the philosopher, the historian, the physician and the an-
thropologist he actually was. Following such a perspective, we encounter 
the human being as a living organization, nurtured in time and space by 
matter, energy, and information. Should we wish to search for nature (even 
knowing that we can never step out of it, because we breathe and eat, there-
fore through our metabolism), it becomes necessary to have withdrawn from 
nature in its virgin state, in time and space. This has happened throughout 
centuries by means of migration towards cities, by mechanisms of industrial-
ization and technique, by sheer reflection (during which metabolisms never 
stop). Though we are conceptually aware that such a withdrawal mainly 
means a re-contextualization of the organizational forms of matter, energy 
and information, the perception of loss is, in most cases, an acute feeling 
that may turn into the motor for developing ecological practices, based on 
the conscience of an ensemble of realities that we have lost or that we risk 
losing. In other words, whereas the primitive human being identified him-
self or herself with the environment through animism, he or she may now 
do so through scientific evidence.
The forms of energy we deal with are not converted into biomass but 
into symbolically codified information, in communicational circuits that 
promote a set of competences articulated with knowledge. According to the 
German sociologist Oskar Negt, such capacities could be summarized into 
six. The first would therefore be a capacity of learning out of experience that 
turns into forms of exemplarity and reservoirs of knowledge and faculty of 
judgment serving as the foundation for all other competences;
• Identitary competence – on personal, interactive, and reflexive levels;
•  Technological competence – as observation of the dialectics of means and 
ends;
•  Competence of managing justice and accuracy – ex negativo, that means, 
prioritizing concerns over avoiding injustice;
• Ecological competence – towards inner and outer nature;
• Historical competence – cultivating individual and collective memories;
• Aesthetic competence (cf. Negt, 2001: 526ff).
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Could the latter represent a synthesis, an articulation of all the other 
competences? Looking for an answer to such a question, we come back to 
art, similarly to the beginning of our reflections, and to Escher’s Relativity 
(1953). It seems an image of self-referentiality, of culture as an ensemble of 
freely combined symbols, which are also situatively independent. They are 
also grounded on a concrete situation that always makes discovery possible, 
even if such a discovery turns out to be a Dichtung that means the condensa-
tion of elements of a real that seems uncanny by reasons of focalization, of 
insufficient regulation of proximity and distance:
We could therefore ask: on which level are we situated? In which sense, 
ascendant or descendent, is our position on the steps? The vertigo caused by 
the circularity of the image allows us to configure possible forms of filling 
gaps – most of them imagined? – between claims that we may formulate, for 
instance in the name of a hypothetical principle of pleasure, and a principle 
of reality that could not but include a considerable number of perspectives, 
of decisions in order to give priority either to threatened, voiceless elements 
or to rupture with circles of vicious behaviours. By thus proceeding, we 
would display the knowledge of the systemic implications of each gesture as 
the product of a contingent decision, nevertheless making possible a sym-
bolic rebirth, in conscientiousness and intuition.
According to Edgar Morin, all forms of organization stem from interac-
tions between order and disorder. We may provide some examples of this:
•  Our knowledge of the universe is simultaneously grounded on familiarity 
and strangeness.
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•  Researching thinking moves in the interface between logics and non-lo-
gics, between the rational and the irrational.
•  What we perceive out of the world is not the object except us, but the 
object seen and observed, co-produced by us (cf. Morin, 1993: 85ff).
Coming back to the initial questions (have we ever at all left them?), the 
one question remains: how can we exercise the right of citizenship as sys-
tems within an environment that we are totally unable to leave (as happens 
in Escher’s images), an environment, to which we should lend a voice in the 
name of those who lack their own voice and use names we arbitrarily create. 
In other words: should an ethical approach to life forbid diversion, tasting 
food and drink, mobility? Or does it merely change our sense of priorities? 
Such a change could begin, in a certain way like a furtive step, with the 
contemplation of a work of art – or of a natural element.
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WB against the Grain or the Devils of History
In an interview three years before his death, the German playwright 
Heiner Müller sustained that angels seem to appear each time we stop see-
ing a chance to make hope come true (Müller, 1992: 350). If this author 
had a chance to talk with Hannah Arendt, maybe he would have heard an 
assertion similar to that we read in a letter written to Kurt Blumenfeld, from 
New York to Jerusalem on 17.2.1957: “We know that the Greeks took wrath 
as being a part of the pleasant sensations of the soul (and hope as being a 
plague upon mortals), and I had plenty of chances to observe upon myself 
how far they were right” (Arendt/Blumenfeld, 1995: 181).
Of lost opportunities, partly rescued under other skies, other times, other 
avatars, of all that and much more does the whole work of WB deal with 
even when seeming splintered, as if such would send an appeal to the reader 
to organize the splinters in a puzzle, whether or not filling empty spaces ac-
cording to his or her faculty of judgment – on a conceptual, ethical and aes-
thetic level. Organizing or reorganizing such empty spaces implies recalling, 
with H. Arendt’s lucidity, that “the process of corruption is at the same time 
a process of crystallization” (Arendt, 1991: 238), of the transmutation of 
forms. This implies never forgetting that the analytical eye claims not only 
the redistribution the zones of light and shadow but also mostly the trying to 
understand the links between both – and, in so doing, to revitalize numerous 
zones in-between, so to say of darkening, threatening to be forgotten, falling 
or being pushed off into sheer darkness.
One of the most exposed Benjaminian figures under the lit spire is the 
angel of History. This angel has been exhibited exhaustively on research 
altars built around this author and all too often recycled in order to serve 
the criticism directed towards the vortex of progress, the inhumanity of 
capitalistic and totalitarian systems, etcetera, etcetera. We might enquire 
whether such an angel has not been deployed as a tool within the growing 
army of WB researchers, somehow similar to the allegory of that theologi-
cal humpback dwarf who secretly guides the movements of the historical-
materialistic Turkish puppet as we may read about in his first Thesis on the 
Concept of History (GS I, 693). Nevertheless, we would still like to ask 
not really about what moves that angel but rather about what implicitly 
paralyzes it.
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Attempts to find an answer to such a question lead us to the well-known 
assertion by WB about the dimension of barbarism present in each docu-
ment of culture. According to such knowledge, it becomes necessary to 
brush History against the grain, as we may read in the seventh Thesis (GS 
I, 696f). Therefore, when beginning to illuminate the space in-between, the 
communicating vessels of mutual nurture between culture and barbarism, 
we enter into the first avatars of the demoniac figures which, with their 
dynamic, could contribute to immobilizing the angel.
Let us now explain this issue partially drawing upon Benjamin’s pursuit 
of intuitive threads whilst keeping to hand the unpacked library and other 
scaffoldings supporting his work, always subjacent and therefore only partly 
visible but no less present. When we discover the figures of private vices and 
public benefits that keep the world moving, we may begin by sharing the 
angel’s staring amazement. However, we also may remain puzzled, where not 
paralyzed, by philosophical astonishment perhaps deriving from its dimen-
sion of theoretic curiosity. The consciousness of an osmotic and systemic 
relationship between the visible and the invisible makes us question such 
terms. Is the invisible perhaps the not yet visible also searching for its verbal 
expression? Therefore, we must also question the criteria determining the 
distribution of light, twilight and shadow.
Recalling what Madame de Staël wrote about Goethe’s Faust, we are led 
to ask whether Mephisto represents the real hero in the play. And why does 
this happen? This happens not really because he is a villain par excellence 
(cf. Mme de Staël, s.d., Cap. XXIII, 323), but most of all because he is a 
worldly person, civilized, with a capacity to observe the moeurs, enlightened 
and conservative – a sort of gentleman. Under this light, another devil be-
gins taking shape, where we never would suspect his existence, at least at 
the outset: Faust himself. Still according to Mme de Staël, he concentrates 
“all the weakness of humanity”, which means “longing of knowledge and 
tiredness of work; need of success, plenty of pleasure”, thus becoming a “per-
fect model of an instable and mobile being”, with “feelings that are more 
ephemeral than the short life about which he complains” (ib., 324). Here, 
we encounter the picture of an average fellow whose will to power, which 
grows out of his weakness, as we all too well know, might lead to barbaric 
deeds. On Mephisto’s side, we would have – according to Nietzsche – the 
moral of the lords, on Faust’s side the moral of the slaves.
Now, we may grasp a picture of such a level of insecurity that is able to 
render Faust an object, exposable to all forms of seduction by cynical reason, 
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to all forms of manipulation by a demoniac intelligence and becoming an 
executor of its purposes. At this point, we should ask ourselves whether the 
impotence of the angel of history does not rather provide a kind of con-
sciousness about its own position in the middle of crossfire ongoing in games 
played by obscure interest. Catastrophes happen, as we always experience, as 
a result of both malign as well as naive intentions. All these intentions come 
together as heavy storm clouds and frame the individuals in circumstances 
and impasses in time and space. The similitude with the obscure mecha-
nisms leading to totalitarian systems thus begins to become clear and Ben-
jamin detected those mechanisms years before Hannah Arendt’s analysis.
The immobilization of the angel occurs therefore as if a kind of a light-
ening paralyzing an off camera image (cf. GS I, 1242). This implies a read-
ing protocol of significations, not – at least not at the first moment – of 
contemplation or empathy. If we look at such network implications, at the 
before and after, at the up and down, at the left and right, when trying to 
look between the lines of the obscure web that holds the angel’s movements 
paralyzed, we understand what freezes it to the observer’s position out of the 
sheer opportunity of making an astonished gaze. Under this point of view, 
the angel allegory may find a correspondence not only in Paul Klee’s paint-
ing but also in the image that became famous a few years before the elabora-
tion of the Theses on the concept of History. Living in Paris in the 1930s, 
Benjamin probably saw in the newspapers a photo of the Republican soldier 
shot in southern Spain at the very moment of his death:
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Federico Borrell García was a victim, not only of the cruelty of civil war 
but also of his own enthusiasm, his own imprudence, and – last but not least 
– of the demoniac look of Robert Capa’s lens. The photographer himself 
would succumb in the 1950s to the voracious effect of a shot, of his cam-
era and of a bullet, at a kairos of the highest risk. In this sense, demoniac 
means not really malicious but rather the provoking, triggering, displaying 
and concealing, in this case, of a tragic situation. It remains to clarify just 
whether this has been a death foretold.
Later on, there were doubts about the authenticity of the photo of Bor-
rell falling dead, questioning as to whether Capa would have asked the Re-
publican soldier to move out from the protection of shelter, out of the deep 
trench, and thus exposing himself to the fire of Franco’s soldiers and allow-
ing Capa to grasp a sensational shot. In an interview with the New York 
World-Telegram on 2.7.1939, Capa said that in the Spanish Civil War there 
was no need for any tricks or camera positions because the images were al-
ways there by themselves and the cameras undertook only the simple task of 
collecting them. Truth would be “the best image and the best propaganda” 
(apud Kershaw, 2004: 57).
“The true image of the past appears fugaciously [huscht vorbei]” (GS I, 
695). This expression in Thesis V is difficult, if not impossible, to translate. 
However even if not finding a suitable translation, we are able to maturate 
its meaning and find a late form (“Nachreife”) of such a maturation in the 
established words, as we may indeed read in WB’s reflections on the trans-
lator’s task. The French version, in which Benjamin deliberately and pro-
ductively betrayed himself by translating his own words, says that “l’image 
authentique du passé n’apparaît que dans un éclair” (GS I, 1261). In fact, 
the theses on the concept of history evoke figurative forms of secularized 
thought within an iconography of correspondences and an allegoric meth-
odology that does not intend to explain but rather to clarify on an analogical 
basis and therefore without any identity pretensions.
The necessity of grasping the “moment of the possible memory” (Vain-
stain, 1994: 234) requires an attention beyond measure, correspondingly 
hyperbolic, as well as a permanent availability for the intended tiger bond. 
Thus, shooting the camera in that exact second or analyzing the minimal 
instant, we may be able to discover the crystal of the total event, even if 
only later emerging (cf. GS V, 575). For moments, we could discern in Klee’s 
angel a fake lightness, a levitation touching the flight by facing all opportu-
nities, all lost instants in history. The Theses might therefore represent a last 
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attempt to balance heaviness and lightness, as well as avoiding the degrada-
tion of pure heroism into grotesque fundamentalism, of firm faith into mad-
ness. The Theses might also be meant to make an attempt to avoid a form 
of despair, similar to knocking one’s head against a wall after understand-
ing that the ways to any transcendental shelter have become impracticable 
and from that moment onwards losing any illusions after experiencing that 
physical blockade. The ways are open but not towards any divinity. This 
now instead splinters into infinitudes of devils, between the playful and the 
megalomaniac, between the mean and the excessive, between the cynical 
and the cruel.
The Theses could thus be read as a group portrait with a gentleman 
(WB), who remains in the shadow with his full body tiredness, with the 
voluntarism that made him carry that text by foot, over the long pathways 
of refugees fleeing through the Pyrenees in the Second World War:
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When all metaphysic illusions have long since disappeared, when at the 
latest, ever since the pact between Hitler and Stalin, the belief in a future 
of humanistic progress in history vanished, when all promises of individual 
happiness have volatilized, such hopelessness still becomes a body made out 
of “the air we breathed together with the persons with whom we might have 
talked or whom we even might have loved” (II Thesis, GS I, 693). Happi-
ness would have been the shade of the wrinkles of a beloved person much 
more than the luminous side of his or her beauty (cf. Einbahnstrasse, GS IV, 
92). What remains is a last effort to rescue the dignity of the memory of the 
nameless people.
Paradoxically, posterity may have taken up just such a task in an almost 
evident and, in any case, systematic way. The increasing interest in the his-
tory of daily life rescues historical registers of apparently insignificant as-
pects, which nevertheless turn out to be of crucial importance. This happens 
out of the desire to complete a spatial and temporal puzzle, to draw a thick 
description even when conscious that such proves an impossible mission. 
Rescuing the memory of the nameless does not mean, contrarily to what 
mass culture might suggest, reproducing photographic images of parvenus on 
social columns or giving voice to roughness and non-culture in talk shows 
but rather shedding a light upon places and times sustained by those who 
seem to have got lost in the labyrinth of history’s reading protocols. WB 
seems to exhort us to such engagement, which implies lucid and reflected 
gestures, articulating memory and oblivion, continuity and discontinuity, 
construction and destruction. Such lucidity counteracts a major tendency 
for making history and politics by repressing mortality, according to Heiner 
Müller, for whom the example of art encapsulated permanent communica-
tion with the dead. For this author, true culture corresponded precisely to 
the concretization of the possibility to concede a place to the dead (apud 
Perthes 1999, 446).
In a letter to Gretel Adorno, WB considers Thesis XVII to be of par-
ticular importance given it would open up recognition of the “hidden yet 
conclusive context (verborgenen aber schlüssigen Zusammenhang)” between 
such reflections and the rest of his works (Adorno/Benjamin, 2005: 410). 
Through a shock – as we read in that Thesis – crystallized in a monad, we 
might discern the opportunity of dynamiting out (herauszusprengen) the” ho-
mogeneous course of History” not only of “a certain epoch”, but an instant – 
a photographic snapshot (GS I, 703). Today, we know that such a desire for 
totality corresponds to a kind of residual hallucination, to a non resoluble 
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friction between the longing for happiness and the claim for dignity. How-
ever, we nevertheless cannot deny the exaltation even should its effects turn 
out lethal and caused by such a friction. When considering Capa’s snapshot 
as being his “lifework”, we grasp by intuition how photography, even if re-
producible and reproduced, at last rescues the aura that seemed to have been 
stolen from painting (according to the well-known analysis on works of art 
in the era of technical reproducibility, cf. GS I, 431).
The energy of this antagonistic, antithetic and demoniac principle seems 
to forsake the author himself in the forced nomadism of his last years and 
especially in the final months of his life. In a letter, written from Paris on 
11.1.1940 to his friend Gershom Scholem, who had emigrated to Pales-
tine, Benjamin denounces the diabolic mechanisms of an epoch that had 
bestowed the “desert landscape” of those days with “unequivocal [...] marks 
for such Bedouins like us” (Br, 846). And the rarefaction of the air, that air 
of conversation and sociability of which the second Thesis spoke, ceased 
shortly after being mere metaphor to become a factor threatening his very 
cardiac metabolism. In the last letter left by WB, written in French to Gretel 
Adorno from Lourdes on 19.7.1940, the author stresses the “action” short-
comings of his heart (Adorno, Benjamin, 2005: 414).
Forty years after the suicide of WB in Port Bou, Lisa Fittko, who served 
as his guide over the Pyrenees, recalls without a shadow of a doubt the facts, 
meanwhile known, about the route that required such a huge effort from 
Benjamin, as we may easily grasp from looking at the map above. “Could 
it be that I’m imagining all that?” she asks in the first lines of the chapter 
dedicated to WB in her personal memories on that route (cf. Fittko, 2004: 
139). Fittko compares Benjamin’s patience with the complaints of so many 
other refugees “on that route which was so hard to him” (ib., 184). From this 
perspective, the whole Benjamin system might be read as the fragmentation 
of a civilizing process, with its doubles of culture and barbarism, of angels 
and devils.
Fragmentation does not yet mean shipwreck. While Benjamin never got 
to know Lisbon port, the route of passage out for so many exiled authors, 
others have guaranteed a productive sequence for many of his concerns. I 
hereby mention only two examples from among the best known. On one 
hand, Dialektik der Aufklärung by Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Ador-
no, first published in 1947, in which the osmotic relationship between cul-
ture and barbarism unfolds brightly and bluntly. On the other hand, as Han-
nah Arendt intends, in Between Past and Future, first published in 1961, the 
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rescue of the lost treasures of humanistic culture, in its dialogic and critical 
dimension.
I close these considerations with an approach moving towards an epi-
logue. Whoever follows the coastline, parallel to Benjamin’s route through 
the Pyrenees, arrives in Port Bou and enters the bay by ship, then encoun-
tering on the left a strange iron protuberance jutting out of a hill over the 
village and the beach, not far from the graveyard where WB is believed 
buried:
An Iberian perspective might at first sight presume we face an unfinished 
and forsaken work of engineering. However, after having disembarked and 
walked around the village, we then head along the road towards the cem-
etery. There, we get not only a spectacular view out over the bay but also 
the perception of a memorial conceived by Dani Karavan in the 1990s. Such 
a memorial might be considered the “architecture of a caesura”, the “mark 
of a landscape” or the “topography of History” (Perthes, 1999: 2). Follow-
ing such topography may mean organizing a mental album of the flashes 
retained from Walter Benjamin, just as the steps of the stairs that end hover-
ing over the sea with a Plexiglas frontal section:
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We go down the steps with a feeling of “wrath without excitement”, 
which should be the art par excellence as H. Arendt wrote to Kurt Blumen-
feld (Arendt/Blumenfeld, 1995: 183). We would add: it would be the art of 
managing any cultural heritage, including that of our author. In our era, that 
of the most vertiginous, self-devouring technical reproducibility, who does 
not get overwhelmed by the charm of a photo album?
Such a question cannot be Socratic, which means there is no obvious 
answer. WB’s work seems to push us towards an autonomic decision about 
what is near or far, about our own angels and our own devils, which we frame 
in our own images – as photos, as films or as products of our imagination.
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On the Edge of the World Play.  
The Skeptical Look of Director Schiller
From Schiller himself, we have learnt never to cease being skeptical, at 
least since following, with our heads turned upwards, the movement of the 
arch performed by a ball over hundred eighty degrees. A letter addressed to 
his friend Ferdinand Huber, dated from the 5.10.1785 describes just such a 
movement. After an energetic rise to the heights and the following fall to 
“motherly earth” (NA 24, 26), we might even read a sigh between the lines 
of the letter (written in energetic calligraphy), sounding like a sorrowful 
goodbye to a self-admitted ideality: “But such an arch is really so beautiful!” 
(ib.)
This passage is well known. However, the directly following lines, far 
less quoted, are no less significant: “So I keep comforting myself about the 
human destiny of my superhuman expectations” (ib.). As a second degree 
observer, Schiller recognizes his own “arch mobility”, his conscientiousness 
about a structure involving a close and mutual relationship between an-
thropology and history. Such a relationship represents a real obstacle to any 
attempt at harmonious thinking as this works with – and also produces – a 
number of paradoxical subsystems and subsequent frictions and tensions. In 
other words, if there is any chance to attain or discover any kind of harmony 
then this may only appear out of a process replete with moments of strug-
gle. In any case, such tensions inspire the author to create not only all his 
forms of polarity but also all the nuances existing between the extremes. In 
this way, he obtains his aesthetical offers of sense as well as his poetic and 
dramatic propositions, and still furthermore – last but not least – his histori-
cal narratives.
Our main perspective, from which we draw the main thesis, presupposes 
the knowledge of Schiller’s complete anthropological evaluation as formu-
lated in his fourth Letter on Aesthetic Education. We might therefore de-
tect a certain anthropological resignation over the conditio humana, which 
for Schiller proves not only a matter of fact but, most especially, wide ground 
for research and presentation. This view constitutes his working method 
right from the times of Karlsschule, the Stuttgart Military Academy where 
Schiller studied medicine and wrote not only his dissertations but also his 
first poems and his first play, The Robbers. The author is conscious of the 
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entropic effects of ideality and how this grasps reality and seeks to configure 
it violently, deploying the mechanisms of production and manipulation of a 
material object without any life of its own. Later on, after the shock of mass 
rebellion and mass manipulation in the process of the French Revolution, 
he surveys the consequences of violence towards human beings and asks 
himself about the necessity for any form of violence. The conclusions re-
main ambiguous: on the one hand, he seems to justify configuring violence 
towards raw materials; on the other hand, he closes his 27th Letter on Aes-
thetic Education by guarantying equality between a modest tool and every 
citizen within an Aesthetic State supposed to fulfill a utopian function.
Let us stick with the idea of Schiller’s inquiétude over the at least potential 
entropic effect of ideality over reality. Such an inquiétude also contains its 
own dynamics and may even enhance the anthropologic complexity. Thus 
the assertion about our being citizens of time, as well as of space, as we may 
read in the second Aesthetic Letter, in this context deserves a closer look. 
We correspondingly take into account its three complementary aspects: 1. 
The human being is a product of his/her time and cannot escape from it; 2. 
The human being is burdened down by history and cannot but live with such 
a fact; 3. The human being is pregnant with his/her own future in the sense 
of an overwhelming thinking ever since the times of transition between the 
Ancient Régime and the modern era following double (French and Indus-
trial) revolutions; this happens independent of the way he/she faces the idea 
of progress, whether with greater or lesser skepticism.
Under such premises, we are able to formulate our thesis, which we also 
need in order to analyze the conditions to any possible application of Schil-
ler’s concept of play: we perceive Schiller as a realist, who is not only widely 
aware of ideality but also searches constantly for free spaces in order to insert 
forms of ideality into reality. This process should happen not in any aggres-
sive, invasive way, but in a harmonic process enabled by the mechanisms of 
configuration. In brief, material idea should turn into idealized matter. We 
may trace this process in the famous letter to Goethe dated 26th December 
1797. In contrast with his friend, Schiller operates in a mood that diverges 
from the realm of literature theory and instead stems from anthropology 
through analyzing both the necessity to distinguish between literary genders 
and the possibility to approach them. What is at stake here, so Schiller feels, 
are not only literary genders but also their cultural contexts. Schiller’s con-
cern deals with in-between spaces, which might bring dramatic necessity 
closer to epic freedom in a form of productive tension (cf. NA 29, 176f), 
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and always in the search for possibilities of configuration within empty 
or unmarked spaced, marking those spaces out in order to build plausible 
scenarios.
In other words: only that separated according to determined categories 
and differentiated according to recognized criteria is able to again meet 
face to face in a fruitful encounter. We should ask ourselves in the present 
whether Schiller’s intended separation of such realms, appearance and real-
ity, does not correspond to a form of operative closure. In any case, Haber-
mas warns us two hundred years later against an interpenetration of both 
realms without mediation in time and space (cf. Habermas, 1985: 64). We, 
the citizens of the 21st century, are only too aware of numerous examples of 
contamination between aesthetics and politics, fiction and reality, tragedy 
and comedy. The extreme forms of much unhappy miscegenation too often 
carry a totalitarian stigma, out of the impossibility of realizing the existence 
or necessity of space distance and time delay – of sheer mediation. In some 
cases, this derives from the unavailability of individuals to realize that and 
we thus see the tragic situations turning comic.
We should ask ourselves about the existence of alternative reading pro-
tocols to Schiller’s play drive, beyond those canonical research results and 
the multiple forms of popularization of their concepts. When in Austria, I 
happened to browse the Linz newspaper Der Standard of 23th October 2009 
and finding, in a section named “Chronik” on page 12, a report about new 
models of ecological cars under the title “Man is only then really a man when 
he plays”. Neither a word about the author, who is probably supposed to be 
popularly known, nor any reference to the 15th Aesthetic Letter. Just a sen-
tence serving as a sort of bridge: “With their constant play drive, car produc-
ers in Japan show that they have not yet run out of ideas in spite of the crisis”.
Such an example displays how Schiller’s quotation may still be taken 
seriously. This happens despite the arsenal of triviality, kitsch and parody, 
thrown at the complete works of the author down the centuries. In this 
case, the direct liberty of scientific research serves a principally noble pur-
pose: protecting the environment. However, how would we react if we read 
the same sentence in connection with a really more trivial, yet more play-
ful commodity? We know how the trivialization of the play concept has 
brought about pernicious effects, among them the attributes of Nietzsche’s 
last man and our fellow humans with their consumerist orientations.
Nevertheless, there remains in Schiller’s aesthetical theory a moment of 
insolubility, which resists all attempts of appropriation and contamination. 
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This also happens because the Aesthetic Letters incorporate a clear warn-
ing about the possibility of being deceived in the real world. We may in 
fact read the criticism concerning the so-called systems of happiness in the 
24th Letter as criticism concerning all forms of desire to make sheer utopic 
ideas become real. In our times, we may detect such moments in the most 
distinct realms, from the leisure society through to fundamentalist groups. A 
specific political warning by Schiller himself might already be read in the es-
say on the necessary limits in the application of beautiful forms (cf. NA 21, 
26). Such criticisms still continue related to the conditions for the feasible 
development or practice of an aesthetical consciousness, which should also 
be capable of developing forms of knowledge. Such conditions imply the 
formation of a self-critical subject.
We may therefore perceive Schiller’s aesthetic writings – apart from his 
well-known living circumstances and the illness that caused an interrup-
tion in his dramatic creation in the early 1790s – as a level of reflection in 
which the self-nominated stage director Schiller places himself on the very 
edge of the world play. From that position, he not only reflects sharply about 
the possible implications of a materialized ideality but also simultaneously 
formulates, for those seeking put it into practice, the methodological devel-
opments to his aesthetic education and, as a kind of prescription, alongside 
several warnings. We might even say that – as the doctor he also remains 
– he even proposes antidotes or offers protective vaccines. This happens 
because Schiller knows only too well that the epoch of transition between 
the Ancient Regime and the Contemporary Age (known in German as Sat-
telzeit, saddle time, meaning an imaginary saddle reaching between epochal 
paradigms), which meant an enormous opening of the horizon of expecta-
tions, not always followed by the extension of the space of experience, and 
also bearing schizophrenic traces. On the one hand, the autonomy of the 
subject is theoretically postulated; on the other hand, the subject himself/
herself is often denied and remains therefore repressed, even though the 
subject idea continues being inscribed as a postulate and, in fact, a desidera-
tum. For such reasons, such a postulate also proves a permanent source of 
frustration with Schiller himself having to repeatedly learn how to manage 
that gap.
The question whether the author would still advise us to cultivate an 
aesthetic education should he live in our present days, may seem somehow 
vain. However, it certainly is not and may also be answered with a resound-
ing Yes, to which we might also add: “Especially nowadays!” As we have 
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seen, the lapidary utopian criticism of the 24th Aesthetic Letter has clearly 
not lost its sense of opportunity. Such a critique points to various forms 
of shortcomings in the mediation of time and space, of contamination, of 
acceleration and partly resulting from the inadequate treatment of contin-
gency by the modern individual. It remains a fact that practicing the idea 
of freedom may produce more forms of contingency instead of attempting 
to manage or neutralize them. Firstly, this is expressed neutrally and should 
not be misunderstood as a defense of conformity to authority and tradition. 
We have been aware of the well-known correlation since Horkheimer first 
postulated it: freedom movements unavoidably carry their egoism along 
with them (Horkheimer, 1968). Since Horkheimer – or also since Schiller’s 
Fiesko? – the threat to freely using one’s own capacity of judgment, caused 
by an opaque web of interests, remains a leitmotiv. Schiller had learned 
this from the school of moral philosophers, who explained it clearly before 
Hegel, in his philosophy of right, understood and developed the system of 
needs in civil society.
In this context, the history of the “Merkwürdige Belagerung von Ant-
werpen in den Jahren 1584 und 1585” (“Notorious Siege of Antwerp in 
1584 and 1585”), written in the working phase of the aesthetic works, justi-
fies closer attention. It was supposed to be an expedient for publication in 
order to overcome the lack of texts for Schiller’s magazine “Die Horen”. 
However, the work proves of far greater import: the text sets out a mer-
ciless portrait of bourgeois groups and state functionaries, led on by their 
own private interests. It even touches upon caricature. In a city, which had 
conquered its freedom from the Spanish Crown, the “lack of consequence” 
(NA 17, 352) of its citizens brought them to defeat. Schiller, the playwright 
and theatre director, may have attributed victory in his account to Alex-
ander Farnese’s capacity of mobilization whilst commanding the troops of 
the Spanish Crown. We thus encounter here a highly interesting case in 
the realm of civilization theory. This work characterizes the transition from 
pre-modern to modern paradigms of value. Schiller discerns the meanness of 
such subjects dominated by limited motivations even if living within a free 
civil order for which they themselves fought. His sympathy blatantly veers 
towards the representative of the Spanish Crown, who happened to be the 
son of the regent Margaret of Parma, whom he had treated roughly in an 
earlier historical essay about the separation of the Netherlands. The display 
of such sympathy does not come a priori but unfolds itself as a process over 
the course of the events and after analysis and presentation of the unequal 
Miolo_material idea.indd   58 5/20/14   10:55 AM
Material Idea. On the Legibility of Culture   |   59
relationship between the forces. However, which side Schiller is on already 
becomes clear in the opening first lines. The incipit of this essay determines 
the reading protocol:
“It is a delightful play to look at the human spirit of invention fighting with 
a powerful element and to see how obstacles, which common capacities can-
not overcome, may be defeated by cleverness, determination and a cons-
tant will. Less delightful, but the more didactic, is the play of the contrary 
situation, where the lack of such qualities jeopardizes all efforts of genius, 
making fruitless all serendipity and, because it does not know how to use 
it, destroying a success which seemed already to be decided” (NA 17, 312).
The whole narrative looks like an epic war film in which both parts ap-
ply their skill: on the one hand, building a ship bridge designed to block the 
river Scheldt, on the other hand, in the development of a strategy of de-
struction in order to break such a blockade. The reader almost gains the im-
pression that Schiller lets his actors move around only in order to come to a 
conclusion and judge in favor of a commander capable of serving as a model 
for his fighters and going into battle alongside them and while respecting 
their “delicate feelings” (NA 17, 354). The just quoted introduction might 
be, in this context, an anticipated conclusion, fitting the abrupt form of the 
last lines. In this case, the inglorious surrender of the city to the Duke of 
Parma, which ends the exposition, may also relate to the deadline for The 
Horen and which allowed for no further explaining of details (cf. letter to 
Goethe from the 19.3.1795, NA 27, 163).
At this point, we might conclude that Schiller, while searching for mani-
festations of republican virtue, merely runs into split individuals – either 
into unmerciful, reason-obsessed citoyens or narrow-minded, interest-orient-
ed bourgeois. All of them badly need aesthetic mediation, as in the art of 
distance taking and retardation in space and time. However, let us not be 
deceived about the well-known commentary by Goethe, in his conversa-
tions with Eckermann, about an alleged aristocratic self-mise-en-scène by 
Schiller and compared with him. Schiller sets out the energy of the will, 
known to produce strong characters that arise beyond all moral representa-
tions. Furthermore, these are exclusively supposed to cast the attentions of 
the scene director.
Schiller’s look upon the past also holds a future orientation. Indeed, he 
may be confessing, just for a moment, to a secret nostalgia towards the hero-
ic times of the Knights of Malta. We know how he worked at that dramatic 
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project for many years and only gave it up in order to write Wilhelm Tell: in 
this last character, he seems to have at last found a worthy representative of 
republican virtue. He also often draws a line between the apparent radical-
ism of a society of warriors and the generations of their refined descendants, 
who were his contemporary fellows. However, he does also critically stress 
the roughness of primitive times, as we may read for instance in the 26th 
Aesthetic Letter (cf. NA 20, 402f). He would certainly not like to see it 
restored, most of all because he knows only too well how artificial – that 
means contrary to cultural evolution – such a restoration would be. In the 
epoch of individual affirmation, Schiller may only make recourse to a kind 
of solution that attributes a person with an external juridical framework and 
an internal aesthetic framework. This means, in other words, the individual 
would be simultaneously both supported and limited.
Schiller’s works do not have autobiographic traces. Nevertheless, we do 
find several tracks of his perceptions of the representational limits of com-
plex contexts. His own game – as a sort of hide and seek – is labyrinthic. He 
sometimes discloses his position on the revolutionary process in France and 
he sometimes conceals it. His method, which as we have seen consists in 
framing reality in order to search for configuration possibilities within that 
frame, is openly documented and also because Schiller applies it to himself. 
We may only imagine how, for instance, the “effect of the Robbers”, similar 
to Goethe’s “effect of Werther”, went viral. However, should we recall his 
defense of an approximation between play and reality (for instance, in the 
1784 Mannheim speech), or his sharp criticism of the living conditions at 
the Karlsschule in his Announcement of the Rheinische Thalia, we attain a 
considerable number of indices and factors that surely led the author to a 
later moderating self-censorship.
One sign of this are the passages eliminated from the second edition of 
the History of the Separation of the Netherlands from the Spanish Government. 
Between 1788 and 1801, the dates of both editions, the European expe-
riential space attained a complexity and depth that unavoidably brings a 
multiple refraction of historical optimism. An assertion from the introduc-
tion, which in 1788 seems implicit within a near horizon of expectation, was 
completely eliminated in 1801:
“Therefore the energy, with which it [the people from the Netherlands, 
TRC] acted, has not vanished among us; nor is the venturous success that 
crowned its boldness denied to us, should the processes come back and simi-
lar opportunities call us to similar actions” (NA 17, 11).
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The refraction persists, and we may perceive it most of all in his refer-
ences to the present in his shorter historical essays. As seen, Schiller never 
takes refuge in any form of nostalgia for past times. Nevertheless, we cannot 
but discern a sharp criticism of the willing weakness of reason in his epoch 
from the introduction to his History of the Malta Order. Precisely those 
“heroes of the Middle Ages” (SW IV, 992), who in the Universal Historical 
Panorama of 1790 had merely contributed to the outcome of the “human 
century” (NA 17, 375), Schiller’s century, in his inaugural speech of 1789, 
are here described as remaining confined to their energetic illusion, their 
“foolishness (Torheit) (SW IV, 992). In their isolation, they cannot be seen 
as integrated members of a chain of progress. Furthermore, also in the Uni-
versal Historical Panorama, which Schiller declared to represent a peak in his 
creative powers and historical construction (cf. the letter dated 3.11.1789 
to Caroline von Beulwitz, NA 25, 315ff), the Modern Age somehow gets 
portrayed as a hybrid product:
“Because only in Europe, and here at the end of the Middle Ages, the energy 
of will came together with the light of understanding, only here could it be 
made possible to hand a virile generation over into the arms of wisdom” (SW 
IV, 849).
We face here not only a historical fiction but also a temporalization of 
historical complexity. The couple metaphor did not produce a happy mar-
riage when taking into account the chronological sequence of both his short 
essays about the Middle Ages. On the contrary: such a sequence disclosed 
the internal laws of history in all their paradoxes and aporias and drew 
Schiller’s attention to the problematic of the non-simultaneity of the simul-
taneous. Schiller’s discontent about civilization is therefore produced not so 
much by some gap between wild roughness and decadent laxity, but rather 
by the fatal contamination of both moments and aspects. Let us recall the 
lucidity of his essays about the necessary limits to using beautiful forms and, 
in the end, about the sublime. In both cases the director’s finger appears, as 
well as the physician’s touch – prescribing scenarios, prescribing dosages. For 
instance: as well as in certain moments, the exuberance of beauty should 
be excluded from contact with the naked reality and its respective exigen-
cies and parameters for the same reasons an anthropological vaccine with 
elements of scarcity and tragedy would be necessary so that in times of the 
“hardships of plains” the heroic values from the times of the “hardships of 
mountains” (Brecht) would not only remain unforgotten but also without 
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effect. Most of all: such a recalling vaccine would impeach those values from 
suffering the fate of heroic and tragic persons, themes and situations in pros-
perous times – the probability of being made ridiculous, parodied or simply 
minimized and at last forgotten. In any case: of not being taken seriously as 
advice against the cyclical crises that often follow prosperity.
The acceptation of asymmetries, by retaining a desirable tendency to 
harmonize the horizon of utopia at a distance on, means Schiller remains 
careful and chooses not to agree with coercive syntheses. The coordina-
tion model, as the basis of the aesthetic education, must itself be learned 
as a process. A desirable praxis without constraint may appear as a final 
goal. However, any hasty reading protocol, somehow tending to place it 
near the communicative action conceived by Habermas, is already denied 
by the delicate irony of the 27th Aesthetic Letter: since when can a “serv-
ing tool” be a “free citizen” (NA 20, 412)? A functional element is bound 
to be used only instrumentally, which means “poietically” not “practically”. 
Could it yet happen that Schiller here anticipates the freedom of ends seen 
in modern art installations, which defunctionalize features in order to trans-
functionalize them?
Precisely because we cannot avoid, as second degree observers, remain-
ing time citizens, we can feel compelled to bring out such examples, which 
Schiller probably never would have imagined. The desideratum of the “free-
dom of a serving tool” may be regarded as a mere ironical metaphor. This 
does not really constitute proof of how unattainable the aesthetic education 
goal actually proves but most of all represents a sign of the secret wish to see 
such a goal against a clearly described horizon, yet still out of reach. Thus, 
also only in this way does the energetic effect of such desideratum keep its 
full tension. And only in this way may Schiller, the director and utopia 
critic, on the edge of the world play, poke fun at History and feel good in his 
nutshell, or director’s box.
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Should the Temple Stand near the River?  
About the Signification of Intermediary Spaces
The receipt, or formula, for the civilization process may be well known 
but is unhappily less often followed: take your time, take your distance. 
Modern voracity is one of the main drivers preventing the implementation 
of such a recipe, which by its very nature becomes flexible enough to suit 
almost any situation. Modern dynamics need open magnanimous spaces 
around the world in order to set productive forces free. This causes all kinds 
of discontent and not only the obvious consequence of exploitation. In 
the early 19th century, Goethe had already complained about “velocipheric 
[velozipherisch]” time management. In times of impatience, of urgent accel-
eration, which has never ceased existing in the Western countries and has 
proven a factor in the most recent crisis, it also becomes necessary to shed 
light on aspects and elements which may seem rough, opaque or incompre-
hensible, simply ignored or made into scorched earth.
In Goethe’s Märchen [Fairy Tale], at the end of the short novel Unterhal-
tungen deutscher Ausgewanderten [Conversations between German Emigrants], 
the lamentation song to the “beautiful Lilie” may at first sound like an im-
patient cry for the rapid concretization of a wish out of utopian thinking: 
“Ach! Warum steht der Tempel nicht am Flusse/Ach! Warum ist die Brücke 
nicht gebaut? [Alas! Why does the temple not stand near the river/ Alas! 
Why is the bridge not built yet?]”. However, Goethe himself provides a pos-
sible explanation for that lamentation, this time in prose: “but alas! Is it not 
simply an infatuation of our nature to imagine that better days will come, 
when so much pain comes together?” (HA 6, 225).
Here, we encounter two interesting references: on the one hand, the 
modern impatience of wanting to attain a self-determined goal just as soon 
as possible, on the other hand, the production of deceiving representations 
that might comfort us over the frustrations caused by the fact that such goals 
cannot in the end actually be reached so fast. As we will see, modernity 
often moves between the production of contingency and the search for com-
pensation – mostly as an effect of that contingency production.
However, let us first remain with Goethe for a while. Not because of any 
kind of perplexity, which often leads us to the classics. The Goethe I mean 
is hardly manageable as a teddy bear for adults to adopt Odo Marquard’s cool 
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terminology (Marquard, 2000: 72) for an object that we carry with us and at 
the end leave on a symbolic toy shelf after having served to strengthen our 
self-evidence, to compensate for our insecurity and to legitimate our further 
needs of justification. That this is not the case stems from being able to still 
feel Goethe’s discontent with modernity.
How did Goethe cope with the signs of modern disquiet, which together 
emerged in the early 19th century, with the critical and crisis-like conse-
quences of his time? We could almost say: probably not at all. In the years 
after all the revolutionary and inflationary traumas, after the effects of the 
French and industrial revolution, Goethe tried, throughout his later works, 
as we know, to allegorize many of the issues and situations that were not to 
his approval. Among such aspects, he stressed the uneconomic consequenc-
es of facts and processes that he neither controlled nor understood such as 
expressions of hubris, voluntarism, lack of insight, egocentrism, searches for 
eternal youth: in short, everything displayed on the surface of the world as 
forms of deceiving behavior by the subjects. In his eyes, such forms were not 
worthy of being taken as symbols – merely as contingent, ephemeral allego-
ries. Under the influence of their nerves, such subjects always suffered and 
remained shorn of all protection. They might suffer a similar discontent to 
ours in a time when we again and again perceive complaints about the loss 
of sure guidelines in our lives.
What subjacent drives push modern people forward? People are certainly 
pushed forward by a lot of different issues and factors because the very basis 
of modern culture is individual. Modern disquiet displays a correspondingly 
differentiated nature. We may mention guilt, in the prospective sense, as 
a striking factor in the creation of cultural models and patterns. How far 
guilt-culture should be considered as a result of the secularization process of 
the Christian religion and, most of all, of its protestant-Calvinistic branch 
still remains an issue for discussion. In a text written in the 1990s, yet only 
recently published in a Portuguese newspaper, the novelist Agustina Bessa-
Luís wrote that culture might not be possible without guilt (cf. Bessa-Luís, 
2011). In her opinion, the global overwhelming of barriers has contributed 
to jeopardizing the right to loneliness, to the productive reflection of many 
individuals. She writes this out of a well-known skepticism towards hedon-
istic trends and the subsequent trivialization of cultural life. However, Agus-
tina’s claim to rehabilitate guilt as a cultural principle may also be thrown 
into doubt especially when recalling the alienating dimension to such 
a principle. We may instead recall that perspective Freud opened: nolens 
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 volens. This may be formulated as follows: without discontent, no civiliza-
tion whatsoever. In this sense, we would shed a positive light on Agustina’s 
culture critique. Simultaneously, our attentions would be redirected to the 
intermediary spaces rather than handling them as unmarked ones, burned 
out by the sheer influence of the guilt drive.
We act in our own cultural epoch and by doing so we model it and are 
modeled by it. The higher or lower risks of life’s demands make us feel our 
anthropological nature constantly, which is as precarious as it is open and 
implies moments of dynamic innovation as well as those of species conserva-
tion. This depends upon personal options. Either we perceive and take new 
chances or we satisfy real or symbolic needs, or, still furthermore, we engage 
ourselves in seeking for more justice in the world. In this sense, we remain 
aware of intersubjective, interactive and material contexts, which means 
our environment. Human nature is therefore exposed to contingency, carry-
ing out possibility in times and spaces between necessity and improbability. 
Simultaneously, this also produces contingency and contributes to raising 
the contingency levels in the modern world.
Should we carry out cultural analysis on a systemic basis, we must begin 
by perceiving the multiple valences of human affairs, their contexts and tak-
en as challenges. This also means only being able to perceive a small amount 
of factors in a reality undergoing permanent change. We must be able to de-
tect significant trends and build frames of reference in order to also plan and 
carry out actions, to understand and build systems, to bring scenarios to life, 
to change objective situations – in brief, to find ways of making it easier to 
handle contingency and understand the forms of compensation conceived 
as responses to it in this context.
The feeling of contingency arises jointly together [“jointly together”?]
with mobility, with those modern dynamics that have not ceased occurring 
ever since the process of the so-called original accumulation (Marx), world 
alienation (H. Arendt), the questioning of religious certainties (Protestant 
Reformation), of power structures (Machavelli) and throughout all the cen-
turies in which natural law theories kept on asking about the just forms 
of government. We know of most compensation formulas that attempt to 
minimize insecurity as an effect of experienced contingency, both acting in 
the world and interpreting the world. From aesthetical theories (the world 
as a stage) to philosophical grids (nature’s intentions and unsociable socia-
bility by Kant, the invisible hand of Adam Smith, the social contract by 
Rousseau, tricks of reason by Hegel and so forth), such interpretations tend 
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to provide a safe haven for individual disquiet in a world full of contingency 
yet without the insurance formerly supplied by a theocentric vision.
In our multimedia present, the “world theatre” metaphor may seem ut-
terly obsolete to our eyes. However can we speak about a “world screen”? In 
any case, such metaphors do contribute to drawing our attention to the il-
luminated zones of the world, to its outstanding points, to “contagious ideas” 
(Sperber, 1996: 8), to mainstream channels that may, for the first moment, 
leave the intermediary spaces of the living world, the interconnected levels 
of reality, in the dark. This deserves some reflection.
Let us recall how such intermediary spaces have been symbolically 
evoked through the distance between the temple and the river in Goethe’s 
Fairy Tale. Such spaces are kept in the dark since they go unmarked as 
a sort of ground of elements that remain unperformed and unrepresent-
ed. They also seem to serve no kind of function but available for usage if 
necessary. They are a product of the conceptual tradition of dualism and 
the subsequent classification of marked and unmarked spaces, with their 
respective signification codes. However, within a cultural perspective 
that reaches beyond the traditional criteria of performative symbolism or 
functional pragmatism, such spaces may be seen as paths only experienced 
when heading through them. They cannot be but detours. They are often 
not tarred and there is no sand under them. Dialectics of means and ends 
is replaced by the scope for obtaining new forms of perception, of open-
ing new forms of reading, should we agree on going through them. Should 
we aim to describe such experiences with the formula of the “discovery of 
sluggishness”, we run into an open door since the discovery of new forms 
of space demands a slow approach to attaining the availability to face the 
corresponding dynamics of each new situation in its concrete space-time 
specificity. Such an approach also contributes to compensating not only 
the arbitrary, functional forms of modern contingency: we may also observe 
how living beings, and ourselves among them, try to regain a homeostatic 
balance after having too often exceeded their tolerance limits. As a matter 
of fact, such balance is provided to our living system by multiple relation-
ships within the environment, which contains a complex web of marked 
and unmarked spaces. Together, they build a web that also integrates inter-
mediary spaces.
We need such intermediary spaces, as both real and symbolic. They are 
in any case something else than the so-called “non-lieux” according to Marc 
Augé, passages, no man’s land, crossing roads, railway stations,  airports 
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(Augé, 1992). However, such places may also be mapped as changeable 
time-spaces. Should we ask: “What do we need them for?” in such cases 
the answer cannot be but functional and contingent. However, on asking: 
“What are they there for?” then we find before our eyes a horizon of multi-
ple possibilities, real and virtual, irrelevant and fascinating, attractive and 
threatening. In this case, even contingency appears as a form of challeng-
ing enrichment and not necessarily as a threat or a limitation. Moreover, 
culture discloses its forms of dimensional self-experience, not only making 
past moments present but also interiorizing and reproducing or recreating 
intermediary spaces.
Multimedia information streams overwhelm us with images and messag-
es spanning every register not only from our modern culture but also from 
ritualized traditional cultures with their taboos and marked spaces. At the 
latest, since the outburst of the Arab spring, we experience an eruption of 
contingency also in places where many observers, at least in the first mo-
ment, would suspect finding a sequence of recurrent formulas. Following 
Schiller’s words, we might say, at least concerning the first months of the 
process in Tunisia and Egypt, that it has been an “attractive spectacle [anzie-
hendes Schauspiel]”, with stimulating and thrilling moments. Nevertheless, 
we know that it is much more than this. Inside each individual, whoever 
actively participates in the democracy building process, there is a peculiar 
clash of civilizations, which means a complex struggle between this indi-
vidual and his or her own self, between contradictory interests and values.
Let us take a step further beyond daily events. In fact, all phases of mo-
dernity may be said to display an unstable mosaic in which contingency 
plays a major role. The relationship between subjective implications and 
objective situations leads each univocal world representation ad absurdum. 
The concurrent rationalities cannot be separated from their irrational di-
mensions. The present crisis discourses display this ad nauseam. We realize 
that we are experiencing crises as processes with three characteristics: 1. A 
dynamics of immediacy, which may signify spontaneity as well as urgency, 2. 
Disorientation and reorientation in space, and 3. Acceleration and period 
classification in time. The modern individual therefore perceives him- or 
herself between the Scylla of their own initiatives (which he or she must 
handle with contingency and cannot help but create further cases of contin-
gency) and the Charybdis of compensatory solutions. These are not strange 
to any individual or the collective memory of traditional patterns and often 
dictated by their nostalgia.
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Modernity also challenges individual consciousness. We may ask our-
selves, taking into account the present research progress in psychoanalysis 
and neurophysiology, whether there is any free will. Such freedom concerns 
first of all the moment of reflection about the potentialities of action. In any 
case, that so-called free will is implicated in numerous, more or less opaque 
networks, within the interactive web of the living world. This happens as 
soon as intentions to act are materialized and the causes are always multiple 
and complex, last but not least, because of the impenetrable deep layers of 
the subject.
We seem to have remained for too long on the ground of an overwhelm-
ing contingency, which seems only to stress contrasts in the world ground 
without however questioning how such contrasts might become varieties. 
At this point, intermediary spaces take on a new relevance in order to re-
order the significance of what until then was an amount of unmarked spaces. 
How can this happen? Let us return to our main symbolic question: how can 
we reach the river coming from the temple – and how can we return? One 
possible way, or answer, might be: this may happen when we open ourselves 
up to the alterity character of the barriers since such barriers have already 
taken root at the discourse level. Where some authors see a clash of civiliza-
tions, we might begin by discerning a critical confrontation of cultural ele-
ments in an intermediary space, most marked by a lack of information and 
understanding, with fear, with discontent, even with hatred. Nevertheless, 
when pulling a single thread out of this intricacy, we may find the distance 
between the opposite elements does not become shorter. Yet the space in-
between no remains longer unmarked and instead packed with aspects that 
challenge us to re-read, re-order.
Let us take the example of identity discourses. Meanwhile, we have 
become aware that they certainly need seeing within a critical light. On 
the one hand, individual identity narratives follow an epic timeline. On 
the other hand, collective identity patterns tend to organize themselves in 
spaces about to become autistic in a dramatic way. Drama always needs a 
counterpart, an image of a hostile alterity. The process of collective identity 
creation is therefore self-foreclosing.
But is this necessarily so? Are collective identities unavoidably bound to 
produce aggressive attitudes? What happens when we encounter situations 
that might get termed “intermediary spaces of facing the Other”? Individu-
als might here meet each other in differentiated forms and perhaps begin 
voluntarily to exchange signs and messages, perhaps without thinking in 
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the first moments, of collective culture patterns that are unavoidably rooted 
in them. Indeed, in doing so, they are already shedding a critical light over 
such patterns. In other words: the well-intentioned postulate of multicultur-
al tolerance and coexistence may often contribute to building isles without 
intermediary spaces, which can only be overcome by individual attempts, 
gestures, signs, and discourses. In this sense, the skepticism of conservative 
politicians towards the chances of success of multiculturalism might be seen 
as a mere reverse of multicultural apology. Both discourses are bound to fail 
because of their insular character with this occurring even before any criti-
cism of their ideological substance has been formulated.
As a matter of fact, we may consider the integration of an individual into 
a foreign country and into a strange culture as a process similar to weaving 
threads from a different nature into a texture that already exists but which 
never takes. As culture analysts, we should be able to develop acceptance 
strategies for strangers, setting out from differentiation into forms of integra-
tion. This implies the necessity of working at obstacles in order to discover 
and display their problematic as well as their enriching aspects. In this con-
text, we may begin seeing ourselves as new intermediary spaces, because we 
have also interiorized distances, gaps, paths and bridges. We are now able to 
recognize, verbalize, symbolize and recreate them.
When it becomes necessary to theorize and to abstract, the theoretical 
threads must be articulated within a complex cultural web even though 
they cannot but at first be elements of strangeness. However, even strange-
ness has its own historicity, which may appear as a reduction of complex-
ity, as a simple summary. In fact, when we draw our attention upon dark 
zones, as information lacunas, even as something that cannot be described, 
we may also begin with a work of archeological reconstruction in order to 
understand our objects of analysis better. We frequently experience two 
parallel processes: while becoming familiar with strange moments from 
outside, there are moments in us that become stranger in our eyes. This 
double process has also often been exhaustively analyzed. Approaching 
the stranger through the imagery of intermediary spaces, we succeed in 
avoiding anthropocentric perspectives. In an integrative sense, this ap-
pears friendlier to the environment than strictly humanistic perspectives. 
Such an approach also allows an insight into situations of modern con-
tingency. We have seen how this contingency contributes to stress the 
tolerance limits, which we constantly perceive as complex psychosomatic 
systems.
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I would like to precise this last assertion so as also not to give the impres-
sion of trying to force a theoretical balance or even an idyll. Such a perspec-
tive is also far from promoting an anti-humanistic attitude. When we get a 
perception of the whole web of relationships and not only of human affairs, 
as Hannah Arendt postulated (Arendt, 1958: 181ff), but also of differentiat-
ed relationships in intermediary spaces that are also historically conditioned, 
then we shall be able to contextualize situations properly, which certainly 
means taking their factors into account. If we miss this procedure, we can-
not avoid producing contingence again and again, which brings the need to 
search out forms of compensation but which will do no more than fill some 
gaps after having trampled upon and even destroying intermediary spaces . 
However, should we wish to build symbolic paths or bridges, towards other 
people or towards other elements of the environment, we must first properly 
perceive this. This means first looking and listening, touching and feeling 
in order to become aware of where such paths or bridges disclose themselves 
as being possible or even desirable, or otherwise. This procedure needs still 
opener forms of knowledge than the usual ones. When we proceed with it, 
we must incorporate the forms of insufficiency, of accepted distances.
In Goethe’s Fairy Tale, the snake sacrifices herself by becoming a bridge. 
In the reality of many situations, a permanent obstacle may work as an un-
derstanding bridge of negativity. Which snake may help us, for instance, 
to overcome the Israeli-Palestinian wall, which has been built precisely in 
order to block intermediary spaces? Maybe this might be achieved by an 
unsustainable situation that will have taken form in images and words. And 
this latter approach means precisely an acute necessity of dialogic interme-
diary spaces in a present when we only seem to encounter barriers of stub-
bornness and speechlessness. In such situations, the real understanding of 
hard necessities may carry a need to incorporate limits of pain in the middle 
of intermediary spaces.
Such spaces are at the end no third elements from outside. They exist 
before our eyes everywhere. We have a symbolic relationship with temple, 
river and bridge and most of all with the elements that stay and move be-
tween them, not only with other people. We simply have to do this without 
ready-made recipes or formulas – just with the principle of respect, which 
can bear but a grain of hope unless it risks manipulating the environment for 
its own sake and, in doing so, no longer proves able to perceive intermediary 
spaces.
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II – At the Crossroads of Conflict and Peace: 
The Birth of Peace out of the Spirit of War?
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The Torn Texture:  
Five Theses about Rescue in the Midst of Danger
1. The questing for chances always takes place between order and chaos. 
Chaos and order always go hand-in-hand. In our times, we commonly feel 
ontologically secure, which means that the search for ultimate reasons has 
ceased to be a priority and most probably remains a reserve for philosophical 
speculations in some forested corner of the soul. Since modern science pro-
vides most explanations, our minds feel free to try a sophisticated rhetoric 
and, by the same token, to deconstruct them. However, that comfortable se-
curity is but a fragile texture and we do not need to recall the omnipresence 
of danger and death, the recent memories of war and devastation in order 
to realize all the menaces arising from our frail psychical constructions, from 
the destructing drive of instrumental technology that culminates in military 
machineries. What is the role of art, of literature amongst all this turmoil? 
Should that fragile texture be definitively torn?
All laws of reciprocity (an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth) are among 
the best examples for the tight relationship between order and chaos. As a 
matter of fact, all laws may serve as examples for this. We know how justice 
has always grown out of violence, out of the need to put an end to or to 
avoid violence, in the worst case to keep it within certain limits by using 
higher, more powerful forms of violence, which have the force to legitimate 
themselves by weapons, by blackmail or, in the luckiest cases, by persuasion 
or compromise.
Nowadays, we are said to live under the laws of the image. Images seem 
to hold absolute sovereignty; many people seem ready to sacrifice the king-
dom of their own self-respect for a single minute in the light of the cameras. 
We certainly realize how some extreme cases (for which reality shows and 
TV interviews fill our perceptive memory with plenty of exemplary situa-
tions) are but consequences of the modern sequestration and fragmenta-
tion of our performative possibilities. In the intimate tyranny of the private 
realm, images may force people into a passivity resulting in the absence 
of engagement or any risking of public opinions. Such passivity may also 
open the door to a chaotic invasion of images, of information, of persuasion 
techniques into our personal systems of perception, discernment and feeling 
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and the subsequent inability to configure our ethical claims to a singular or 
 collective, to a performed or modulated voice.
Nevertheless we cannot simply turn away from the world we live in and 
thus must therefore search for the first form of rescue from danger in which 
our singular voices may grow stronger by meeting other similar voices, out of 
trivial violence and without leaving the ground beneath our feet.
2. We have not yet left modernity and perhaps never shall. The unpredict-
ability of human manifestations is involved in a web of ideas and emotions, 
ideologies and judgments, a web which carries acts and words in a relation-
ship with their interactive and material environment. Hence, this means: 
what starts out as immaterial has to take worldly shape or else simply remains 
inexistent. However, conjectures also hold huge force and may easily become 
weapons of mass destruction. We always live in contingency and even contrib-
ute to increasing contingency given how our subjectivity may lead to prob-
lematic forms of world alienation. Here, I do not only mean fundamentalist 
forms of religion, in that sense which made Nietzsche write that religious 
people think only of themselves. We may easily point to other examples: the 
struggle for world hegemony, for energy sources, for geopolitical influence; 
their motivations always rooted in a dark chaos of intentions, desires, and 
attempts at legitimation. Order and reason have their source and find their 
legitimacy mostly as a form of compensation. Furthermore, this compensation 
involves attempts at reducing the moments of insecurity and anxiety – of 
contingency – by acting in the world and by interpreting the world.
Today, the global reality enters our living room through media images 
and shows us how cultural patterns constantly keep merging. The collec-
tive pride and traditionalism of the shame-cultures, such as the Islamic, are 
crossing over with the fascination generated by the individual models of 
the guilt-culture, which relies upon western traditions of self-identity, upon 
an unstable balance between capital exchanges and critical citizenship. No 
testimony is timeless: I am writing these lines some days after the surrender 
of Bagdad, after having read about the worldwide discussion in the media 
(including on the streets of Bagdad, where the people, although humiliated, 
now seem to feel free to defend their own opinions) concerning the roles 
played by the international military and political actors. However, can we 
truly believe in the fiction of remaking a new order out of the chaos, after 
the war game-like displays of such a monstrous “clash of civilizations”? The 
psychical precariousness of the modern subject, so often glossed over in the 
literature of the last three centuries, finds here a tragic correspondence with 
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the material precariousness of the living conditions caused by the subjective 
and the objective arising out of contingency.
3. More than about a clash of civilizations or empire, would it not be appro-
priate to speak about a spiral of hyper-contingency and overcompensation? The 
dramatic dimensions to some worldviews, and their subsequent individual 
performances, are daily conveyed in images that make us realize how shame 
and guilt may combine under many modalities. We constantly meet forms 
merging between honor and responsibility, between material interests and 
ideals, between religion and western concepts of citizenship. Nowadays, we 
realize how reduced and simplified the leitmotiv of the isolated subject in 
the twentieth century has been especially if just contemplating all the im-
plications of the butterfly effect on the economic and communicative ex-
changes ongoing on a global scale.
From the thesis about the clash of civilizations (Samuel Huntington), 
we may retain the feeling of the emulative inhibition shame-cultures display 
towards the power of technique and military machineries, which constitute 
the monopoly of violence in the guilt-cultures and underpins the scope for 
most European countries developing the politics of the social welfare state 
and the discourse of social and international solidarity, which now seems 
spreading across the globe. Neither have we reached the end of history nor 
even does the often quoted author of that thesis (Francis Fukuyama) believe 
this because, in the end, he still maintains that human beings never will 
abdicate from a so-called timic impulse (Geek word for evaluations) to reach 
beyond their own possibilities and skills. In a way, we here encounter the 
heritage of the shame-culture even in our world wide web and this means an 
always renewed chance to act, to create and to perform art and citizenship.
On the other hand, the same timic impulse, combining with or strug-
gling against material interests, may reach extreme attitudes and originate 
forms of hyper-contingency, which contribute to fostering permanent disorder 
and crisis. The greater the chaos, the more powerful the order required to 
respond to it and hence why we nowadays see and hear forms of discursive 
legitimating of overcompensation, which becomes imperative, inquisitorial 
and intransigent in the intended way of supporting its supposed democratic 
values. By an impressing technological apparatus, this aims to confuse our 
perceptions of reality and fiction, of B-series pictures and science fiction.
4. Between the sublime and the ridiculous, should we not try to rescue a tragic 
feeling, together with the possible lightness of being? The codes of heroes cannot 
help but be codes of cruelty and aggressiveness. They tend to rise up not only 
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against the sheer materiality of daily life, against the consumer and leisure 
society but also out of a situation of crude needs, of economic despair and 
political hopelessness. Between both extremes, we always encounter bridges 
of religious intransigence, of ideological convictions, of explicit interests to 
a greater or lesser extent, which turn into violence when taking possession of 
some kind of material. In both cases, we feel the excesses of energetic fluxes, 
which are nevertheless necessarily requested by life and by art. “Meanwhile, 
until the philosophers try to explain the construction of the world, the same 
world keeps going on, through hunger and through love”, wrote Friedrich 
Schiller more than two centuries ago (1795) in a satirical poem about “The 
wise men of the world”.
Nowadays, the so-called “old Europe” (D. Rumsfeld) seems to represent 
the enlightened, cynical, decadent but also because of that tolerant part of 
the world. It also seems wedged between two fundamentalist domains, the 
self-cultivated American illusion of legitimacy over world hegemony and 
the Islamic conviction of spiritual integrity. However, that may precisely be 
what in recent months has rather appeared a frailty: the sense of the diver-
sity of the other embedded in a social state, the consciousness of the weight 
of our cultural heritage, of the endless precariousness of human life and the 
uniqueness in each individual biography. This might yet mean a new chance 
for searching and finding other forms of engaged citizenship, closer to life, 
to art, to informality, to the rhythms of hearts beating yet tempered by a 
disciplined breath.
In recent times, we have felt impotent between two main streams, the 
discourses and the movements of the self-declared heroes and, on the other 
hand, the deconstructions of their images, above all through the Internet 
cartoons over the first intended and then executed Iraq invasion. We could 
see Bush and Saddam as symmetrical figures, as a kind of unhappy comic and 
tragic blood brothers, in several ridiculous forms through the materialistic 
reduction of their poses. At this point, we should be allowed to ask how can 
we rescue, from both forms of noise, the heroic discourses and the sarcasms 
intending to tear them down, how can we rescue our differentiated, am-
bivalent, dialogical heritages, such as irony and dialectics, such as the tragic 
feeling and a bearable lightness of being? Are we really paralyzed through 
overdoses of global information, stripping us of our ability to translate our 
communicative impulses into new performative acts?
5. There is no recipe for rescue from danger or “nobody can grasp God alone” 
(Hölderlin). Today, we may replace the word God in Hölderlin’s poem 
Miolo_material idea.indd   78 5/20/14   10:55 AM
Material Idea. On the Legibility of Culture   |   79
 “Patmos” with that kind of sacred values that not only mean the “real pres-
ences” (George Steiner) in art but also clamor for materialization in forms 
of justice, freedom and human rights. We should by now know that the 
only just struggles are those carried out for negative purposes, which means 
against the lack of those aforementioned values. This means therefore strug-
gling for the chance, for new gaps where we might inscribe not only fairer 
political systems but also our works of art and, on an untouchable personal 
level, perhaps our nostalgia for the happiness possible. For these tasks, we 
must trust the role of culture, as a plural, open, discursive and acting ration-
ality capable of recognizing the place of contingency and preventing it from 
becoming a factor of aleatory, of anomy or of totalitarianism. In this point 
of view, war is not just a form of hyper-contingency but also an evident 
manifestation of a movement of flux and reflux, of identity contraction in 
the face of an external threat, a merging between star treks and gulf strug-
gles. This reflects not only the gap between the existential interests of civil 
populations and the strategies of great capital, which during the colonial 
period used to export inner social conflicts and in post-colonial ages requires 
the help of a mask in the form of democratic discourse. Should our capacity 
to deconstruct the same discourse remain testimony to our powerlessness?
Precisely in this situation, and before we come to face the threat of de-
featism, we are invited to search for new human dimensions in the useless 
weapons of the former heroes and meaning we mock our frailties and faults 
to explore our capacities, to reformulate the consciousness of the world’s 
potentialities into new forms of creation. We still admire American culture, 
literature, film, music, as well as the precious Islamic tradition and arts. And 
we are also fully aware that the response to oil wars cannot be as simple as 
the polemic work written by Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer in 
1947 in their “Dialectics of Enlightenment”, under the trauma of the experi-
ence of the American culture industry. What I mean by this is that we really 
can do more than (as Adorno and Horkheimer polemically put it) light can-
dles, eat raw vegetables and ride by carriages. We deserve at least ecological 
bulbs, Mediterranean cooked vegetables and reliable public transports.
(2003)
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Two or Three Things that Did Not Happen: 
Is There any Possible Peace without  
Somewhat Tragic Memories?
This question looks suspiciously rhetorical. Its implicit answer might make 
all the following considerations sound superfluous or even sophistical. Never-
theless, we writers still feel a kind of pressure to keep spinning a tiny thread of 
sense, raising a small voice, in a world that seems too illegible, too illogical, 
too absurd or simply too unpredictable. Since “faith has become portable” 
(Fouad Ajami), since ideologies have become changeable, the temptation 
to complain about these and many more items (the increasing replacement 
of the book by the screen, for instance) is no longer sustained by any system 
of traditional values, which most of us have imbibed with our mother’s milk 
only in order to deny them during our own process of individuation.
Whoever thinks of reality as a heart beating, as a living system with its 
systolic rhythms of distress and pain, but also with its diastolic moments of 
joy and anger, cannot help but also thinking historically (in time) and con-
textually (in space). For two or three moments of extreme violence, brought 
into our homes by the TV’s evening news, we can easily imagine a long, an 
overly long odyssey of accumulated daily sufferings, humiliations, oppres-
sions, which fertilize the soil where violence grows, seasoned by whatever 
kind of religion or ideology. Even this is anything but new; we all remember 
the words of Friedrich Engels in the 19th century about theory becoming 
material Gewalt when taking possession of the masses.
Gewalt: this German word meaning both violence and power and re-
vealing how the latter grows out of the former, how the memories of fire 
must be kept alive to help give light to a modulate sense in which shadows 
remain perceptible within the most intensive clarity. As we know, this was 
one of the most cherished metaphors of the Enlightenment, when thinking 
and debating were finally being seen as progress in contrast to the dreadful 
scenes of the Thirty Year War. However, we are also aware how further wars 
got fought even while thinkers and writers were engaged in discussions in 
the salons or through publications about the most suitable means of imple-
menting a government of justice and peace on earth. This means a peace 
which, remembering the irony of Immanuel Kant’s words, we may desire to 
be eternal but lasting forever only in the graveyard.
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Thus, we must keep on with trying to formulate our concerns, our aims, 
our hopes, our fears, within an increasingly worn out system of words and 
images. It already seems that the not even so modern, not even so post-mod-
ern fight between words and images, is getting exchanged for a long succes-
sion of déjà vus, that most common currency in which we are no longer able 
to read the inscriptions but also because we already know them by heart. 
However, we need only to remember, for instance, that amazing scene from 
the film American Beauty (by Sam Mendes) when the boy describes the 
movements of a plastic bag in the wind to the girl. Suddenly, that prosaic 
object we use every day at the supermarket is animated by forces of nature 
that render it alive and so seemingly having become a bearer of its own will, 
if not free will then at least an aesthetical will. Suddenly, another reality 
emerges in the middle of a distressing, suffocating environment. All at once, 
the sight of an unexpectedly graceful form may contribute to neutralizing 
family violence, generational conflicts. What is more, in the end, the world 
kaleidoscope has changed. It has become lighter, somehow more bearable 
And through the simple movement of the wind.
However, we do not live in a movie even while our fictionalizations of 
the world go on ceaselessly. Moreover, such fictionalizations, which we ex-
perience daily in TV news, reality shows, etcetera, are strongly tinged with 
some tragic knots supposed to increase the show’s appeal. Nevertheless, in-
stead of inoculating with the germs of a strong character, as Friedrich Schil-
ler defended in the 18th century, these home made tragedies do not prepare 
us to act properly in real and tragic situations. This does not happen because 
we are but spectators who mostly sit comfortably on the sea shore gazing out 
at the ship all the while it sinks. This then was also the situation of the spec-
tator in Schiller’s time (By the way, we can also read how Schiller argued 
against the banality and futility of most spectators, thus anticipating the 
critical voices of the present against a demonized TV as if we are not free not 
to turn it on, not to instead choose a book or a CD rather than watching re-
ality shows). We only feel disarmed when no longer able to bear the silence 
which inevitably precedes the analysis of tragic situations and therefore also 
such works that most of us aim to create within the largest spectrum in time 
and space, all the way from those stupidly killed and wounded through to 
the dancing, flying plastic bag. But are there the words for saying silence? 
Are there acts to answer tragedy? From this question onwards, from all the 
real memories that we have of the present, even when merging with many 
journalistic banalities and TV news or shows, from the unsheltered human 
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condition which perhaps makes us stick together, we may begin rethinking 
peace. The idea of peace may therefore be reborn out of a collective of living 
images and forms containing at least two or three things that did not happen 
but tragically could have happened. In our unreligious world, this exercise 
may seem suspicious. However, I consider that precisely such an exercise not 
only lies at the root of all artistic creation but may also stimulate a new, at 
least, or even a better attitude towards the environment that means nature, 
that means the constructed world, that means other people and most of all 
those whom we do not understand at the first glance.
This is, at a time when everyone speaks and reads English, not a matter of 
language. It’s a matter of ascertaining just where the roots of our system may 
be able to blend history with fiction (but is writing history not already a kind 
of fiction?), of finding where the branches of our human condition remain 
unprotected against the winds of violence, except when these branches take 
wing and begin flying after having stood stock still during a great storm.
(2004)
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Terrorism of Expression as a Means  
for the Sake of Freedom
Some twenty years ago, when working on my doctoral thesis, a sociology 
professor told me that he had once dreamed of becoming a writer. However, 
he said further, he never grasped what motivates writers and hence he quit 
literary studies. He only knew one thing: such authors as Walter Benjamin 
or Theodor W. Adorno, whose paths to their own particular forms of expres-
sion were impossible to retrace but proved far more interesting than those of 
the much more easily decoded Georg Lukács or Max Weber.
Such words may provide us one main reason to place the first two au-
thors, Benjamin and Adorno, among the group whom I shall call the authors 
of silence. That means to me, authors who shape sentences out of silence, 
bringing them into life as the result of a struggle against silence, pushed by 
a kind of will to memory. However, what does silence really mean? In the 
context that matters for the sake of art, of creation in freedom, for the sake 
of everything that prevents life from being an “eternal view of destruction”, 
as Friedrich Schiller wrote more than two centuries ago, silence may also 
mean a sort of threat, a condemnation to oblivion, a negation of the right to 
live and let live, precisely not in the sense of a struggle for life.
Some further steps have been made since the debates about engaged art 
and ideology, since Sartre’s literature engagée, since Peter Weiss’ aesthetics of 
resistance, since many others who have not quit searching for the right meas-
ure, the right balance, who have not given up trying to represent what can-
not be represented. Between silence and triviality, we seem to have at our 
disposal a wide highroad, or at least an open field of aesthetical virtualities. 
But I don’t think we do. The resistance of the text is proportional to the 
challenges of which we become aware, which touch us or even penetrate 
us deeply, but which we cannot let turn into expression. I am not speak-
ing about epidermic agitations following clear geopolitical interests under 
a cloak of religion. Nor am I speaking about the risks which freedom must 
take, otherwise it would not really be free.
Instead of that, I’m speaking about the obscure web of implications from 
which the human condition never can escape. We must not mistake the 
cloud for Juno. If we do so, should we remain by the letter forgetting the 
desire to search for ways which may bring us to an idea of spirit, we  profess 
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well-intended commonplaces such as “freedom of expression is a high good”, 
“religious feelings deserve respect”, “some regimes pour oil onto fire”, “vio-
lence is not always unjustified”, etcetera. However, we all know how the core 
of the problem lies somewhere else. Perhaps we do not even know where the 
problem is, but we know almost always where it is not. I mean, we are able 
to differentiate instinctively the ways to explore a subject for a newspaper 
article, for a radio feature or for a written text.
By this time, I should have begun to explain the title to my work. If I 
seem to be beating around the bush, it is because I perhaps fear being misun-
derstood. Many of us had the opportunity to live radical historical changes, 
from censorship to freedom of expression. Those who have undergone such 
experiences have also developed practices of looking for fractures within 
the system into which it is always possible to pour what we would like to 
say or at least to suggest it. We know the tension of texts, the challenge to 
improve. This might even produce a great thrust of adrenalin in times of 
censorship, which might also later contribute to a certain mistrust in the 
freedom of expression as the natural consequence of a democratic evolution. 
However, we also here know the slings and arrows of the book market, as 
well as the inner tensions caused by our own aesthetic censorship, so that 
in the end there is no wide highroad, no open field for our creation, just a 
small gap between anger and longing, between engagement and reflection.
How can we therefore take a step beyond the discussion about engaged 
art? Here, I would say that engaged art goes beyond the discussion itself. 
This is not merely a speech game. We all feel it each time we experience the 
necessary, although not always urgent, dimension of a work of art in such 
a way that always represents more than words could ever say. However, we 
must work with words, which remind us that each tug of war between spirit 
and letter often leads to a clash of fundamentalisms, not of cultures. Cultures 
are resistant because they are versatile; fundamentalisms are fragile in their 
apparent toughness, in their real fear of opening up fissures in their walls.
Freedom is both resistant and fragile. No power is able to defend it with-
out making itself vulnerable. Nevertheless, the dilemma is that no power is 
able to defend itself without keeping liberty of expression. Neither is this 
a speech game. And I must also stress that the title of my paper holds no 
intention of playing with the theme of this round table. Furthermore, I am 
convinced that freedom in its noblest sense, which goes together with hu-
man dignity, with human rights, must always be conquered against some 
kind of oppression, of prejudice, of self-complaisance, of security thinking, 
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against all those attitudes tending to too easily take things for granted. Each 
of us certainly has a different definition of freedom, more or less driven ei-
ther by the desire to decide about our own ways of acting, of writing under 
the given conditions, or by the caution not to hurt someone else by our own 
actions, by our own writing. In any case, I simply care about the following 
kind of alternatives, which may well be mixed in different proportions: free-
dom in the positive sense of doing something, freedom in the negative sense 
of not having to do something, freedom to care about someone else’s feel-
ings, freedom to face contradictions. In this last case, freedom begins to take 
on another shape, to become a sort of civil courage, to apply the linguistic 
expression, speech acts in its fullest sense.
However, even all these forms of freedom tend towards becoming com-
mon places, especially nowadays. It proves enough to wrap them up into 
journalistic jargon, which may flatten and dissolve each text by ignoring 
its context or, even worse, by creating a false context dictated by immedi-
ate interests. But here again I would not like to be misunderstood. To put 
it into a sentence, we should not forget aims over useful purposes. I am not 
establishing hierarchies. I am simply speaking of different things. In the 
same way, I refuse any attempt to place limits on freedom of expression, 
I would like to stress that one literary aim may be a kind of terrorism of 
expression, as a consequence of freedom and for the sake of freedom. Here, 
I at last reach the point where I have to explain what this means to me. 
However, this does not represent an easy task. Otherwise, it becomes too 
easy to imagine some kinds of shocking effects, of language attacks, of sado-
masochistic descriptions. Nevertheless, this would perhaps never leave any 
level of significance and remain as epidermic as an angry person burning a 
flag at a demonstration.
Leaving the epidermic level will not lead us to attain any kind of “essen-
tiality”, which is but a construction of the mind and simply does not exist. 
Instead of a nebulous “Empire,” we live in a networked world. Every art pro-
ducer has known and felt this for many centuries and, in whatever the case, 
long before he or she might have dreamed about the existence of a world 
wide web. What we really know is the existence of the world as a real or sym-
bolic battle field, a minefield with some beautiful places, some landscapes, 
some houses, some cafés and some works, which cannot but cause us perma-
nent astonishment. However, the battle field, the mine field still remains 
everywhere even should we ourselves feel secure. This simply represents the 
price of freedom, which many of us would like to push away. We notice it 
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at the mere level of words as I try to legitimate my positions in order not to 
be misunderstood precisely as if tip-toeing through a minefield. And the oc-
casional explosion would not derive from some kind of anger that my words 
might provoke in you but from within, from my own conception of living 
within the reality of the texts and of their networked implications.
We could also see that metaphorical minefield as a severe warning about 
the need to differentiate. Each painful situation and memory on the one 
hand, but also each cliché, each commonplace, on the other hand, may be 
a mine. Furthermore, just how can we write about what is marked by mines 
through forgetting them, through concentrating on what is between them? 
Mines are not only local metaphors; they also have a temporal life in our 
individual and collective memories. I apply them here as metaphors for what 
would destroy perhaps not really our safety but most of all that tension that 
proves indispensable for a work of art to achieve its polysemic dimension 
and thus its resonance of former stories, of lives which perhaps remained 
without expression but were nevertheless lived. Perhaps you recognize here 
the old claim put forward by Walter Benjamin in his historical-philosophical 
theses written a few months before he committed suicide in a small hotel on 
the Spanish-French border in order not to fall into the hands of the Nazis.
However, rescuing forgotten issues begins with our own history. In the 
middle of the 19th century, Karl Marx wrote, while reasoning on the Jew-
ish Question, that the Christian state is the Christian negation of the State 
and not the political realization of Christianity. By replacing Christians 
with Muslims, by comparing history with contemporary times, we are do-
ing more than summing up history; we are mainly rescuing the European 
memories of all that long process of secularization during the Modern Age, 
which gave birth to possibilities of tolerance and coexistence, by separat-
ing religion from politics. This proved possible – and the work of Thomas 
Hobbes perhaps serves as the best example – by putting pacifying people 
and the satisfaction of their basic needs over religious questions, as a public 
matter and not as a private matter. Therefore, we are correspondingly more 
likely to defend our cultural and political heritage of freedom and human 
rights, of plurality of expression when remembering how dramatically these 
have been conquered. The history of the 20th century, that Age of Extremes 
reminds us too closely that this same heritage of freedom and tolerance has 
been anything but granted. Even the coexistence of cultures, of groups, is no 
guaranty of any dialogue between them, which should always start from the 
beginning as if some morning exercise. Let us start in Guantanamo.
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We may still ogle at the passion that moves masses in rage against free-
dom of expression when felt as in the Danish cartoon affair and secretly 
envy that emotional picture show because we would like to have our own 
citizens also so passionately mobilized for the cause of freedom. However, 
we also forget too easily the individualistic implications of a guilt-culture. 
We are, so to speak, sentenced to pluralism, therefore to challenges made to 
our capacity to tolerate, not only by people with different habits, beliefs and 
sensitivities but most of all by situations and conflicts caused by practices 
incompatible with the democratic order and its claim to dignity. This dif-
ferentiation could be a criterion to help us in breaking the chains of politi-
cal correctness that render people blind to the necessary clarification of the 
contradictions and should draw on a little help from our cartoonist friends. 
In other words – what about letting Mohamed’s head blast off as a bomb 
but not of explosives but of flowers, of sweeties, of toys? In any case, I find 
political correctness much more suitable material worthy of satire than any 
kind of deity, who in our secularized society rather lacks flesh and blood and 
therefore any explosive potential.
It took Europe many centuries to learn how to differentiate between 
powers, religions, competences and perspectives. The analytical sciences 
even intensify still further that tendency. Nevertheless, only art can retie 
the threads which in the past had to be cut in order to gain the democratic 
liberties and freedom of expression. When I say art, I mean literature within 
it, with open limits and glass doors between the codes of expression. When-
ever literature does not produce a sort of butterfly effect, showing the impli-
cations of each simple story, of every apparently clear situation, whenever 
a text does not confront us with the unbearable dimensions of that life that 
must incessantly feed art, then you may be looking for a pocket book at an 
airport magazine store and about to have a pleasant flight.
Don’t worry; you are not on the passenger list of a hijacked plane.
(2006)
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The Walls Inside Us or:  
What Kind of Resistance Is at Stake?
Which are the points of resistance, active and passive, conscious or un-
conscious, that impede us from doing the right things? In the prologue to her 
work The Human Condition (University of Chicago Press, 1958), Hannah 
Arendt asks herself and the reader whether the emancipation and seculari-
zation of the Modern Age, “which began with a turning-away, not necessar-
ily from God, but from a god who was the father of men in heaven”, should 
“end with an even more fateful repudiation of an Earth who was the Mother 
of all living creatures under the sky” (p. 2). Fifty years ago, there were al-
ready good reasons to worry about the earth, regarding the agonistic escala-
tion of nuclear weapons during the Cold War, the paranoia represented by 
the stubborn clashes of ideologies between the blocks of the so-called free 
world against the so-called socialist world or, in reverse terms, of the so-
called imperialist world against the so-called totalitarian world.
Historians often speak about the century of ideologies, the Era of the Ex-
tremes, etcetera. Umberto Eco even said in an interview that he believed the 
20th century had turned out “hyper-religious”. This irony is not accidental; 
I just had to stress once more how the analyzing subject is himself a con-
stitutive part of the analyzed object. However what constitutes the core of 
the problem, if there ever is one? In any case, we should retain the accurate 
analysis by Hannah Arendt of what she called “world alienation,” which 
means several forms of subjectivity, of withdrawal from reality in the name 
of some paradise searching, of aggression towards the objects in the name of 
some survival or welfare or even profitable interests.
However, we also understand this represents a wider problem, which con-
sists of setting limits inside us, of judging what is right or wrong not accord-
ing to moral norms but as the consequence of judging a concrete situation; 
we must “play it again” and again and again, repeating the question about 
the Here, about the Now and most of all about the Who – that means, about 
the place and the time, about just who is really concerned about a crisis 
situation. However, when simultaneously thinking historically and globally, 
we correspondingly risk both generalizing and particularizing. Excuse me for 
mentioning Hannah Arendt on several occasions, there are surely the usu-
ally expected reasons for doing so (her 100th birthday and the  conferences 
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and meetings held all over the place last year), but I would also like to stress 
one of her leading ideas, on the possibility of being symbolically born again 
and again by having the courage to act according to our judgment, made 
possible by reflection and completed by communication and interaction. 
This is by no means a system of rules drawn by the book and outside of real-
ity but, on the contrary, a conscientious presentation of our whole philo-
sophical tradition as a sort of treasure arch from which we are free to take 
inspiration in our reflecting connections with the real world. When Han-
nah Arendt refused, in the famous TV-interview given in 1964 to Günter 
Gaus, to be labeled as a political philosopher and, instead, claiming to be a 
political theorist, this was because she knew too well that the treasure arch 
threatened to turn into a Pandora’s box with ideological intentions and the 
world’s reading protocols, mostly taking possession of it, following an idea, 
or – even worse because higher placed – an ideal. Instead of that, theory 
should rather descend to the level of a simple tool, which anyone could use, 
even in precarious situations, even in dark times, but never without any sort 
of mediation. In the same interview, she stressed that there are (almost) 
always ways of acting with dignity without risking (necessarily) one’s life. 
We know the history, we know what she was talking about. We can spare 
ourselves the recalling of her analysis of totalitarian systems in the 1940s, 
her report on Eichmann’s trial in Jerusalem in the early 1960s. However, we 
must remember that she refused to “anthropologize” political contingency, 
this means rendering it essential by sustaining how an Eichmann exists in-
side each one of us who, under the same circumstances might act in exactly 
the same way as he did.
My own point in raising H. Arendt is above all to think reality and cor-
respondingly history in a holistic, systemic way, which requires trying to 
observe the observer. As a matter of fact, this author offers a most interesting 
example of the difficulties in getting along with the “hardships of the plains” 
after having experienced the “hardships of the mountains” – the words taken 
from the poem “Wahrnehmung” (“Perception”) written 1949 by an already 
disillusioned Bertolt Brecht and chosen by H. Arendt’s biographer Elisabeth 
Young-Bruehl as the epigraph for the chapter about the post-war period. In 
the so-called dark times, men (a problematic designation, which includes 
Rosa Luxemburg among Lessing, Jaspers, Heidegger, Brecht, H. Broch, W. 
Benjamin and Pope Johann XXIII; but I don’t intend to follow the gender 
studies path) could fight, had to fight against outside barriers; afterwards, 
in times which we dare not really call full of light, people who have gone 
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through all forms of totalitarian darkness due to the suppression of the pos-
sibilities of living differences in public spaces, such people have to face a sort 
of inside barriers, which means walls interiorized after having survived the 
course of those dark times.
How come such inner walls remain – or even arise anew – in a demo-
cratic society? Here, we must take care not to throw the baby out with the 
bathwater and therefore not to anathematize economic progress as a factor 
that brings about short-sighted, materialistic perspectives and behaviours: 
we know only too well those cynical cartoons that pointed out (not only 
with the pencil, there are many words with cartoon effect, as we know) the 
East Germans rushing towards Coke and bananas shortly after the Berlin 
Wall came down; it is then too logical to proceed with a really Wailing Wall 
litany against the loss of orientation and values, about the dissolution of 
violent monopoles that warrant security, about the incapacity of common 
people to fight against more or less sophisticated forms of criminality in the 
era of globalization, as if there remained no alternative than becoming “one 
of them” or remaining comfortably sat on a cosy couch reading the latest 
world best-seller about conspiracy theory.
We do not live in any Brave New World but merely in a time when the 
information speed confronts us permanently with the simultaneity of the 
non-simultaneous. We may call it a clash of civilizations but we still remain 
never able to understand completely what is going on. I must correct myself: 
we begin understanding parts of it, even if such cognition takes a slower 
path, we always begin understanding when feeling how the contradictions 
and paradoxes of our time go through our complex psychosomatic system 
and leave traces.
In this sense, post-totalitarianism might be a new illustration of the fa-
ble of the wizard’s apprentice: the big broom is not only broken but also 
replaced by a lot of small brooms, which seem to work together to produce 
a similar paralyzing influence, however with one significant difference. To-
talitarianism produced visible walls; the tradition of human rights has to 
recall them in order to prove that no freedom can be taken for granted and 
the will to fight against injustice shall never vanish. The small brooms are 
the “hardships of the plains” in the shape of the comfortable belief about 
already reached utopias. But is that really so? Can we afford to quit climb-
ing mountains and not only for fun or fitness? At the moment I write this, 
I see the TV news about the disclosure of a planned terrorist conspiracy in 
Great Britain to kidnap and execute a soldier – but I also subsequently hear 
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the wonderful lyrics by David Gilmour and I ask if we can hear them, again 
and again, without a chill, which is more than a mere goose skin reflex but a 
sense of real freedom of choice, a real capacity of determination that breaks 
the walls of indolence within us: “On the day the Wall came down/They 
threw the locks onto the ground/And with glasses high we raised a cry for 
freedom had arrived” (Pink Floyd, The Division Bell). Can we still complain 
about becoming conformists, can we still – raising the cynical parade – be 
glad about the existence of reasons elsewhere to fight for freedom? Let me 
quote H. Arendt one last time on sustaining in a letter to Kurt Blumenfeld 
that wrath was a more positive feeling than hope – precisely because it calls 
for action and does not legitimize passivity. Hope might become a powerful 
inner wall – wrath never: it just has to be moderated by critical analysis.
(2007)
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Abolish Conflicts? Do We not Need Them  
for the Sake of a Stable Peace?
On such issues as trying to develop an ethical attitude towards history as 
a source of peace, on trying not to forget tragic events, on doing everything 
in order to prevent deformation or even repression of painful facts, we can-
not prevent experiencing a deep contradiction. For some of us, who did not 
live our whole life under the banner of freedom, it seems that our highest 
aim should be, now enjoying the freedom of expressing our thoughts, which 
is also warranted by law, never to rest before the “whole truth” is discovered, 
which means both that shown through images and that written down. It 
might seem most probable that we feel a strong need to disclose the hid-
den aspects of a past made up of dictatorship, censorship, war and civil war. 
However, why it this not always so? Putting this in other terms, why for in-
stance does literature reach farther than history, sociology, statistics or psy-
chology? Why is it able to accomplish a broader understanding of complex 
situations in spite of the fact that it cannot work without the support of all 
those forms of abovementioned knowledge?
We know that literature universalizes insights without losing the appear-
ance of tracing a direct line to our individual soul. This individual soul is 
also part of a system in being a complex mixture of feeling and understand-
ing attempting to establish a balance of emotional and critical reason. Here, 
I hesitate about which term I should mention first and decided to put in first 
place that which displays itself more immediately, that is, emotion, which 
in a certain way also provides a considerable part of the energy necessary to 
driving the mechanisms of judgment.
With the help of these precise mechanisms, we can disclose another am-
biguity. We cannot but occasionally show certain nostalgia for those times of 
dictatorship and raw violence. Why does this happen? Because those times 
also allowed for the developing of radical qualities, which were themselves 
mostly ambivalent: heroism mixed with criminal energy, courage mixed 
with ferocity, but also fear, hope and disappointment. Such a mixture pro-
vided the capacity to give both the best and the worst of oneself. Here, we 
already begin to see how literature may work more effectively than social 
sciences. While sociologists like Karl Mannheim were able to mention com-
plexity as the “simultaneity of the non-simultaneous”, writers like Malcolm 
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Lowry described and dissected the reasons why modern individuals feel torn 
when facing past and present.
We notice the present commitment towards cultivating historical mem-
ories, for instance at universities through the creation of such specialized 
branches such as “Memory Studies” or “Memory research”. This trend is 
not only proportional to the civic conscience but also appears as a political 
conquest against the tyranny of pragmatism and functionalism, against the 
primacy of strict economic criteria, which are often imposed by global rules. 
Regarding the twentieth century, “memory” is often a synonym of “Holo-
caust” and I do not see any reason not to agree with that when perceiving 
this from a broad perspective, which grasps all the victims of the totalitarian 
Nazi hallucination about eliminating all the persons who did not fit into the 
fable of a 1000 Year Reich maintained by pure Aryan people.
Let us say that we carry with us our phylogenetic memories whether or 
not we like it: we carry with us the former hunter and collector that have 
been a more considerable part of humankind than the shepherd and the 
farmer or, still closer to us, the courtesan and the citizen. Both our phylogen-
esis and our ontogenesis are crisscrossed with memories of violence and the 
process of its taming. This process is anything but linear but we may gener-
ally state that the biggest civilization conquest has been the evolution from 
direct physical violence to a more performative form, either in the form of 
satire, irony, drama, story-telling, debate or any kind of discourse. Here, we 
can clearly make out two sorts of reasons: first, why literature plays a capital 
role in changing societies and interfacing times; secondly, why we can never 
take any peaceful situation for granted, whether between two or just a few 
people or among a group or a nation. As Norbert Elias, the Jewish sociologist 
whose parents died at Auschwitz put it as he had to answer the accusations 
of seeing his civilization process – that is, the evolution from the warrior to 
the courtesan – in a linear way, which did not fit reality: We can never say 
“once civilized, forever civilized”. Even the philosopher may turn into a can-
nibal under particular circumstances as the young Friedrich Schiller wrote 
in the 18th century.
Our ethical commitment to history means, as I see it, a close relationship 
with our long term phylogenetic past, as well with our short ontogenetic 
biography, because we know, at latest since Freud, that we were born neither 
as wolves nor as lambs. In other words, we need the close experience of con-
flicts precisely in order to develop a capacity for conflict. The danger of ig-
noring the possibility of becoming aggressive, and this happens sooner than 
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we think, creates a problematic gap or a blind zone where fear, hope, love 
and hatred may establish the most fantastic projections which suddenly ap-
pear as a “material idea” (Schiller) where ideology takes direct possession of 
any kind of object, transforming, functionalizing, and possibly perverting it.
I do not want by any means to adopt Goethe’s words when he told Eck-
ermann that he did not know any crime which he would not be able to 
carry out. Let us hope never to come into a situation when we should be 
forced to kill. Let us reject Hannah Arendt on the assertion there is always 
an Eichmann inside us. H. Arendt did it vehemently during a debate in 
the sequence of the not very peaceful reception of her Eichmann report in 
the early sixties – we may do it more softly and skeptically in the present 
days. However, we need the insight into history and this implies reading 
it as Walter Benjamin did as a history of injustice and repression, which 
clamors for rescue as a text with images on which we draw retrospectively 
because the past put these images into the text, like negatives clamoring for 
development.
Since Aristophanes, we have known that wars may break the stagna-
tion and even decadence of long periods of peace. Nevertheless, when more 
closely studying that kind of “peace”, we notice that it already contains the 
germs of violence within, and this not just because violence is inherent to 
life as a sort of primary energy, which needs to be “processed”, sublimated, 
civilized, cultivated and channeled. Furthermore, when looking at real life, 
which occurs in those times of “peace”, we probably notice that it may be 
a “hot peace” (in a way a pendant to the “Cold War” or its continuation 
after the fall of the Berlin Wall). They usually represent times when mate-
rial plenty is not favorable to the cultivation of citizenship virtues, of civil 
courage and discipline without giving up on generosity and solidarity. Those 
qualities are generally supposed not to grow in this soil; on the contrary, we 
often see them satirized, maybe because they get experienced as unbearable 
to the way of feeling and living in the mainstream. The step from that situ-
ation to the tyranny of the marketplace, to the conjuncture of pressures by 
majorities, is only a small one as we so well know.
How can we draw our path lines in the most complex web of our glo-
balized realities, among the plenty of sense offers, of historical narratives? 
Perhaps we should simply go back to our human condition, which we have 
never really abandoned and recall the sentence that René Char wrote dur-
ing his years in the Resistance: “Notre heritage n’est precédé d’aucun testa-
ment” (“Our inheritance was left to us by no testament”) (Feuillets d’  Hypnos, 
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1943-44). In the words of the Spanish poet Antonio Machado: “Caminante, 
no hay camino, se hace camino al andar” (Wanderer, there is no way, the 
way is made by walking”). For that, we are not undefended, because we have 
our capacity to collect information (including, or even firstly, our percep-
tions) and submit them to our faculties of judgment.
Hannah Arendt quoted that René Char sentence (in her book Between 
Past and Future) in order to remind us how problematic it is whether forget-
ting the link to the years of the Resistance or idealizing that period; a whole 
generation of European intellectuals have done that, contributing to the 
building of the European identity as the inheritance of both critical and 
practical reason.
We return to the problem that I raised in my paper last year, that is the 
problem of the transition from a situation where everything is missing and 
danger lingers to another one where we cease measuring each step, where 
every deed and word loses weight among the noise of the doxa. Therefore, 
I will not insist on this problem but just recall how crucial it is to interpose 
our critical judgment between our heroic nostalgias and our living, daily 
praxis. This praxis should be precisely a constant research for peace. This 
reaches from a present, where we have to take options at every moment, 
which are often painful, to an active way of dealing with the past. We return 
to Hannah Arendt who compares René Char’s lack of testament with Toc-
queville’s assertion about the obscurity in which a man would wander when 
his past has ceased to throw its light upon the future.
How can we reach peace with a world in which men seem engaged in 
so many kinds of warfare? The ethical claim of describing and narrating the 
past, of setting it up as a problem by opposing true and distorted facts, by 
comparing different historical perspectives and, simultaneously, by trying to 
analyze all kinds of censorship, all of this should always be more than some 
simple rescue of stories, of names, of voices, of situations. Taking ethical at-
titudes at the very present has to represent a challenge. For this challenge, 
there are no rules, no books, solely the faculty of judging from within an un-
avoidable situation of contingency. Nevertheless, it was still René Char who 
wrote in those abovementioned Resistance papers: “L’ homme est capable de 
faire ce qu’il est incapable d’imaginer” (Oeuvres Complètes, Paris: Gallimard 
1983, p. 230). Even when knowing that history is not suitable for telling, 
we may always try to tell a version, which we in the same breath admit only 
constitutes our own version, our own contribution and proposal for peace.
(2008)
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Understanding versus Acting: a Silent Effect?
The well-known assertion by William Faulkner that the past is never 
dead because it is not even past, since its formulation in 1951, has found 
infinite possibilities for usage, especially within the realm of memory studies 
and their corresponding intention to precise and differentiate historical nar-
ratives. In our global time and space, the consciousness about the fact that 
such historical narratives move ever closer to fictional writing, or vice-versa, 
has risen to the surface and become discursive evidence.
Historical memories may therefore be seen as one of many discursive 
strategies applied by our task of understanding. I hereby recall Hannah 
Arendt’s answer in a television interview with Günter Gaus, after having 
been asked whether the job of thinking, of constructing political theories, 
would not be a specifically masculine task (We must recall this happened in 
1964). The answer of the non-feminist Arendt might lead us into the fringes 
of gender role clichés, when telling the interviewer – amidst thick waves of 
smoke by the way since smoking was not generally forbidden at that time 
– that while men wanted so terribly to act, to produce effects (in German: 
so furchtbar gerne wirken), she would rather try to understand (in German: 
verstehen), as if this meant taking a step backwards from the arena of action 
and towards a platform of reflection.
In our present communicative world, we may no longer avoid processes 
leading to decisions that might be of some importance and contributing 
somewhat to making the world more human or less inhuman. At the least, 
we must no longer remain mere de jure individuals, simply enjoying the fact 
of having civil rights, as new technologies are increasingly putting at our 
disposal means which allow us to exercise our faculties of understanding, 
judging, and acting in order to feel as one part of a huge communicating 
world and thereby inserting ourselves into a process which may make us de 
facto individuals, which means citizens standing up for their words and deeds 
even at risk to their own lifes.
We know that Hannah Arendt rather arranged herself in a shadowy 
private domain in order to observe how the different realms of the world 
interacted. This was reaffirmed several times, including in her last speech, 
delivered upon receiving Denmark’s Sonnig Prize in 1975, a few months 
before she died. Her position had in my opinion less to do with possible 
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 self-judgment about some feminine incapacity to act or to carry out the ex-
istence of a political person than with her sense of the correlative propor-
tion of understanding, which would also imply judging and acting. In some 
sense, we could say that understanding and acting, rather than excluding 
themselves mutually in the sense of situational options similarly correlate to 
the invisible and visible parts of an iceberg.
A most interesting, and perhaps less known, proof of an unusual sense for 
an urgency to act by Hannah Arendt comes from a series of articles by her 
published during the 1940s in several American magazines, in both English 
and in German, concerning the Palestine issue and the foundation of the 
state of Israel. Here, there is no space for the speech about reflexive interac-
tion between understanding and acting. On the one hand, we feel the pres-
sure of urgency in her pointing out the necessity of taking political measures 
and acting in a dialogical way to the Palestine Jews, the necessity to neither 
let themselves get enraptured by Zionistic policies nor fail to criticize all 
situations of violence and injustice. On the other hand, Arendt’s urgency, in 
this particular case, of judging by acting and acting by judging, could not be 
understood by us, as her readers, without knowledge about her philosophical 
and political working and living processes and experiences. However, for the 
moment, let us merely presuppose these aspects and proceed.
“There is still time”: this is perhaps the most acute assertion we might 
read or hear when knowing it was formulated just a few days before the 
proclamation of the Israeli state. The article, published in May 1948 in the 
New York magazine Commentary, meant the “Jewish homeland”, which in 
H. Arendt’s opinion could still be saved, both as an idea and as a reality, 
not as a result of Zionist claims based upon a militarist and expansionist 
practices, but upon the neighborly reality, at each moment made possible by 
negotiations, mostly on the edge of incommunicability, between Jews and 
Arabs. This simultaneous reflection about the conditions to the possibility 
for acting politically and its subsequent communication within an influen-
tial Jewish community revolved around the polarity of what “should never 
have happened”, as she said during the aforementioned interview concern-
ing the Holocaust.
I cannot help asking myself again and again what that assertion (“there 
is still time”) really could have meant since Hannah Arendt knew only too 
well the irreversibility of the creation of the Israeli state under the banner 
of the Zionists. She knew about the long history of the Zionist fiction of a 
so-called “land without people for people without land”. She knew about 
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the total disrespect of radical Zionist groups and their armed troops such as 
Irgun and Stern and not only towards their Palestine neighbors. She knew 
about the long coexistence of practices between Jews and Arabs under the 
Ottoman Empire or the British protectorate. She knew about the crimi-
nal military “operations” against Palestinian and British people since April 
1948, in order to protect settlements outside the territories included in the 
United Nations decision of November 1947. She knew about the massacre 
in the Palestine village of Deir Yassin on 8.5.1948, when 254 people, mostly 
women and children, were brutally slain. She knew about the complexity of 
the historical relationship between Jews and Arabs, which the Zionists were 
about to reduce to a tabula rasa. She knew what we also know today, since 
the reigniting of the Gaza war led to a wave of eagerness to be informed 
about a past, which is not even yet past.
And yet – is there still time? We look at the waste land of Gaza and have 
heard of the constant bombings and the intransigent statements by Arabs 
and Jews during the war from watching Al Jazeera, which for a while seemed 
the only bearable TV channel as close to a reality which we knew was too 
real but yet still unable to allow us out of our daily life any more than the 
financial crisis has done.
Yes, there still might be time. There might be the time necessary to re-
set the capacity of thinking back to the complexity of a situation carrying 
not only geopolitical but ideological, religious and symbolic aspects. Under-
standing might mean, within the context of the Palestine issue, deliberately 
not acting in a first moment in order to first ask how to break the spiral of vi-
olence, which itself stems from a twisted product of too many violent chains.
Is the Israeli-Palestine conflict really so original in universal history? In 
his booklet against fanaticism, Amos Oz asserted that both peoples have 
to be ready, as if two men agreeing to have limb amputated to save their 
lives, to make the most painful concessions that in his opinion should lead 
to a peace for which the Europeans have needed an unequally longer time. 
Writing in the 1940s, Hannah Arendt stresses the immaturity of both sides, 
reflected by emotional, nationalistic and illusionary forms of behavior, ren-
dered possible by the umbrellas of the Ottoman Empire and British pro-
tectorate. As a “late nation” such as Italy and Germany, Israel has right 
up until today continuously reinforced its symbolic legitimacy through the 
Holocaust tragedy, which leads an Irish journalist to call for an end to this 
same legitimacy in order to allow the world to judge Israeli war crimes and 
the daily humiliations inflicted on the Palestinian people.
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Is there still time to re-act like a symbolic new birth, starting from a 
mined political platform, a clash of intransigent interests? In any case, the 
analysis by Hannah Arendt about the violent clashes around the creation of 
the Israel state points us, mutatis mutandis, to the necessity of deconstructing 
the Israeli colonization of Palestine, as a tragic case in which dominators 
and dominated live next door and not on some far distant continent. In 
spite of not being a feminist, and perhaps simply because she was not one, 
Hannah Arendt enables us to understand better the reasons for long self-
legitimating, humiliation, aggression, which amounts to a long chain of ir-
rational aspects not really beyond but rather in-between the daily lifes of Is-
raelis and Palestinians. In this sense, the letter by a Jewish woman to Barack 
Obama, written to the new president of the USA on the day of his election 
in November 2008 and begging him to come to the disputed “homeland” 
and release her from the pain of carrying the guilt of a brutal colonization 
(“Obama, take away the pain in my stomach”), reveals a similar concern 
about caring for real people without any longer having to support forms of 
daily military violence. “Do it for me”, she claims. This is not a simply ego-
istic issue but also the acute form of feeling a daily tragedy.
Next to or beyond, analysis of the materially detectable and describable 
aspects remains perhaps the biggest section of the problem and perhaps just 
as big and silent as the hidden chunk of any iceberg or as sinuous as a laby-
rinth thread that leads us through a perpetuation of violent chains out of the 
symbolic, ideological, religious and historical issues clash over a long spiral. 
The path leading to negotiations seems blocked by genuine dilemma, out of 
the necessity for the mutual recognition of one side by the other but which is 
mutually blocked by fears of getting into still greater dangers by recognizing 
the other, the first being losing one’s own face with the next being having 
to give up ownership rights and other forms of legitimacy. Men – Hannah 
Arendt would perhaps say again were she alive in this precise moment –so 
dreadfully want to keep on humiliating and shooting and bombing their 
neighbors whilst women have more than enough in trying to understand 
and want, once and for all, to sleep in peace, raise their children, cook a 
meal in order to invite all the neighbors, Arabs and Jews. There is always 
time for a shared meal.
(2009)
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Rapid, the Shadow of Peace,  
between Hinge and Door
I borrow here the title to a beautiful novel by Vergílio Ferreira (1916-
1996), a most distinguished novelist and essayist and also a founding mem-
ber of Portuguese PEN. He meant this shadow as a memory of brief but bright 
moments of happiness, such moments that we are mostly able to recognize 
only when they are gone. We also may experience the memory of dark mo-
ments thereby stressing the sunshine that we feel after such moments in 
our breathing chest and that makes us offer up a secret hymn to sheer life. 
Thus does peace also often get experienced, out of an oppressing, depressing 
realm, back to simple and clear lines of life so easily recognized but also often 
so difficult to put into words.
However, peace represents more than just non-violence even though the 
absence of violence may be seen as a threshold of peace. What then does 
peace have to do with dreams?
While it seems almost self-evident to me that daydreams are affected by 
what Ernst Bloch called das Prinzip Hoffnung, the principle of hope. How-
ever, I do not attain the same clarity on whether night dreams are defini-
tively bound to turn into nightmares. I think most of us may love night 
atmospheres and find them suitable not only for dysphoric sceneries but also 
for open-eyed dreams of a better world while speculating between books and 
the computer screen, between the cat purring under our working lamp and 
the jazz music kept low because of the neighbors, a soft saxophone within 
imaginary smoking spirals. There, we may also find a terrible arena for fights 
between hope and anger. We may then realize just how paralyzing hope can 
prove, how mobilizing anger can disclose itself as.
Contradictions lurk and sit everywhere. We may have blissful and hope-
ful day-time visions, scenes of a possible better life, as well as experiencing 
not only nightmares but also stimulating night dreams as projections of our 
daily wishful thinking. Dreams are no linear issue but certainly most com-
plex and thus their ability to serve as inspiring sources for literary images, 
both in poetry and fiction.
However, there is a perspective according to which light and darkness 
must be strictly differentiated: all forms of repression and tyranny need a 
dimension of conspiring in the dark, which means in private secret domains 
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away from the lights of the public realm. But soon we notice how these 
realms of lightness and darkness cannot really exist without each other. 
We also know how they melt into a borderline that resembles the sea level 
at the point in which the smaller visible part of the iceberg emerges from 
its bigger invisible part. They stick intrinsically together just as any totali-
tarian regime blends lightness and darkness, private conspiracy and public 
presentation.
Even in the midst of political darkness, where the state of hope touches a 
threat of despair, there may always be daydreams of a better world, based on 
experiences that have been made elsewhere or in former times. Such experi-
ences, or the reporting of them, allow us to tell how some dreams might pos-
sibly come true someday and right in those places where we happen to have 
been born simply because they have become reality elsewhere. However, 
there are also those situations when we fancy we are dreaming reality itself. 
Then, we may exclaim “we must be dreaming”, but we may also do this in 
both a positive and a negative sense.
I can tell you my own experience. As a daydreaming, eighteen year old 
girl from the middle classes, I fled the Portuguese dictatorial regime after 
secondary school in order to continue my studies abroad. Though I had 
friends who, in 1960s Portugal, had troubles with the political police, I did 
not have the sensation of going into exile. My grandfather, a freemason and 
humanist, showed me that there could always be a narrow path on which 
one could pursue a civic life with dignity even under a dictatorship. It was 
therefore not directly political persecution but rather the suffocating atmos-
phere that pushed me out of the Lisbon village – and it was almost a village 
or at best a small town at that time when I left in the late 1960s, with its 
old yellow trams and double-decker green buses. Girls had to wear skirts and 
uniforms at school. We all knew that in each corner, at each table in those 
beautiful cafés dotting the city, there might be standing or sitting an agent 
from the political police. The literature and the cinema of the decade and its 
predecessor had shown me another world really did exist, a world with more 
freedom of expression and more life choices, without having to wait for fam-
ily favors or to bear the consequences of expressing one’s own opinion. It 
seemed, out of my bookish daydreams, to be a world with greater glamour 
and mobility, a cosmopolitan world where women wore tight sweaters, could 
say what they liked and smoked.
I was a student in West Berlin, having engaged in many of the cam-
paigns and actions during the wild 1960s, when I heard one morning, on 
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25.4.1974, the news about the uprising of the April captains in Portugal and 
the  immediate huge support from a population fed up with a rotten regime. 
My first reaction was to say “It must be a dream” and though I stuck to the 
radio and TV news during all that day, it happened that I only really be-
lieved in the events the next day, when a Brazilian friend congratulated me 
by slapping me on my back and so to say a sign to return to a reality that I 
had never before dreamed. Later on, having read a lot about the factors lead-
ing to the Carnation Revolution, I again understood how the immaterial 
dimension to many of those factors was made out of the same stuff dreams 
are made of – dreams of a better world. That made only a small push neces-
sary to topple and collapse an already frail building.
Thirty-six years after this revolution, most of those beautiful cafés in Lis-
bon city have been replaced by banks – political freedom needs its economic 
backing, even while the aesthetics of daily life had to be sacrificed for that 
sake. In our days, it would simply bring a café to ruin were there still the old 
possibility of taking up a table for a whole morning or afternoon, reading 
the paper or discussing daily life and consuming just a single espresso. How-
ever, we also cannot forget the permanent paradox of life, of literature, of 
culture. Portuguese poetry of the twentieth century derives its high quality 
partly because there was censure and many messages got obliged to circulate 
through the flower, the durch die Blume to turn to the well-known German 
expression. Nevertheless, in this way they also reached the receivers often 
as an explosive “condensation”, Dichtung, therefore in a process similar to 
Freud’s Traumarbeit, dream work.
Dreams circulate in our communication as well as in our literary work. I 
would even say that in their volatility they may begin by fitting themselves 
into the empty spaces between the reality of facts and objects. However, at 
the same time, and in doing so, they contribute to reconfiguring what seems 
so indefectibly factual and objective. We all incorporate our dreams, both 
daydreams and night dreams, into a dimension that is not always conscious 
to ourselves.
What has peace to do with all this? Well, we have known since the 
Greeks that both war and peace are ambiguous. On the one hand, most 
common aspects connoted with peace are positive, such as peace of mind 
and civilized urban communication. On the other hand, most live testimo-
nies convey the image of war as sheer hell but not only that: we now even 
have war tourism and, ever since the Gulf wars, we encounter the opportu-
nity to exercise the “embedded journalism” contributing to raised adrenalin 
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levels. Furthermore, we have experiences of the rotten peace, the graveyard 
peace of corrupt or totalitarian regimes.
Nowadays, we live daily with images of war; we consume them at dinner 
because they may even contribute to higher prime time audience shares for 
several TV news channels. The dangers of this situation have not only been 
analyzed by media researchers: we feel them daily precisely by noticing how 
our capacity of empathy with sufferance seems on the wane. We cannot 
reach a hand out to the children in Gaza or in Haiti and, if we could do, we 
would probably only encounter more troubles in our busy existence. City 
life is principally monochromic; even if diverse stimuli draw our attention 
from several sources, we have to do just one thing at a time, whatever placed 
upon our agendas. Therefore, we corresponding seek to appease our troubled 
consciences by making donations, by signing petitions.
We therefore mean to live in peace within the daily struggle of our ur-
ban life. Nevertheless, we still know that at every instant this situation may 
change. Out of the apparently most peaceful situations, the most unexpect-
ed forms of violence may emerge, challenging our endurance, our capacity 
of conflict to deal with them. We can just fancy how many accumulated 
frustrations and nightmares have built up the support, over a long period of 
time, for many sudden attitudinal outbreaks of violence.
However, we also know that the inverse also proves possible, which 
means we have experienced or read or seen in pictures or on TV that in the 
middle of such brutal struggles there may be scope for gestures of kindness, 
of mercy, of humanity. I remember that wonderful picture by B.Z. Goldberg, 
Judith Shapiro and Carlos Bolado called “Promises” (2001). There, we see 
how serious and concerned are the Israeli and Palestinian children brought 
to talk with one another to then ask their parents inconvenient questions. 
Children, as Goethe once said to Eckermann, are the greatest realists. At 
the end of this independent documentary, the Israeli children bring their 
parents following a dinner invitation from the Palestinian family of their 
new friends on the West Bank.
There must perhaps be a childish impulse to produce the conditions for 
peace, a naïve gesture made of a precise will, a will not to forget but rather 
to go beyond heavy memories. This is the sense of the words of Ernst Bloch 
in his Prinzip Hoffnung (Principle of Hope): Denken heißt Überschreiten – 
Thinking Means Going Beyond. And it was a Portuguese poet and scien-
tist, António Gedeão (1906-1997), who wrote a marvelous poem, “A pedra 
filosofal” (“Philosopher’s stone”) in the 1950s. On being put to music by the 
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singer Manuel Freire in the following decade, it rapidly became a resistance 
song against the oppressive atmosphere of the dictatorship: I quote the last 
lines:
“They neither know nor dream, / that dream leads life, /and always when 
a man dreams, / the world springs and goes forward,/as a colored ball / be-
tween the hands of a child”. Or between hinge and door, perhaps as rapid as 
a shadow, but no less vivid, as a powerful source of hope and anger – and an 
impulse to act.
(2010)
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On the Road between Pages with a Multitude of 
Strangers and Me among Them
It nowadays seems commonplace to say that we are our own next stran-
gers and hence meaning strangers towards ourselves. As children, we dis-
cover parts of our body, we see our face in the mirror for the first time, we 
experience all that as something both familiar and strange and only after 
that as something of our own. The process of socialization – seen from the 
perspective of an average individual, living in a modern city – helps us get 
acquainted with a large palette of Others. We get to know both figures of 
otherness: the alter, as the familiar Other, as our privileged dialogue part-
ner, and the alius, as the really strange stranger, as the uncanny Other. The 
process of individuation, which follows the process of socialization in the 
ontogenesis, makes us acquainted with the abyss of our own self. Later on, as 
adults, we feel able to turn such forms of fracture, experienced during child-
hood and adolescence, into masks that we are obliged to wear in our daily 
practices. They can even be masks of creation, like the heteronyms of Fer-
nando Pessoa. Indeed, Fernando Pessoa himself, as a signature with his real 
name, might have been just one more mask and perhaps his best achieved 
face to the world.
We seem, as adults, to have interiorized former experiences of facing 
both the alter and the alius. We could say they now struggle with each other 
inside of us. Such a situation is a common pattern of our experience of in-
terior strangeness while we also become acquainted with exterior strange-
ness. Along this process, we build our images in endless configurations. They 
have to be problematic, critical, unusual should they truly be supposed to 
supply us with stimulating material for our creative plans. In other words: 
why should images of the stranger, as well as experiences with strangers, be 
felt as threatening from the outset? This must not necessarily be so at least 
in the times and places of current city life in peace, whenever growing up 
in an open-minded human environment. City life is exciting and so are the 
strangers we meet there. Moreover, an image of a stranger can prove a per-
manent reason for fascination whenever the conditions of possibility extend 
to including it in an open horizon of understanding. In other words: we can-
not but consider the meaning of strangeness as being polysemic where not 
outright paradox.
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The image of the stranger may yet become threatening if coped with 
alongside any sort of identity obsession whether of the individual or the 
collective sort. This happens because such identity obsessions in most cases 
provoke a closure of that horizon of understanding letting it instead turn 
into an arena of misunderstanding. Reading the Other, in such situations of 
closure, no longer becomes an open adventure on the wire between discov-
ery and risk but rather a dull, uniform, self-reproductive task. The horizon 
is also no more one of understanding but of self-defense. From that reactive 
platform to aggression and violence, there is no more than one short step. 
However, this may happen whenever subsuming our fears and frustrations 
into a sheer singular. If we differentiate that singular, decomposing it into 
the plural that such a figure really is, we also deconstruct the dramatic ten-
sion of such a fixation. Let us therefore say: the others. And let us quit that 
phantasmagoric majuscule.
Moreover, when searching for shelter (and on many occasions we simply 
need a shelter or a friendly shoulder), we must ensure that such a shelter 
keeps a door or at least a window open, otherwise it rapidly turns into a pris-
on. And should we continue being free, according to our eccentric human 
nature always looking for new information and impressions to be written on 
our reservoir of experience, we also keep being critical towards prejudices. 
We know only too well that prejudice is no more than the result of a blatant 
inability to set up communicative bridges towards the others, thereby cor-
respondingly recognizing their merits, their particularities. The problem of 
the stranger is therefore a matter of receptivity.
We read the others but we also read ourselves. Furthermore, within 
each additional reading, contradictions and paradoxes become ever more 
visible, yet disclosing connections with aspects that we can only suspect, 
these therefore being invisible – or as we might rather say protovisible. As we 
know, visibility does not mean necessarily clearness. We always carry with 
ourselves a fullness of forms, of masks, of impressions and pictures, of the 
experienced or the imagined otherness. The wider we keep the spectrum, 
the smaller the danger that we build hostile images of others, most of all out 
of experiences with figures of the alius. The roots of any form of barbarism 
always lie in a dangerously narrow sense of the meaning that we produce, for 
ourselves and for others.
And how do we learn to deal with diversity where not through the me-
diation of literature and art? Literature provides us with that wide spectrum 
of characters, many of them said to be larger than life but in any case able to 
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extend our organs of perception ad infinitum. I must say that I cannot speak 
for the generations born with e-books. My individual room, as an adoles-
cent, was situated next to the home library. The limitations on the space 
experienced due to the Portuguese dictatorship in the 1950s found a lot of 
compensation between book covers. We could read almost everything be-
cause the regime trusted upon the gap between a small cultivated elite and 
the non-literate masses. Reading had therefore to be, in the second decade 
of my life, experience enough.
Perhaps we should reformulate the sentence claiming that an image is 
worth more than a thousand words. As a matter of fact, does a single word not 
also provoke a thousand associations and correspondingly images? Discuss-
ing this issue in my university courses, a student gave as an example the word 
LOVE and the myriads of images associated with it. All the academic audi-
ence understood her immediately. We understand this immediately. And yet 
there is also hardly a word that may lead to more frustrations and misunder-
standings than the word LOVE. Literature nourishes itself to a considerable 
extent on this insight. But the human sciences, for instance psychoanalysis, 
come to similar conclusions: listening to Freud in his “Civilization and its 
Discontents”, we soon recall not only the deceiving and deceptions con-
nected with love in spite of its sublime moments, but also the fata morgana 
dwelling in the Christian dogma that tells believers to love the Other, and 
further, to love their own enemies. We know that even if succeeding in do-
ing so, we would be lying to ourselves, or even worse, be violating ourselves. 
And why is this so? Because in doing so, we are erasing, or trying to erase, the 
necessary distance, within the space of appearance, from which we become 
able to understand, to respect, and should such prove the case, to love the 
Other. (I would not like to be misunderstood: there may be situations of coup 
de foudre; but if bound to become stable relationships, they must still also go 
through a process of mutual knowledge and understanding.)
Through differentiated relationships with many others, the problem splits 
into a myriad of processes. The one-sided monotheistic cultural patterns are 
definitively contradicted, if not dissolved, by modern network relationships. 
Furthermore, our capacity of dealing with insecurity, with difference, with 
contradiction, with ambiguity, with strangeness, can be promoted inten-
sively through literature. However, here we must care about the way we do 
it. Whenever functionalizing what we read, for instance, in order to quote 
it in academic papers or before an audience, we may be jeopardizing the 
chances of knowing others, because by doing so we shall be subjecting it to 
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a dialectic on means and ends. (Again I ask not to be misunderstood: in our 
academic jobs such procedures are all too often unavoidable but this does 
not represent a reason for not recognizing this as functionalistic.) In an in-
terview about his researches on Hitler’s private library, Timothy Ryback said 
the German dictator only applied the matters he read about in his books in 
order to legitimate his perverted deeds through quotations. This represents 
an extreme but significant example of the assertion above. Books do not 
make us better without a process of self-distance that also implies a critical 
distance towards the dialectic of means and ends.
From literature, we also experience processes of identification. Which 
characters appear sympathetic to us, which roles do we often secretly play, 
resembling those figures whose skin we feel easy about slipping into? Nev-
ertheless, precisely because this is a process, we soon realize how differenc-
es and discrepancies become clearer and clearer and therefore we become 
strange to them while also a stranger towards ourselves.
To promote that capacity for handling strangeness means approaching 
literature with the open attitude of purposelessness. We do it for its own 
sake, incidentally in the same way as we should approach a strange face. 
We are aware of all the light-years of knowledge and experience, all the 
black holes that lie in the great history of mankind, but in spite of that 
we keep trying to build small narratives upon our experience of reading, of 
facing others. We are looking for meaning instead of (immediate) love, for 
insight instead of deceiving images of happiness. We are cultivating a men-
tal space that promotes the ability of living with ambivalence. All strangers 
have several Doppelgangers within us. Literature and art have shown this 
to us since the most primitive times. Freud has just asserted it. Some writers 
handled this insight genially. Pessoa once wrote that he felt being just one 
was a prison. As we know, he escaped from that prison by creating several 
heteronyms.
Walking with our own Doppelganger, we keep struggling with him or her, 
or even them. Nevertheless we still also escape from the prison of identity 
obsessions. And at the end of the road, we may feel happier because we 
breathe freely, without having been pursuing happiness, or any form of es-
sentialism, as a primary purpose. And most important of all, we make peace 
with the strangers inside and outside us, because on our way we have learned 
how to measure and to handle distance and mediation, before arriving at the 
threshold of our home – if still able to recognize it.
(2011)
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A Handful of Sand: Looking for a Lost Paradigm?
Modernity spans a large spectrum across both time and space. This may 
include late modernity and post-modernity as variations, or reading proto-
cols, on the same pattern. One of the main characteristics of such a pattern 
may consist of a sort of absence of previous determination, leaving free space 
for tracing individual paths. This would mean that we are also able to see 
in many manifestations of modernity the lacunas left among the paths to 
greater mobility and dynamics. But is this really so? When looking back over 
the long history of the Modern Ages and the first manifestations of what 
Hannah Arendt called pathos of novelty, we may draw a line throughout five 
centuries, throughout the attempts to follow one’s mind and the faculty of 
judgment, among and against all kind of barriers and lianas of authority, 
hierarchy, traditions, prejudice. Therefore, we may also say that modernity 
is a permanent state of latent or outburst crisis.
As a matter of fact, we need to differentiate among a lot of aspects. In 
this second decade of the 21st century in which we live, we might unfold, 
so to say, a fan of innumerous stories within history. These are both uni-
versal (since the basic anthropological structure of humankind has hardly 
changed) and local (with their visual outlines but also sounds, textures, fla-
vors, tastes, cultural patterns). That means, within our individual protocol 
of history reading, we are continuously drawing lines of grandes et petites 
histoires, and also discovering how mutually interwoven these are. Looking 
into each one of such microcosms, we might also disclose expressions of free 
will against conventions, thus establishing a possible plot for avoiding such 
situations of clashes that help in shaping successful narratives.
Let me make this clear: whether or not such processes are carried out in 
full consciousness – or not all the times – we are always tracing our own story 
within history. If we write fiction, we slip under the skin of our characters to 
bring them to life – otherwise, they will not be living characters but outlined 
shadows. If we write essays, we unfold our line of thought around concerns 
that we wish to share regarding whatever the object of analysis.
Therefore, we are always sharing the world with others but on a very 
basic level. We are permanently exfoliating outside ourselves but within the 
world, as well as incorporating parts of it. Modernity means mobility too as 
we know too well. In crisis scenarios, we are forced to remain mobile even 
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when holding down secure jobs. I mean hereby a protean kind of mobility, 
able to create forms of empathy and solidarity, beginning with the avail-
ability to listen to others. Moreover, in our age of communication, we have 
access to all kinds of scenarios without getting up from our working chair. As 
well as for creating our fictive characters, we not only need full documenta-
tion and research about a topic but also a full life inside its characters.
We have to experience the whole meaning of sharing, before choosing 
which step might be our next step, both in literature and in real life.
In his reflections about the essence of beauty, Friedrich Schiller analyzed 
five situations around helping a man who had become a victim of robbery 
and lay wounded on the edge of a road. The first four situations showed dif-
ferent people acting out of a genuine wish to help but still displaying differ-
ent kinds of secondary motivation and interest. The only kind of beautiful 
act was therefore, according to Schiller, the final one, as an example of an 
action carried out of a spontaneity that meant not precisely a real absence of 
motivations but most of all an impulse born of the situation.
This leaves the dialectics of means and ends on a second plan because 
the gesture of the helping hand takes over the whole picture. No matter how 
helping somebody else, in this case a stranger, would bring trouble into the 
daily life of those whose hand reached out to the wounded, such a gesture 
was simply drawn without asking further questions and therefore providing 
the scene with the absolute character of being its own end. Later, Schiller 
characterized such an attitude as graceful. Furthermore, in a letter written 
to a friend he wondered whether the Christian religion might be the only 
religion deserving of being called aesthetical. This means surely a form of 
idealization of the character of Jesus, after whom the Pietistic tradition cre-
ated the conception of the “beautiful soul”. We may even trace a biblical 
influence in Schiller’s description of the five scenes of helping the wounded 
man, leading to find out which one might be considered aesthetical. But 
we must also say that Schiller did not conceive an unhistorical theory of 
beauty, since such perfect and fulfilled situations can never be programmed 
and cannot be considered but as ephemeral and absolute. The beautiful soul, 
he wrote in his essay about grace and dignity, has no other chance than 
becoming sublime in situations of affect, urgency, necessity, pain and death.
“Does God judge us by appearances? I suspect that He does”. By quot-
ing W.H. Auden at the beginning of her volume about Thinking, so to say 
as the first degree of the life of the mind, Hannah Arendt did not want to 
hurt any religious feelings but only draw the reader’s attention upon our 
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worldly  condition. Under this very condition we stand every minute before 
the decision of keeping or sharing material and immaterial things, issues, 
aspects, opinions. This is not a matter of consuming in order to be happy – 
whatever each of us may understand under the volatile concept of happiness 
– but simply understanding the difference between use values and exchange 
values.
By the same token, we have to take one step further. This means taking 
into account not only those material, exchangeable goods or unique objects 
that may bring color into our lives, but also the wholeness of materialized 
ideas. These may be perceived as a link between the visible realm and the 
invisible domains existing and taking shape and coming into existence when 
we communicate, act and create. Conceiving therefore the world as a huge 
mosaic full of familiar and uncanny regions, of delight and dread, we cannot 
but begin realizing that openness towards such a mosaic already represents a 
first degree of sharing. However, this is not in itself enough.
When trying to shed a contextualizing light upon the examples men-
tioned above, we realize that the biblical intertextuality of Schiller’s aesthetic 
considerations not only integrates topics from the Old and New Testaments, 
but is mostly rooted in the tradition of an ancient culture, according to pat-
terns which prescribe the duty to share our possessions with relatives, friends 
and strangers, acknowledged as such. We still experience this in many coun-
tries, correspondingly in rural regions. The subjacent thought could thus be 
formulated: what has Mother Nature given to us is to be shared.
On the opposite side, modern urban culture has been built over the last 
three centuries upon a basis of individuals earning their livings and there-
fore relying primarily on the result of their work. This creates forms of on-
tological security but existential anxiety as Anthony Giddens expresses it. 
The numerous glosses about individual spleen and solipsism in literature and 
art, in the human and social sciences can be read both as a brand or a stigma 
of modernity itself. Moreover, since the modern human condition seems to 
bear the face of a magazine cover, with fancy clothes but sad eyes foretelling 
a tragic “Dorian Grayish” aging, its representations seem to lie on the op-
posite side of the socializing life of traditional, tribal cultures.
Since Freud, however, we have also become aware of the double bind of 
freedom and neurosis, the later seen as the incapacity of the ego to endure 
the free times and spaces of each individual path. This also explains why 
many modern individuals attempt to compensate such moments of empti-
ness with packed agendas and meticulous routines as if living within a huge 
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tribe of alter egos somehow repressed or at least troubled by an unconscious 
or untold sense of guilt. The glass-bell motive has also been too often glossed 
in all sorts of works dealing with modernity. The way out of such modern 
dilemmas seems, at a first moment, sheer suicide or madness.
Many of us modern citizens live therefore in a culture that makes sharing 
simultaneously easier and more difficult. It seems easier on the one hand, 
because free individuals in democratic regimes enjoy freedom of expression 
and association, of making personal choices. It appears more difficult on the 
other hand, because of the individual urgency to earn a living – a condi-
tion we often paradoxically share without the sense of sharing – inhibits the 
socializing moments that belong to the communication texture that makes 
sharing consistent, as a praxis of joyful interchange.
When assuming the freedom to excavate the asphalt in order to find the 
beach that means utopia, according to the sixty-eighty slogans, we may even 
reach a handful of sand, which at first we are unable to share. It is not only 
a matter of searching for a kind of cultural second nature, in some form of a 
lost tribal tradition. We have also seen the historical results of the obsession 
to find or build communitarian forms of group sheltering, out of modern 
loneliness. They have led to forms of totalitarianism in which the freedom 
of exchanging free opinions with others in the public realm has simply been 
erased through panoptical control.
Let us assume that Kant’s anthropological assertion of the “unsocial so-
ciability” holds a considerable amount of experienced historical reality. This 
would open the door to other anthropological interpretations of human be-
ings as being born with an openness resulting from their lack of autonomy. 
Let us stick to this image, associated with Hannah Arendt’s assertion of 
acting among the others (and not towards a mystified abstraction of “the 
Other”) as a symbolic form of birth, of nativity. By communicating and shar-
ing our knowledge (as the Dalai Lama said) we achieve the only possible 
form of reliable immortality. This kind of sharing means an earth connec-
tion, not a bank donation.
We also need both tradition and modernity in order to deal with the 
present crisis. This word may also have been felt as a mere cliché of real 
ancient tragedies, when whole populations were massacred in wars or lost 
their entire living basis in natural catastrophes. Media discourses of (finan-
cial) crisis have a taste of ruminant arrogance towards the contemporary 
sufferance of entire populations on other continents. We still have a roof 
over our heads, flowing warm water in our homes and enough to eat and 
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dress ourselves. However, do we have the courage to live on these essential 
goods, not sacrificing animals in order to source our nourishment, assuming 
the transitory aspects of creation and interaction as if moments of being – as 
Virginia Wolf put it – and handling those objects we call our own and that 
will survive us as if ephemeral goods that we might easily give away because 
the most important aspect of sharing comes from an immaterial impulse to 
become part of the eyes and ears of the world?
Up until this moment, the word peace has been avoided, perhaps because 
such a word easily becomes another cliché if merely proclaimed and not 
converted into a living praxis out of a desire to end all superfluous forms of 
daily violence, to break the chains of repression and cruelty and look into 
the eyes of another individual even when not speaking his or her language. 
Maybe then, we have found a lost paradigm, that which lies around the cor-
ner and can be reached by our stretched hand, without asking why.
(2012)
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Close to the Next Door
Travelling is becoming more and more difficult nowadays and this hap-
pens precisely because it is being made all the easier. This apparent paradox 
gets rapidly solved when thinking of what travel as a learning process should 
not be – the purchase of a tourist package, the blind and breathless running 
between airports and seashores, monuments and hotel rooms. All this will 
continue to exist as a continuously self-reproducing commodity crossing our 
eyes and probably generating new forms of blindness. And such blindness is 
then supposedly compensated for by the frantic eye of the cameras, which 
completes the apartheid of the senses and dividing our complex psychoso-
matic system from the respective environment. However, let us be sure: it 
certainly does not prove difficult to agree upon avoiding tourist packages 
should we want to become and remain a full system in permanent connec-
tion with the changing environment before the written feedback comes out.
Some great writers never travelled far from home or never travelled at all. 
Does this mean they never escaped their bodies, that their bodies never un-
derwent transfiguration? Reality changes every second even when not leav-
ing our working chairs. There are basic aspects about travelling that should 
be discussed before talking about the peaceful role of the writer abroad or 
about the utilization of new media.
Peace means regaining self-balance, after letting contradictions and par-
adoxes speak up and display themselves. If what is at stake is a simple under-
standing of other cultures, we simply need to cross the street and encounter 
the sheer difference existing in other individuals, with their own complex 
systems and subsystems, with their own biographies and even when speaking 
the same language as ours. Intercultural communication, as is deemed the 
politically correct way of approaching foreign people, therefore begins at a 
former, almost incipient level, which seems to be subconscious; and in no 
case whatsoever may be taken for granted. The experience of the Other, of 
the Stranger, always begins close to the next door. And such an experience, 
even if it should be radical, is not always frightening or threatening: this may 
be felt not only as a fascination towards the Freudian Uncanny but also as a 
genuine wish to read the great book of the world, with all its lights and shad-
ows, its colors, its sounds and smells, its moments of silence and cacophony, 
of misunderstandings and déjà-vus. As for the people one meets, the great 
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discovery consists of changing the alius, the uncanny other, into an alter, a 
travel mate on the path of life.
The idea of the Bildungsreise, only approximately translatable as travel 
for one’s own formative enrichment, is at least as old as the educative ideals 
of the Enlightenment. Reading travel reports from the eighteenth century, 
such as Goethe’s Italienische Reise, means travelling in time and space. This 
implies a patient work of context reconstruction, in which the incorpo-
ration of the familiar, the apparently familiar, the not really familiar, and 
strange aspects helps fulfill the formal figure of re-entry, which enlarges our 
views, our minds and our memories. We assimilate images, text passages, 
ideas, impressions, reflections until they become part of our systems. If we 
read about Goethe trying to understand whether the coach drivers in Naples 
are really lazy or just have to wait hours for a customer on the streets, hav-
ing occasionally the opportunity to take a siesta, we also incorporate a new 
understanding into the differences of living conditions in various cultures. 
Goethe was, as we know, a practicing anthropologist avant la lettre, trying to 
seize structures through participant observation as Claude Lévy-Strauss was 
later to do.
All genuine literature could, in a certain sense, be read as travel literature 
since it involves endless longing for that far distant and unreachable – and 
a spiritual trip to the places described in a book. It never ceases to produce 
the tune of such longing (in German: Sehnsucht, the most perfect word for 
this feeling perhaps) in our head, in our soul and between the lines. Even 
when the text describes places that may sound familiar, literature always 
configures various forms of distance and longing for it. Such a distance has 
also a time dimension, between temporary experience and writing about it. 
There is always a before and an after (the real or imagined journey). Travel 
literature is therefore an example not only of what Michel Foucault called 
heterotopie, other spaces, but also what I would call heterochronie, other times. 
When the traveler writes down his topics in notebooks, whether paper or 
digital, there is always a new version that differs from the concrete experi-
ence. If we are aware of this as readers, we may ask about the worlds turning 
around between such moments.
Travel reports satisfy both sides of our phylogenetic heritage: the hunter’s 
and the collector’s mobility, or the hunger for obtaining new experiences 
and the settler’s text of cultivation. As a traveler and note taker, the writer 
is a hunter and collector; as a text worker, he or she is a farmer. The chron-
ological sequence may synthesize the former big periods of our common 
Miolo_material idea.indd   115 5/20/14   10:55 AM
116   |   Teresa R. Cadete
 history. Furthermore, within a developing media system, in which journal-
ists and writers approximate each other, the former often compose novels 
out of their reports while the later give up on some stylistic exigency in order 
to reach a wider public.
Travel literature may therefore become part of mass tourism since many 
book guides also seek to enrich themselves with literary quotations – both 
from specific literary reports and from the literary works of the country 
which they are introducing tourists. In this view, the experience of foreign 
countries and the strangers who live there may become an obligatory home-
opathic exercise for modern citizens in order to rescue the educative dimen-
sion of travel. This implies traveling as its own goal, in the sense of Cavafy’s 
“Ithaca” – “As you set out for Ithaca, hope that the voyage is a long one, full 
of adventure, full of discovery”.
But what has all this to do with peace? At the outset, very little. In any 
case, not directly.
But insofar as every form of stable peace cannot but be born in a negative 
sense out of the experience, or memory, or knowledge of war, we should ask 
ourselves whether war reporters could (not) prove the best defenders of the 
idea of peace, whether intentionally or otherwise. Within this perspective, 
it is interesting to consider a work which might be characterized as the op-
posite of travel literature – Jean Genet’s Un captif amoureux, published 1986, 
shortly after the author’s death. Here, we deal with a multiple terrain of 
writing – is this an essay, an autobiography, a travel report, a poem in prose, 
a novel?
Genet has, using Goethe’s words, a feeling eye and a seeing hand, which 
allows him to change each alius into an alter. Genet follows, in the 1970s, 
the romantic mythos of the Palestinian struggle for freedom, according to 
the model of the guerilla anti-colonial fight. His search is everything but 
touristic: the feddayin have not yet any real national conscience, which 
would later become expressed as a demand for a Palestinian state. Genet 
searches for the eternal mobile, under the form of that permanent Sehnsucht 
that aims for no goal but the path. He does not care about a chronology 
while noting his Middle Eastern experiences, aware of their artificial char-
acter and the permanent perspective of change in a ground already so often 
retraced, reoccupied and redefined. From his perspective, each attempt to 
settle down incorporates the danger of getting corrupted. In this sense, we 
have a travelling author writing about a moving object. The self-critical 
dimension, as a second degree observation in time and space, also conveys 
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a sign of consciousness about his near death, recalling several trips to the 
Middle East in the early 1970s and the 1980s. He also witnessed in Beirut 
the consequences of the departure of the multinational UN forces and the 
massacre of the remaining Palestinian refugees in the Shatila camp, carried 
out by the soldiers of the Phalangist Party with the complicity of Israeli 
troops. Two year later, Genet testifies to the turbulent daily life in the same 
refugee camp that had been the arena of that massacre. This inspires the 
question about the ghost character of all memories, even the bloodiest ones, 
even those that seem to have been deeply engraved in the author’s system 
with the help of every sense.
The quest for peace makes a tragedy into an epos: it has a narrative struc-
ture. We could also call this the narrative spirit that pulls forward the writing 
hand. The quest for peace could also be read as a remake of the Odyssey. 
Genet’s Penelope is a family fragment, a home that had given him shelter 
in the early 1970s, the young Haza and his mother. He asks himself: “... 
mais pourquoi ce couple est-il tout ce qui me reste de profond, de la révolu-
tion palestinienne?» (J. Genet, Un captif amoureux, Paris: Gallimard 1986, 
p. 611).
We could read in Genet’s search for the reality of that house, of that fam-
ily, which fulfill the dream of a precise sense of home, and how this becomes 
fourteen year later, a search for peace. This means a search for a kind of 
settlement without corruption, represented through the simplest family ties 
in their daily labor. In this sense, we find in Genet a defense of the practice 
of peace, of images and situations related to peace and coexistence, which 
leads to the struggle for peace and should also be present in every conversa-
tion that politicians carry out on this issue. Only when the sound of guns 
is overlapped by memories of devastation and by the desirable horizon of a 
reestablishment of the conditions for normal life, only then can we begin 
talking about peace. Recalling that which caused a spirit of war may also be 
a safe midwife to a stable spirit of peace.
Like Goethe, Genet carried out a participating observation of the com-
munities that shared their daily livelihoods with him. Is there any other way 
towards peace? Can we rely on writers who have not shared the same bread 
with the people of the regions where they travel before they provide us with 
a sense of these places and people as being close to the next door?
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On the Legibility 
of Culture.
What we call “the real” is also the result 
of a protocol of reading. Such a reading 
is unavoidably historical and contingent, 
as a product of a specific temporary 
sense. It also stands within a complex 
correlation of marked and unmarked 
spaces, therefore in a spatial sense too. 
But this latter framework also carries the 
evidence of time. Such “marks”, taken 
as individual projections or choices, are 
not only constantly changing, according 
for instance to the daylight (or nocturnal 
illumination, or twilight palettes), to the 
instant temper or mood, to the physical 
conditions and the cultural antecedents of 
the perceiving and exposing subject – to 
sum up, according to a whole package 
of conditions and circumstances. If we 
put together the myriads of individuals 
on the global surface, we constantly have 
to redraw the lines of intersection and 
re-read the mappings of an interactive 
geography made of partly individual 
options, partly mimetic movements. 
Like ruins, views are constantly being 
destroyed and rebuilt; like lines, they are 
constantly being erased and rewritten. 
But this never happens completely 
anew. Culture work may also be seen as 
a patient attempt to read palimpsests 
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